William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

9-13-2019

Section 4: Immigration Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 4: Immigration Law" (2019).
Supreme Court Preview. 289.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/289

Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

IV. Immigration Law
In This Section:
New Cases: Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California; Trump
v. NAACP; McAleenan v. Vidal
“IT’S NOW THE SUPREME COURT’S TURN TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE FATE OF THE
DREAMERS”
Michael D. Shear and Adam Liptak
“SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW DACA PROGRAM PROTECTING YOUNG UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS”
Robert Barnes
“SUPREME COURT DOESN’T ACT ON TRUMP’S APPEAL IN ‘DREAMERS’ CASE”
Adam Liptak
“APPEALS COURT FINDS TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MOVE TO END DACA ‘ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS’”
Ann E. Marimow and Robert Barnes
“FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT SIDES WITH UC REGENTS IN FIGHT TO PRESERVE DACA”
Megana Sekar
“U.S COURT ORDERS TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO FULLY REINSTATE DACA PROGRAM”
Andrew Chung
“FEDERAL JUDGE SAYS TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO JUSTIFY DACA RESCISSION”
Miriam Valverde
“SUPREME COURT SAYS WHITE HOUSE CAN WITHHOLD DACA DOCUMENTS FOR NOW”
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall
“DACA HAS NOT BEEN SAVED—AND IT MAY BE IN ITS LAST DAYS”
Jack Herrera
New Case: Kansas v. Garcia
“SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON IDENTITY FRAUD BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS”
Greg Stohr
“SUPREME COURT TAKES UP KANSAS IDENTITY THEFT CASE”
Lawrence Hurley
“FEDS, CONSERVATIVES WEIGH STATES’ USE OF I-9S IN PROSECUTIONS”
TIFFANY HU
“SHOCKER: KANSAS SUPREME COURT LICENSES IDENTITY THEFT–BUT ONLY BY ILLEGAL
ALIENS”
Jack Cashill
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New Case: Hernandez v. Mesa
“JUSTICES TO HEAR CASE OF U.S. AGENT’S SHOOTING OF TEENAGE ACROSS THE MEXICAN
BORDER”
Adam Liptak
“BORDER PATROL AGENTS MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE”
Steve Vladeck
“IS THERE LIABILITY FOR CROSS-BORDER SHOOTING?”
Charles Doyle
“SUPREME COURT REVIVES SUIT AGAINST BORDER AGENT IN SHOOTING DEATH”
Jess Bravin
“DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT SOMEONE ON THE MEXICAN SIDE OF THE BORDER?”
David G. Savage
New Case: Barton v. Barr
“HIGH COURT TO REVIEW REMOVAL OF LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS”
Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson
“COURT FINDS GREEN CARD HOLDER IN THE UNITED STATES ‘INADMISSIBLE’ FOR
DECADES-OLD CRIME”
Dayna Lally
“GREEN CARD HOLDER CAN’T BE ‘INADMISSIBLE,’ HIGH COURT TOLD”
Suzanne Monyak
“GREEN CARD HOLDER CAN’T BE ‘INADMISSIBLE,’ HIGH COURT TOLD”
Nicole Narea
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Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California
Ruling Below: Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir.
2018).
Overview: This is a case concerning whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to
wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and
whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim.
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; Janet Napolitano, in her official
capacity as President of the University of California, Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Kristjen Nielsen, in
her official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
Defendants- Appellants
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on May 15, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
It is no hyperbole to say that Dulce Garcia
embodies the American dream. Born into
poverty, Garcia and her parents shared a San
Diego house with other families to save
money on rent; she was even homeless for a
time as a child. But she studied hard and
excelled academically in high school. When
her family could not afford to send her to the
top university where she had been accepted,
Garcia enrolled in a local community college
and ultimately put herself through a four-year

university, where she again excelled while
working full-time as a legal assistant. She
then was awarded a scholarship that, together
with her mother's life savings, enabled her to
fulfill her longstanding dream of attending
and graduating from law school. Today,
Garcia maintains a thriving legal practice in
San Diego, where she represents members of
underserved communities in civil, criminal,
and immigration proceedings.
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On the surface, Dulce Garcia appears no
different from any other productive—indeed,
inspiring—young American. But one thing
sets her apart. Garcia's parents brought her to
this country in violation of United States
immigration laws when she was four years
old. Though the United States of America is
the only home she has ever known, Dulce
Garcia is an undocumented immigrant.

from its inception, and therefore could no
longer continue in effect. And after Dulce
Garcia—along with other DACA recipients
and affected states, municipalities, and
organizations—challenged this conclusion in
the federal courts, the government adopted
the position that its fundamentally legal
determination that DACA is unlawful is
unreviewable by the judicial branch.

Recognizing the cruelty and wastefulness of
deporting productive young people to
countries with which they have no ties, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a
policy in 2012 that would provide some relief
to individuals like Garcia, while allowing
our communities to continue to benefit from
their contributions. Known as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, the
program allows those noncitizens who
unwittingly entered the United States as
children, who have clean criminal records,
and who meet various educational or military
service requirements to apply for two-year
renewable periods of deferred action—a
revocable decision by the government not to
deport an otherwise removable person from
the country. DACA also allows recipients to
apply for authorization to work in this
country legally, paying taxes and operating in
the aboveground economy. Garcia, along
with hundreds of thousands of other young
people, trusting the government to honor its
promises, leapt at the opportunity.

With due respect for the Executive Branch,
we disagree. The government may not
simultaneously both assert that its actions are
legally compelled, based on its interpretation
of the law, and avoid review of that assertion
by the judicial branch, whose "province and
duty" it is "to say what the law is." The
government's decision to rescind DACA is
subject to judicial review. And, upon review,
we conclude that plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on their claim that the rescission of
DACA—at least as justified on this record—
is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. We therefore affirm the
district court's grant of preliminary injunctive
relief.
I.
A. History of Deferred Action
The central benefit available under the
DACA program is deferred action.
Because much of this dispute revolves
around the legitimacy of that practice, we
begin by reviewing the Executive Branch's
historical use of deferred action.

But after a change in presidential
administrations, in 2017 the government
moved to end the DACA program. Why?
According to the Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security, upon the legal advice of
the Attorney General, DACA was illegal

The basic concept is a simple one: deferred
action is a decision by Executive Branch
officials not
to
pursue
deportation
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proceedings against an individual or class of
individuals otherwise eligible for removal
from this country.

Act litigation over the government's efforts to
deport John Lennon and Yoko Ono,
apparently based on Lennon's "British
conviction for marijuana possession." Then
known as "nonpriority status," the practice
had been observed in secret within the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) since at least the 1950s, but INS
officials had
publicly
denied
its
existence. After the Lennon case revealed the
practice, the INS issued its first public
guidance on the use of deferred action, stating
that "[i]n every case where the district
director determines that adverse action would
be unconscionable because of the existence
of appealing humanitarian factors, he shall
recommend consideration for nonpriority."
Although the 1975 guidance was rescinded in
1997, DHS officials continue to apply the
same humanitarian factors in deciding
whether to grant an individual deferred
action.

Unlike most other forms of relief from
deportation, deferred action is not expressly
grounded in statute. It arises instead from the
Executive's inherent authority to allocate
resources and prioritize cases. As such,
recipients of deferred action "enjoy no formal
immigration status." But despite its nonstatutory origins, Congress has historically
recognized the existence of deferred action in
amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), as well as other
statutory enactments. The Supreme Court
has also recognized deferred action by name,
describing the Executive's "regular practice
(which ha[s] come to be known as 'deferred
action') of exercising discretion for
humanitarian reasons or simply for its own
convenience." Thus, "it is well settled that
the Secretary [of Homeland Security] can
exercise deferred action."

In addition to case-by-case adjudications, the
Executive Branch has frequently applied
deferred action and related forms of
discretionary relief programmatically, to
entire classes of otherwise removable
noncitizens. Indeed, the Congressional
Research Service has compiled a list of
twenty-one such "administrative directives
on blanket or categorical deferrals of
deportation" issued between 1976 and 2011.

Official records of administrative discretion
in immigration enforcement date at least back
to the turn of the twentieth century, not long
after the enactment of the nation's first
general immigration statute in 1882. A 1909
Department of Justice circular regarding
statutorily
authorized
denaturalization
instructed that "as a general rule, good cause
is not shown for the institution of proceedings
. . . unless some substantial results are to be
achieved thereby in the way of betterment of
the citizenship of the country."

To take one early example, in 1956 President
Eisenhower extended immigration parole to
over thirty thousand Hungarian refugees who
were otherwise unable to immigrate to the
United States because of restrictive quotas
then in existence. The power to parole—that
is, to allow a noncitizen physically to enter

The government's exercise of deferred action
in particular first came to light in the 1970s,
as a result of Freedom of Information
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the country, while treating that person as "at
the border" for purposes of immigration
law—is established by statute, but the version
of the INA in existence when President
Eisenhower acted did not explicitly authorize
programmatic exercises of the parole power.
Subsequent presidents made use of similar
categorical parole initiatives. Wadhia.

Since then, the immigration agency has
instituted categorical deferred action
programs for self-petitioners under the
Violence Against Women Act; applicants for
T and U visas (which are issued to victims of
human trafficking and of certain crimes,
respectively); foreign students unable to
fulfill their visa requirements after Hurricane
Katrina; and widowed spouses of United
States citizens who had been married less
than two years. None of these deferred action
programs was expressly authorized by statute
at the
time
they
were
initiated.

Another salient example is the Family
Fairness program, established by the Reagan
Administration and expanded under
President
George
H.W.
Bush.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) had provided a pathway to legal
status for hundreds of thousands of
undocumented noncitizens, but did not make
any provision for their close relatives unless
those individuals separately qualified under
the Act's criteria. President Reagan's INS
Commissioner interpreted IRCA not to
authorize immigration benefits for anyone
outside the statutory criteria, but nevertheless
exercised executive discretion to defer the
deportation of the minor children of
noncitizens legalized under the statute. And
in 1990, the INS instituted "significant
liberalizations" of the policy by granting oneyear periods of extended voluntary departure
to children and spouses of individuals
legalized under IRCA who could establish
admissibility, continuous residency, and a
clean criminal record.
Contemporary
estimates by INS officials of the number of
people potentially eligible ranged as high as
1.5 million. Extended voluntary departure,
the mechanism through which these
individuals were allowed to remain in the
United States is, like deferred action, a
creature of executive discretion not
specifically authorized by statute.

B. The DACA Program
DACA was announced in a June 15, 2012,
memorandum from Secretary of Homeland
Security
Janet
Napolitano, entitled
"Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children." Secretary
Napolitano explained that the nation's
immigration laws "are not designed . . . to
remove productive young people to countries
where they may not have lived or even speak
the language," especially where "many of
these young people have already contributed
to our country in significant ways," and,
because they were brought here as children,
"lacked the intent to violate the law." She
therefore determined that "[p]rosecutorial
discretion, which is used in so many other
areas, is especially justified here."
The Napolitano memorandum thus laid out
the basic criteria of the DACA program,
under which a noncitizen will be considered
for a grant of deferred action if he or she:
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• came to the United States under the age of
sixteen;

DHS regulations allow all deferred-action
recipients
to
apply
for employment
authorization, enabling them to work legally
and pay taxes. Indeed, "DACA recipients
are required to apply for employment
authorization, in keeping with the Executive's
intention that DACA recipients remain
'productive' members of society." Finally,
DHS does not consider deferred-action
recipients, including those benefitting from
DACA, to accrue "unlawful presence" for
purposes of the INA's reentry bars.

• has continuously resided in the United
States for at least five years preceding [June
15, 2012] and is present in the United States
on [June 15, 2012];
• is currently in school, has graduated from
high school, has obtained a general education
development certificate, or is an honorably
discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or
Armed Forces of the United States;

In an attempt to build on the success of the
DACA program, in 2014 Secretary of
Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued a
separate memorandum that both announced
the related Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
program (DAPA), which allowed deferred
action for certain noncitizen parents of
American citizens and lawful permanent
residents, and expanded DACA by (1)
removing the age cap, (2) extending the term
of deferred-action and related workauthorization grants from two to three years,
and (3) moving up the cutoff date by which
an applicant must have been in the United
States to January 1, 2010. Twenty-six states
challenged this extension in federal court,
arguing that DAPA is unconstitutional. All of
the policies outlined in the Johnson
memorandum were enjoined nationwide in a
district court order upheld by the Fifth Circuit
and affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court. The original DACA program
remained in effect.

• has not been convicted of a felony offense,
a significant misdemeanor offense, or
multiple misdemeanor offenses, nor
otherwise poses a threat to national security
or public safety; and
• is not above the age of thirty [on June 15,
2012].
DACA applicants must submit extensive
personal information to DHS, along with fees
totaling nearly $500. Applicants also submit
to biometric screening in which they are
photographed and fingerprinted, enabling
extensive biographical and biometric
background checks. If those checks come
back clean, each application is then evaluated
for approval by DHS personnel on a case-bycase basis.
If approved into the DACA program, an
applicant is granted a renewable two-year
term of deferred action—again, "a form of
prosecutorial discretion whereby the
Department of Homeland Security declines
to pursue the removal of a person unlawfully
present in the United States." In addition to
the deferral of removal itself, pre-existing

In 2017, a new presidential administration
took office, bringing with it a change in
immigration policy. On February 20, 2017,
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then-Secretary of Homeland Security John
Kelly issued a memorandum that set out the
administration's new enforcement priorities,
stating that "the Department no longer will
exempt classes or categories of removable
aliens
from
potential
enforcement."
However, the memorandum explicitly left
DACA and DAPA in place. In a second
memorandum issued June 15, 2017, after
"consider[ing] a number of factors, including
the preliminary injunction in the [Texas]
matter, the ongoing litigation, the fact that
DAPA never took effect, and our new
immigration
enforcement
priorities,"
Secretary Kelly rescinded DAPA as an
"exercise of [his] discretion."

repeated rejection of proposed legislation that
would have accomplished a similar result.
Such an open-ended circumvention of
immigration laws was an unconstitutional
exercise
of
authority
by
the
Executive Branch.
The Attorney General further opined that
"[b]ecause the DACA policy has the same
legal and constitutional defects that the courts
recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that
potentially imminent litigation would yield
similar results with respect to DACA."
The very next day, following the Attorney
General's directive, Acting Secretary Duke
issued a memorandum rescinding DACA.
The
memorandum
begins
with
a
"Background" section that covers DACA,
DAPA,
the Texas litigation,
Secretary
Kelly's previous memoranda, Texas Attorney
General Paxton's threat, and the Attorney
General's letter. Then, in the section titled
"Rescission of the June 15, 2012 DACA
Memorandum," the Duke memorandum
states:

Then, on June 28, 2017, Texas Attorney
General Ken Paxton wrote to United States
Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III
threatening that if the federal government did
not rescind DACA by September 5, 2017,
Paxton would amend the complaint in
the Texas litigation to challenge DACA as
well as DAPA.
On September 4, 2017, the day before
Paxton's deadline, Attorney General Sessions
sent his own letter to Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security Elaine Duke. The
Attorney General's letter "advise[d] that the
Department of Homeland Security . . . should
rescind" the DACA memorandum based on
his legal opinion that the Department lacked
statutory authority to have created DACA in
the first place. He wrote:

Taking into consideration the Supreme
Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the
ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017
letter from the Attorney General, it is clear
that the June 15, 2012 DACA program
should be terminated. In the exercise of my
authority
in
establishing
national
immigration policies and priorities, except
for the purposes explicitly identified below, I
hereby rescind the June 15, 2012
memorandum.

DACA was effectuated by the previous
administration through executive action,
without proper statutory authority and with
no established end-date, after Congress'[s]

The Duke memorandum further states that
although DHS would stop accepting initial
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DACA requests effective immediately, the
agency would provide a one-month window
in which renewal applications could be filed
for current DACA beneficiaries whose
benefits were set to expire before March 5,
2018. It also states that DHS would not
terminate existing grants of deferred action
under DACA "solely based on the directives
in this memorandum." Thus, beginning on
March 5, 2018, each DACA recipient's grant
of deferred action would be allowed to expire
at the end of its two-year term. As of
September 4, 2017—the day before the
rescission—approximately
689,800
individuals were enrolled in DACA.

the District Court for the Northern District of
California and proceeded to litigation.
On October 17, 2017, the district court
ordered the government to complete the
administrative record, holding that the record
proffered by the government was
incomplete in several respects. Seeking to
avoid providing additional documents, the
government filed a petition for mandamus. In
arguing its mandamus petition, the
government took the position that the legality
of the rescission should stand, or fall based
solely on the reasons and the record already
provided by the government. We denied the
mandamus petition, stating that "the notion
that the head of a United States agency would
decide to terminate a program giving legal
protections to roughly 800,000 people based
solely on 256 pages of publicly available
documents is not credible, as the district court
concluded."

C. Procedural History
The rescission of DACA instantly sparked
litigation across the country, including the
cases on appeal here. Suits were filed in the
Northern District of California by the
Regents of the University of California, a
group of states led by California, the City of
San Jose, the County of Santa Clara and
Service Employees International Union
Local 521, and a group of individual DACA
recipients led by Dulce Garcia. The
complaints included claims that the
rescission was arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA);
that
it
was
a
substantive
rule
requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking
under the APA; that it violated the due
process and equal protection rights protected
by the U.S. Constitution; and that DHS was
equitably estopped from using the
information provided on DACA applications
for enforcement purposes. The cases were
consolidated before Judge William Alsup in

The government next petitioned the Supreme
Court for the same mandamus relief; the
Court did not reach the merits of the
administrative record dispute, but instead
instructed the district court to rule on the
government's
threshold
arguments
challenging reviewability of its rescission
decision before requiring the government to
provide additional documents. Thus, the
administrative record in this case still
consists of a scant 256 publicly available
pages, roughly three-quarters of which are
taken up by the three published judicial
opinions from the Texas litigation.
Returning to the district court, the
government moved to dismiss the
consolidated cases on jurisdictional grounds
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and for failure to state a claim, while the
plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction.
The district court granted the request for a
nationwide preliminary injunction, holding
that most of the plaintiffs had standing; that
neither the APA nor the INA barred judicial
review; and that plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on their claim that the decision to
rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious.
The district court therefore entered a
preliminary injunction requiring DHS to
adjudicate renewal applications for existing
DACA recipients.

conclusions de novo, the factual findings
underlying its decision for clear error." A
district court's decision on a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
or for failure to state a claim is also reviewed
de novo.
III.
The threshold question in this case is in many
ways also the most pivotal: is Acting
Secretary Duke's decision to rescind the
DACA program reviewable by the courts at
all? The government contends that both the
APA and the INA bar judicial review; we
address each statute in turn.

In a separate order, the court partially granted
and partially denied the government's motion
to dismiss. The court dismissed plaintiffs'
notice-and-comment
and Regulatory
Flexibility Act claims; a due process claim
premised on an entitlement to deferred
action; and the equitable estoppel claim. The
court denied the motion as to plaintiffs' equal
protection claim and a due process claim
premised on an alleged change in DHS's
information-sharing policy.

A. Reviewability under the APA
The APA provides for broad judicial review
of agency action: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof. Thus, as a general
matter, the Supreme Court has consistently
articulated "a 'strong presumption' favoring
judicial review of administrative action."

The district court certified the issues
addressed in both its orders for interlocutory
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We
granted the government's petition for
permission to appeal the orders. Plaintiffs
cross-appealed, asserting that the district
court erroneously dismissed their notice-andcomment and due process claims.

However, the APA also forecloses judicial
review under its procedures to the extent that
"agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." "This is a very narrow
exception" that comes into play only "in
those rare instances where statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply.”

II.
"We review the district court's decision to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion." Within this inquiry,
"[w]e review the district court's legal

In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court
analyzed this exception in considering "the
extent to which a decision of an
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administrative agency to exercise its
'discretion' not to undertake certain
enforcement actions is subject to judicial
review under the [APA]." In Chaney, the
Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) declined to take
investigatory and enforcement action against
state prison officials' use of drugs, which had
been FDA-approved for medical use, in
human executions. A group of prisoners on
death row had petitioned the FDA, arguing
that using the drugs to execute humans was
unlawful because they were only approved
for
medical
use,
and
not
for
executions. Responding to the petition, the
Commissioner questioned whether the FDA
had jurisdiction to prohibit the use of drugs
in executions, but went on to conclude that
even if the agency did have jurisdiction, it
would "decline to exercise it under [the
agency's] inherent discretion to" do so. The
inmates then sued the FDA, attempting to
invoke the APA's framework for judicial
review.

refusals to institute investigative or
enforcement proceedings, unless Congress
has indicated otherwise." That is, the normal
presumption in favor of judicial review is
reversed when the agency action in question
is a refusal to enforce the substantive law.
Importantly for present purposes, the Court
explicitly left open the question whether "a
refusal by the agency to institute proceedings
based solely on the belief that it lacks
jurisdiction"
might
be
reviewable
notwithstanding this general rule. This
reservation makes perfect sense. It is one
thing to read the APA's exception for "agency
action [] committed to agency discretion by
law" as including the Executive's
discretionary
decisions
to
decline
enforcement, given a pre-existing legal
tradition that had treated those decisions as
unreviewable. It would be quite another to
say that an agency's non-discretionary belief
that it lacked the power to enforce the law
was similarly "committed to agency
discretion."

The Supreme Court held that the FDA
Commissioner's discretionary decision not to
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
against
state
prison officials
was
unreviewable under the APA. The Court
identified a pre-APA "tradition" under which
"an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce . . . is a decision generally committed
to an agency's absolute discretion," and
concluded that "the Congress enacting the
APA did not intend to alter that tradition." As
the Court summed up its holding, "[t]he
general exception to reviewability provided
by § 701(a)(2) for action 'committed to
agency discretion' remains a narrow one, but
within that exception are included agency

Several years after Chaney, our court directly
addressed the question that the Supreme
Court had left open. In Montana Air Chapter
No. 29 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,
a union representing civilian Air National
Guard employees filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the National Guard
Bureau, but the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) refused to issue a
complaint. . The opinion letters issued by
FLRA's general counsel indicated that he had
"determined, according to his interpretation
of the statutes and regulations, that he lacked
jurisdiction to issue an unfair labor practice
complaint" under the circumstances.
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Acknowledging Chaney's rule that "[a]n
agency's decision not to take enforcement
action . . . is presumed to be immune from
judicial review," we noted that the
Supreme Court had nevertheless "suggested
that discretionary nonenforcement decisions
may be reviewable when" the refusal to
enforce is based on a supposed lack of
jurisdiction. We took the next logical step,
holding that Chaney's presumption of
nonreviewability "may be overcome if the
refusal is based solely on the erroneous belief
that the agency lacks jurisdiction." Because
"the General Counsel's decision not to issue
an unfair labor practice complaint was based
on his belief that he lacked jurisdiction to
issue such a complaint," we proceeded to
"examine the General Counsel's statutory and
regulatory interpretations to determine if his
belief that he lacked jurisdiction was
correct."

but substantively incorrect judicial decision
is not ultra vires." But the same is not true
with respect to agencies: "Both their power to
act and how they are to act is authoritatively
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act
improperly, no less than when they act
beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is
ultra vires." . Thus, the Court concluded,
"[t]he reality, laid bare, is that there is no
difference, insofar as the validity of agency
action is concerned, between an agency's
exceeding the scope of its authority (its
'jurisdiction') and its exceeding authorized
application of authority that it unquestionably
has."
To summarize, Chaney holds that an
agency's refusal to enforce the substantive
law is presumptively unreviewable because
that discretionary nonenforcement function is
"committed to agency discretion" within the
meaning of the APA. Montana Air builds
upon the question left open by Chaney's
footnote
four,
explaining
that
a
nonenforcement decision is reviewable
notwithstanding Chaney if the decision was
based solely on the agency's belief that it
lacked jurisdiction to act. And City of
Arlington teaches that there is no difference
between an agency that lacks jurisdiction to
take a certain action, and one that is barred by
the substantive law from doing the same; the
question "is always, simply, whether the
agency has stayed within the bounds of its
statutory authority." The rule that emerges is
this: an agency's nonenforcement decision is
outside
the
scope
of
the Chaney presumption—and is therefore
presumptively reviewable—if it is based
solely on a belief that the agency lacked the
lawful authority to do otherwise. That is,

The final piece of the APA reviewability
puzzle is the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Arlington v. FCC. There, the Court
was faced with the question whether an
agency's determination of its own jurisdiction
is entitled to the same deference as any other
agency interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., Writing
for
the
Court,
Justice Scalia explained in no uncertain
terms that in the context of administrative
agencies,
"the
distinction
between
'jurisdictional'
and
'nonjurisdictional'
interpretations is a mirage." With respect to
courts, the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional
divide is a real and consequential one,
because "[a] court's power to decide a case is
independent of whether its decision is correct
. . . . Put differently, a jurisdictionally proper
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where the agency's decision is based not on
an exercise of discretion, but instead on a
belief that any alternative choice was
foreclosed by law, the APA's "committed to
agency discretion" bar to reviewability, 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), does not apply.

agency explains itself in terms that
are judicially cognizable does not change the
categorical rule. Fair enough. But the
categorical rule announced in Chaney does
not
encompass
nonenforcement
decisions based solely on the agency's belief
that it lacked power to take a particular
course; instead, the Court explicitly declined
to extend its rule to that situation. And
in Montana Air, we held that such
decisions are reviewable. BLE's statement
about "otherwise unreviewable" agency
decisions, therefore, has no application to the
category of agency action at issue here.

This rule is fully consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in ICC v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (BLE), which rejected
the notion that "if the agency gives a
'reviewable' reason
for
otherwise
unreviewable action, the action becomes
reviewable." We have no quarrel with that
statement in the abstract, but as applied it
simply begs the question: is the agency action
in question "otherwise unreviewable"?

We believe the analysis laid out above
follows necessarily from existing doctrine.
And, just as importantly, this approach also
promotes values fundamental to the
administrative process.

The BLE case concerned the reviewability of
the Interstate Commerce Commission's
denial of a motion to reopen proceedings on
grounds of material error. The Supreme
Court held that category of agency action
presumptively unreviewable because it
"perceive[d] . . . a similar tradition of
nonreviewability" to the one it had found
in Chaney for nonenforcement decisions. In
reaching its holding, the Court rejected an
argument that there was nevertheless "law to
apply"—and that therefore the action was not
committed to agency discretion—as the
agency's order had discussed the legal merits
at length. What mattered was that the
agency's "formal action" was one for which a
tradition
of
nonreviewability
was
discernable, regardless of how the agency
explained its action.

First, the Montana Air rule does not
impermissibly encroach on executive
discretion; to the contrary, it empowers the
Executive. If an agency head is mistaken in
her assessment that the law precludes one
course of action, allowing the courts to
disabuse her of that incorrect view of the law
does not constrain discretion, but rather
opens new vistas within which discretion can
operate. That is, if an administrator chooses
option A for the sole reason that she believes
option B to be beyond her legal authority, a
decision
from
the
courts
putting
option B back on the table allows a reasoned,
discretionary policy choice between the two
courses of action. And if the agency's view of
the law is instead confirmed by the courts, no
injury to discretion results because the status
quo is preserved.

BLE thus stands for the proposition that if a
particular type of agency action is
presumptively unreviewable, the fact that the
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Moreover, allowing judicial review under
these circumstances serves the critical
function of promoting accountability within
the Executive Branch—not accountability to
the courts, but democratic accountability to
the people. Accountability in this sense is
fundamental to the legitimacy of the
administrative system: although they are
"unelected . . . bureaucrats," the heads of
cabinet-level departments like DHS "are
subject to the exercise of political oversight
and share the President's accountability to the
people."
Indeed,
the
Constitution's
Appointments Clause was designed to ensure
public accountability for . . . the making of a
bad appointment . . . ."

cannot 'determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or
series of pernicious measures ought really to
fall.'" In then-Professor Kagan's words, "the
degree to which the public can understand the
sources and levers of bureaucratic action" is
"a
fundamental
precondition
of
accountability in administration."
The Montana
Air rule
promotes
accountability by ensuring that the public
knows where to place blame for an unpopular
measure. When an agency justifies an action
solely with an assertion that the law prohibits
any other course, it shifts responsibility for
the outcome from the Executive Branch to
Congress (for making the law in question) or
the courts (for construing it). If the Executive
is correct in its interpretation of the law, then
the public is correct to blame the other two
branches for any resulting problems. But if
the Executive is wrong, then it avoids
democratic accountability for a choice that
was the agency's to make all along. Allowing
the judiciary—the branch ultimately
responsible for interpreting the law—to
review such decisions prevents this antidemocratic and untoward outcome. As Judge
Bates of the District Court for the District of
Columbia aptly put the point in confronting
the very issue we face here, "an official
cannot claim that the law ties her hands while
at the same time denying the courts' power to
unbind her. She may escape political
accountability or judicial review, but not
both."

This democratic responsiveness is especially
critical for agencies exercising prosecutorial
functions
because,
as
Justice Scalia
explained in his oft-cited dissent in Morrison
v. Olson, "[u]nder our system of government,
the primary check against prosecutorial abuse
is a political one.” This check works because
"when crimes are not investigated and
prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a
reasonable sense of proportion, the President
pays the cost in political damage to his
administration." In other words, when
prosecutorial functions are exercised in a
manner that is within the law but is
nevertheless repugnant to the sensibilities of
the people, "the unfairness will come home to
roost in the Oval Office."
But public accountability for agency action
can only be achieved if the electorate knows
how to apportion the praise for good
measures and the blame for bad ones.
Without knowing the true source of an
objectionable agency action, "the public

We therefore must determine whether the
Acting Secretary's decision to end DACA
was based solely on a belief that the program
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was
unlawful,
such
that
the Chaney presumption does not apply.

In the next sentence, the Acting Secretary
went on to announce the rescission itself:

risks" as a "consideration." And both
"consideration[s]" actually enumerated by
the Acting Secretary are most naturally read
as supporting a rationale based on DACA's
illegality.
The
"ongoing
litigation"
referenced is of course Texas v. United
States, in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a
preliminary injunction against the related
DAPA policy, and the Supreme Court
affirmed by an equally divided vote. The
"rulings" in that case are propositions of
law—taken alone, they are more readily
understood as supporting a legal conclusion
(DACA is illegal) than a pragmatic one
(DACA might be enjoined). The pragmatic
interpretation requires extra analytical steps
(someone might sue to enjoin DACA, and
they might win) that are entirely absent from
the list of factors that the Acting Secretary
stated she was "taking into consideration" in
making her decision. Acting Secretary Duke
easily could have included "the prospect of
litigation challenging DACA" in her list of
considerations; had she done so, then perhaps
the reference to the Texas litigation could be
read as supporting a practical worry about an
injunction.
Absent
that,
however,
the mention of the courts' "rulings" is best
read as referencing the courts' legal
conclusions.

In the exercise of my authority in establishing
national immigration policies and priorities,
except for the purposes explicitly identified
below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012
memorandum.

Attorney General Sessions's September 4,
2017, letter likewise focuses on the supposed
illegality of DACA, rather than any alleged
"litigation risk." Its substantive paragraph
states

The easy rejoinder to the government's
insistence that the Acting Secretary rescinded
DACA due to "litigation risks" is that the
Acting Secretary did not mention "litigation

DACA was effectuated . . . without proper
statutory authority and with no established
end-date, after Congress'[s] repeated
rejection of proposed legislation that would

We take Attorney General Sessions literally
at his word when he wrote to Acting
Secretary Duke that "DACA was effectuated
. . . without proper statutory authority," and
that DACA "was an unconstitutional exercise
of authority by the Executive Branch." These
are the reasons he gave for advising Acting
Secretary Duke to rescind DACA. We
therefore agree with the district court that the
basis for the rescission was a belief that
DACA was unlawful, and that the
discretionary "litigation risk" rationale
pressed by the government now is a mere
post-hoc rationalization put forward for
purposes of this litigation. Acting
Secretary Duke's September 5, 2017,
rescission memorandum contains exactly one
sentence of analysis:
Taking into consideration the Supreme
Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the
ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017
letter from the Attorney General, it is clear
that the June 15, 2012 DACA program
should be terminated.
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have accomplished a similar result. Such an
open-ended circumvention of immigration
laws was an unconstitutional exercise of
authority by the Executive Branch.

After consulting with the Attorney General,
and in the exercise of my discretion in
establishing
national
immigration
enforcement policies and priorities, I hereby
rescind
the
November
20,
2014
memorandum [that established DAPA].

These sentences unmistakably reflect the
Attorney General's belief that DACA was
illegal and therefore beyond the power of
DHS to institute or maintain. The letter goes
on to opine that "[b]ecause the DACA policy
has the same legal and constitutional defects
that the courts recognized as to DAPA [in
the Texas litigation], it is likely that
potentially imminent litigation would yield
similar results with respect to DACA." But in
the context of the full paragraph, the
reference to "similar results" is best read not
as an independent reason for rescinding
DACA, but as a natural consequence of
DACA's supposed illegality—which is the
topic of the paragraph as a whole. In the
words of Judge Garaufis of the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, that
reference "is too thin a reed to bear the weight
of Defendants' 'litigation risk' argument."

Placed alongside Acting Secretary Duke's
language,
the
parallels—and
the
differences—are stark. Acting Secretary
Duke's memorandum reads:
In the exercise of my authority in establishing
national immigration policies and priorities,
except for the purposes explicitly identified
below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012
memorandum [that established DACA].
The obvious similarities between the two
passages strongly suggest that Acting
Secretary Duke modeled her language after
that of Secretary Kelly's memo. And indeed,
we know that
the
Acting
Secretary
considered the Kelly memorandum in
reaching her
decision,
because
the
government has told us so.

In any event, the Attorney General's letter is
relevant only to the extent it illuminates
whether Acting Secretary Duke—the official
who actually rescinded the DACA
program—did so as an exercise of her
discretion or because she understood her
hand to be forced by the law. In this
connection, it is helpful to compare the
operative language used by Acting Secretary
Duke to rescind DACA with that used by her
predecessor, Secretary John Kelly, to rescind
DAPA just months before. In his June 15,
2017, memorandum, Secretary Kelly wrote:

Given that Acting Secretary Duke hewed so
closely to Secretary Kelly's language in
general, it is appropriate to draw meaning
from the one major difference between the
two sentences: Secretary Kelly exercised his
"discretion" in ending DAPA; Acting
Secretary Duke merely exercised her
"authority." The point is that with the
example set by the Kelly memorandum in
front of her, Acting Secretary Duke clearly
would have known how to express that the
rescission was a discretionary act case.
Furthermore, the near-verbatim language of
the two rescission memoranda suggests that
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the Acting Secretary adopted the majority of
Kelly's wording, but actively rejected
describing the DACA rescission as an act of
discretion. This difference in language cuts
strongly against any suggestion that the
rescission was discretionary.

Acting Secretary's rationale is hardly the only
one that 'may reasonably be discerned' from
the Acting Secretary's memorandum."
But Bowman is about finding a reviewable
rationale in an agency's action versus
finding no articulation of
that
rationale. Bowman does not say—and it
certainly does not logically follow—that a
court must ignore the most natural reading of
an agency's statement of reasons just
because it may also be "reasonably
susceptible" to a (less compelling) reading
that the government would prefer. The
government is in effect asking the court to
defer to agency counsel's post-hoc
rationalization, as long as there is some
reading of the rescission memorandum—
never mind how strained—that would
support it. Bowman does not require this
incongruous result.

The government counters that the
memorandum "focused from beginning to
end principally on litigation concerns, not the
legality of DACA per se." But as the State
plaintiffs point out, the memorandum's
references to these supposed "litigation
concerns" were limited to a simple summary
of the Texas litigation's procedural history;
appeared only in the "Background" section of
the memorandum; and were not referenced in
the Acting Secretary's statement of what she
was "[t]aking into consideration."
The government also asserts that because the
Acting Secretary wrote that DACA "should"
rather than must be ended, she did not view
herself as bound to act. But even on its face,
"should" is fully capable of expressing
obligation or necessity. The Acting
Secretary's use of "should" instead of "must"
cannot overcome the absence of any
discussion of potential litigation or the "risks"
attendant to it from the rescission
memorandum's statement of reasons, and the
discrepancy between the rescission of DAPA
as an act of "discretion" and the rescission of
DACA as an act of "authority."

We agree with the district court that the
Acting Secretary based the rescission of
DACA solely on a belief that DACA was
beyond
the
authority
of
DHS.
Under Montana Air and Chaney's footnote
four, this conclusion brings the rescission
within the realm of agency actions
reviewable under the APA. Unless the INA
itself deprives the courts of jurisdiction over
this case, we must proceed to evaluate the
merits of plaintiffs' arbitrary-and-capricious
claim.

Finally, the government takes a quote from
the Supreme Court to the effect that courts
should "uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned,", and contorts it into an argument
that the district court's "narrow reading of the

B. Jurisdiction under the INA
The government contends that the INA
stripped the district court of its jurisdiction in
a provision that states:
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Except as provided in this section [which sets
out avenues of review not applicable here] . .
. no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the
[Secretary of Homeland Security] to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.

clearly designed to give some measure of
protection to 'no deferred action' decisions
and similar discretionary determinations. . .
."
The government argues that AADC's
reasoning—and therefore Section 1252(g)—
applies to the rescission of DACA, which is
itself in some sense a "no deferred action"
decision. It seems quite clear, however,
that AADC reads Section
1252(g) as
responding to litigation over individual "no
deferred action" decisions, rather than a
programmatic
shift
like
the DACA
rescission. For example, the treatise
passage AADC quotes to set the scene for
Congress's action refers explicitly to
"[e]fforts to challenge the refusal to exercise
[deferred action] on behalf of specific aliens.
. . ." And in any case, the holding of AADC
was explicit: "The provision applies only to
[the] three discrete actions" mentioned in the
statute.

The Supreme Court has explicitly held
that this section "applies only to three
discrete actions that the [Secretary] may take:
her
'decision
or
action'
to
'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders.'" As the Court
put it, "[i]t is implausible that the mention of
three discrete events along the road to
deportation was a shorthand way of referring
to all claims arising from deportation
proceedings. Not because Congress is too
unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that
literary device is incompatible with the need
for precision in legislative drafting."

The government's fallback argument is thus
to cast the rescission of DACA as an initial
"action" in the agency's "commence[ment]
[of] proceedings." But AADC specifically
rejected a broad reading of the three discrete
actions
listed
in Section
1252(g).
"[D]ecisions to open an investigation, [or] to
surveil
the
suspected
violator"
are not included
in Section
1252(g)'s
jurisdictional bar, even though these actions
are also "part of the deportation
process," and could similarly be construed as
incremental steps toward an eventual
"commence[ment] [of] proceedings,"

The government attempts to expand Section
1252(g) to encompass this case in two ways.
First, it points out that the AADC Court read
that provision as Congress's effort to shield
executive decisions not to grant deferred
action from review outside the procedures
prescribed by the INA. The Court quoted a
treatise describing the practice of deferred
action and the litigation that would result
when the government declined to grant
deferred action: "Efforts to challenge the
refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf
of specific aliens sometimes have been
favorably considered by the courts . .
.." Having reviewed these developments, the
Court concluded: "Section 1252(g) seems

Indeed, in a case closely on point, our court
rejected
the
application
of Section
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1252(g) and allowed to proceed a challenge
to INS guidance narrowly interpreting the
terms of a "one-time legalization program"
for undocumented immigrants. We noted
that "[a]s interpreted by the Supreme Court in
[AADC], [Section 1252(g)] applies only to
the three specific discretionary actions
mentioned in its text, not to all claims relating
in any way to deportation proceedings," and
held that the challenge was not barred. The
panel did not appear concerned by the fact
that it was possible to conceptualize that
policy choice by INS as an ingredient in a
subsequent
decision
to
commence
proceedings against particular individuals.

The government takes issue with the district
court's conclusion on only one of the
preliminary injunction factors: the likelihood
of success on the merits.
In an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge,
"[i]t is well-established that an agency's
action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis
articulated by the agency itself."
Similarly, it is black letter law that where an
agency purports to act solely on the basis that
a certain result is legally required, and that
legal premise turns out to be incorrect, the
action must be set aside, regardless of
whether the action could have been justified
as an exercise of discretion. That principle
goes back at least as far as the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Chenery I, in
which the Court stated:

The government cites no cases applying
the Section 1252(g) bar to a programmatic
policy decision about deferred action; the
two cases it does cite were challenges to
individual "no deferred action" decisions—
that is, they fall exactly within Section
1252(g) as interpreted by the Court in AADC.
Especially in light of the "'strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative action' governing the
construction
of
jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of IIRIRA[.]"

If [agency] action rests upon an
administrative determination—an exercise of
judgment in an area which Congress has
entrusted to the agency—of course it must
not be set aside because the reviewing court
might have made a different determination
were it empowered to do so. But if the action
is based upon a determination of law as to
which the reviewing authority of the courts
does come into play, an order may not stand
if the agency has misconceived the law.

IV.
Having concluded that neither the APA nor
the INA precludes judicial review, we turn to
the merits of the preliminary injunction. The
district court held that plaintiffs satisfied the
familiar four-factor preliminary injunction
standard with respect to their claim under the
APA that the rescission of DACA was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."

This holding of Chenery I remains good
law. As the D.C. Circuit flatly put it, "An
agency action, however permissible as an
exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained
where it is based not on the agency's own
judgment but on an erroneous view of the
law."
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Thus, if the DACA rescission was based
solely on an erroneous legal premise, it must
be set aside under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We
have already concluded, in our discussion of
reviewability, that the rescission was indeed
premised on the belief that the DACA
program was unlawful. We next must decide
whether that legal conclusion was correct.

amounted to "an unconstitutional exercise of
authority." More specifically, the Attorney
General asserted that "the DACA policy has
the same legal and constitutional defects that
the courts recognized as to DAPA" in
the Texas litigation.
The claim of "constitutional defects" is a
puzzling one because as all the parties
recognize, no court has ever held that DAPA
is unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit and
district court in Texas explicitly declined to
address the constitutional issue. Indeed, the
government makes no attempt in this appeal
to defend the Attorney General's assertion
that the DACA program is unconstitutional.
We therefore do not address it further.

Attorney General Sessions's September 4,
2017, letter expresses several possible bases
for the agency's ultimate conclusion that
DACA was unlawful. First, the Attorney
General states that "DACA was effectuated
by the previous administration through
executive
action
.
.
.
after
Congress'[s] repeated rejection of proposed
legislation that would have accomplished a
similar result." But our court has already
explained that "Congress's failure to pass the
[DREAM] Act does not signal the
illegitimacy of the DACA program," partly
because "the DREAM Act and the DACA
program are not interchangeable policies
because they provide different forms of
relief": the DREAM Act would have
provided a path to lawful permanent resident
status, while DACA simply defers removal.
Moreover, there is nothing inherently
problematic about an agency addressing a
problem for which Congress has been unable
to pass a legislative fix, so long as the
particular action taken is properly within the
agency's power. This argument therefore
provides no independent reason to think that
DACA is unlawful.

With respect to DACA's alleged "legal . . .
defects," the district court explained in great
detail the long history of deferred action in
immigration enforcement, including in the
form of broad programs; the fact that the
Supreme Court and Congress have both
acknowledged deferred action as a feature of
the immigration system; and the specific
statutory responsibility of the Secretary of
Homeland Security for "[e]stablishing
national immigration enforcement policies
and priorities,". The government does not
contest any of these propositions, which
themselves go a long way toward
establishing DACA's legality. Instead, the
government argues that the Fifth Circuit's
reasons for striking down the related DAPA
policy would also apply to DACA.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA was
unlawful on two grounds: first, that DAPA
was in fact a legislative rule and therefore
should have been promulgated through

The Attorney General's primary bases for
concluding that DACA was illegal were that
the program was "effectuated . . . without
proper statutory authority" and that it
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notice-and-comment
rulemaking;
and
second, that DAPA was substantively
inconsistent with the INA.

that only those highly likely to receive
deferred action will apply; otherwise,
applicants would risk revealing their
immigration status and other identifying
information to authorities, thereby risking
removal (and the loss of a sizeable fee)."

With respect to the first holding, notice-andcomment procedures are not required where
the agency pronouncement in question is a
"general statement[] of policy." "The critical
factor to determine whether a directive
announcing a new policy constitutes a rule or
a general statement of policy is the extent to
which the challenged [directive] leaves the
agency, or its implementing official, free to
exercise discretion to follow, or not to follow,
the [announced] policy in an individual
case."

Moreover, the denial rate has risen as the
DACA program has matured. DHS statistics
included in the record reveal that in fiscal
year 2016, for example, the agency approved
52,882 initial DACA applications and denied
11,445; that is, 17.8% of the applications
acted upon were denied. As Judge King
concluded, "Neither of these numbers
suggests an agency on autopilot." In light of
these differences, we do not agree that DACA
is a legislative rule that would require noticeand-comment rulemaking.

On its face, DACA obviously allows (and
indeed requires) DHS officials to exercise
discretion in making deferred action
decisions as to individual cases: Secretary
Napolitano's memorandum announcing
DACA specifically states that "requests for
relief pursuant to this memorandum are to be
decided on a case by case basis." The Fifth
Circuit in Texas held that DAPA was a
substantive rule notwithstanding similar
discretionary language, based primarily on
statistics regarding the approval rates of
DACA applications. The court read those
statistics as revealing that DACA was
discretionary in name only—that is, that DHS
personnel had no discretion to deny deferred
action if the DACA criteria were met.

As to the substantive holding in Texas, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA conflicted
with the INA largely for a reason that is
inapplicable to DACA. Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the INA provides "an
intricate process for illegal aliens to derive a
lawful immigration classification from their
children's immigration status" but that
"DAPA would allow illegal aliens to receive
the benefits of lawful presence solely on
account of their children's immigration status
without complying with any of the
requirements. . . that Congress has
deliberately imposed." As the district court
in this case noted, there is no analogous
provision in the INA defining how
immigration status may be derived by
undocumented persons who arrived in the
United States as children. One of the major
problems the Fifth Circuit identified with
DAPA is therefore not present here.

But as the dissenting judge in Texas pointed
out, DACA's (then) 5% denial rate—which
did not include applications rejected for
administrative deficiencies—is consistent
with a discretionary program given that
applicants self-select: "It should be expected
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In resisting this conclusion, the government
flips the Fifth Circuit's reasoning on its head,
arguing that "[i]nsofar as the creation of
pathways to lawful presence was relevant, the
fact that Congress had legislated only for
certain individuals similarly situated to
DAPA beneficiaries—and not DACA
recipients—would
make
DACA more inconsistent with the INA than
DAPA." To the extent the government meant
to draw on the Texas court's analysis, it gets
it exactly backwards: the whole thrust of the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning on this point was
that DHS was without authority because
"Congress has 'directly addressed the precise
question at issue.'" There is no argument that
Congress has similarly occupied the field
with respect to DACA; as the Attorney
General himself noted, Congress has
repeatedly rejected Dreamer legislation.

added to the statute books piecemeal over
time by Congress.
Given this context, we find it improbable that
Congress "considered the . . . possibility" of
all other potential uses for deferred action
"and meant to say no" to any other
application of that tool by the immigration
agency. We think the much more reasonable
conclusion is that in passing its seriatim
pieces of legislation, instructing that this and
that "narrow class[]" of noncitizens should be
eligible for deferred action, Congress meant
to say nothing at all about the underlying
power of the Executive Branch to grant the
same remedy to others. We do not read an
"and no one else" clause into each of
Congress's individual express grants of
deferred action.
Another element in the Fifth Circuit's
analysis was that "DAPA would make 4.3
million otherwise removable aliens eligible
for
lawful
presence,
employment
authorization, and associated benefits, and
'we must be guided to a degree by common
sense as to the manner in which Congress is
likely to delegate a policy decision of such
economic and political magnitude to an
administrative agency.'" DACA, on the other
hand, had 689,800 enrollees as of September
2017. The government asserts that this
difference in size is "legally immaterial," but
that response is unconvincing. If the point is
that the "economic and political magnitude"
of allowing 4.3 million people to remain in
the country and obtain work authorization is
such that Congress would have spoken to it
directly, then surely it makes a difference that
one policy has less than one-sixth the
"magnitude" of the other. As the district court

The second major element of the Fifth
Circuit's analysis on the substantive issues
was that the INA itself "prescribes . . . which
classes of aliens can achieve deferred action
and eligibility for work authorization." The
court drew the implication that the statute
must therefore preclude the Executive
Branch from granting these benefits to other
classes.
But "[t]he force of any negative implication
. . . depends on context." Indeed, "[w]e do
not read the enumeration of one case to
exclude another unless it is fair to suppose
that Congress considered the unnamed
possibility and meant to say no to it." Here,
the express grants of deferred action cited by
the Fifth Circuit were not passed together as
part of the original INA; rather, they were
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laconically put it, "there is a difference
between 4.3 million and 689,800."

recognized as a practical reality by both
Congress and the courts. In a world where
the government can remove only a small
percentage of the undocumented noncitizens
present in this country in any year, deferred
action programs like DACA enable DHS to
devote
much-needed
resources
to
enforcement priorities such as threats to
national security, rather than blameless and
economically productive young people with
clean criminal records.

Finally, the government finds "an
insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs'
position" in that "the district court's
injunction affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
covered both DAPA and expanded DACA."
It is true that the Texas court also enjoined
the expansions of DACA that were
announced in the same memorandum as the
DAPA program. But no analysis was
devoted to those provisions by either the Fifth
Circuit or the Texas district court, and one of
the keys to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning—that
Congress had supposedly occupied the field
with respect to obtaining immigration
benefits
through
one's
children—
does not apply to either the original DACA
program or its expansions. Under these
circumstances,
we
do
not
find
the Texas courts' treatment of the DACA
expansions to be strong persuasive authority,
much less an "insurmountable obstacle."

We therefore conclude that DACA was a
permissible exercise of executive discretion,
notwithstanding
the
Fifth
Circuit's
conclusion that the related DAPA program
exceeded DHS's statutory authority. DACA
is being implemented in a manner that
reflects discretionary, case-by-case review,
and at least one of the Fifth Circuit's key
rationales in striking down DAPA is
inapplicable with respect to DACA. With
respect for our sister circuit, we find the
analysis that seemingly compelled the result
in Texas entirely inapposite. And because the
Acting Secretary was therefore incorrect in
her belief that DACA was illegal and had to
be rescinded, plaintiffs are likely to succeed
in demonstrating that the rescission must be
set aside.

In sum, the reality is (and always has been)
that the executive agencies charged with
immigration enforcement do not have the
resources required to deport every single
person present in this country without
authorization. Recognizing this state of
affairs, Congress has explicitly charged the
Secretary of Homeland Security with
"[e]stablishing
national
immigration
enforcement policies and priorities."

To be clear: we do not hold that DACA could
not be rescinded as an exercise of Executive
Branch discretion. We hold only that here,
where the Executive did not make a
discretionary choice to end DACA—but
rather acted based on an erroneous view of
what the law required—the rescission was
arbitrary and capricious under settled law.
The government is, as always, free to
reexamine its policy choices, so long as doing

It is therefore no surprise that deferred action
has been a feature of our immigration
system—albeit one of executive invention—
for decades; has been employed categorically
on numerous occasions; and has been
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so does not violate an injunction or any
freestanding statutory or constitutional
protection.

individual. Under these circumstances a
single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the
rule, may obtain "programmatic" relief that
affects the rights of parties not before the
court.

V.
Having concluded that the district court was
correct in its APA merits holding, we now
turn to the question of the appropriate
remedy. The district court preliminarily
enjoined the rescission of DACA with
respect to existing beneficiaries on a
nationwide basis. The government asserts
that this was error, and that a proper
injunction would be narrower.

A final principle is also relevant: the need for
uniformity in immigration policy. As the
Fifth Circuit stated when it affirmed the
nationwide injunction against DAPA, "the
Constitution requires an uniform Rule of
Naturalization; Congress has instructed that
the immigration laws of the United States
should be enforced vigorously and uniformly;
and the Supreme Court has described
immigration policy as a comprehensive
and unified system."
Allowing uneven
application of nationwide immigration policy
flies in the face of these requirements.

The general rule regarding the scope of
preliminary injunctive relief is that it "should
be no more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs before the court."

In its briefing, the government fails to explain
how the district court could have crafted a
narrower injunction that would provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs, including the
entity plaintiffs. Nor does it provide
compelling reasons to deviate from the
normal rule in APA cases, or to disregard the
need
for
uniformity
in
national
immigration policy. The one argument it
does offer on this latter point—that
"[d]eferred action is itself a departure from
vigorous and uniform enforcement of the
immigration laws," and that "enjoining the
rescission of DACA on a nationwide basis . .
. increases rather than lessens that
departure"—is
a
red
herring.
DACA is national immigration policy, and
an injunction that applies that policy to some
individuals while rescinding it as to others is
inimical to the principle of uniformity.

It is also important to note that the claim
underlying the injunction here is an arbitraryand-capricious challenge under the APA. In
this context, "[w]hen a reviewing court
determines that agency regulations are
unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules
are vacated—not that their application to the
individual petitioners is proscribed." As
Justice Blackmun explained while "writing
in dissent but apparently expressing the view
of all nine Justices on this question,"
The Administrative Procedure Act permits
suit to be brought by any person "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action." In
some cases the "agency action" will consist
of a rule of broad applicability; and if the
plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is
invalidated, not simply that the court forbids
its
application
to
a
particular
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We therefore conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in issuing a
nationwide injunction. Such relief is
commonplace in APA cases, promotes
uniformity in immigration enforcement, and
is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here
with complete redress.

the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power." "To qualify as a
general statement of policy . . . a directive
must not establish a binding norm and must
leave agency officials free to consider the
individual facts in the various cases that arise
and to exercise discretion."

VI.

The district court held that because DACA
itself was a general statement of policy that
did not require notice and comment, it could
also be rescinded without those procedures.
This proposition finds support in MadaLuna, in which "we conclude[d] that [a
deferred-action
Operating
Instruction]
constituted a general statement of policy, and
thus could be validly repealed and
superseded without notice-and-comment
proceedings."
Plaintiffs
contest
this
conclusion,
arguing
that
the
DACA rescission was a binding rule, even
though DACA's adoption was a general
statement of policy. They provide two bases
for this assertion.

We turn next to the district court's treatment
of the government's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The government
moved to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims; the
district court dismissed some claims and
denied the government's motion as to others.
We take each claim in turn.
A. APA: Arbitrary-and-Capricious
For the reasons stated above in discussing
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits,
the district court was correct to deny the
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
claim that the DACA rescission was arbitrary
and capricious under the APA.

First, plaintiffs argue that the rescission is
binding because it requires DHS officials to
reject new DACA applications and (after a
certain date) renewal applications. It is true
that Acting Secretary Duke's rescission
memorandum makes rejections of DACA
applications mandatory. But the relevant
question under the rescission memorandum is
not whether DHS officials retained discretion
to accept applications for a program that no
longer existed; instead, the question is
whether DHS officials retained discretion to
grant deferred action and collateral benefits
outside of the (now-cancelled) DACA
program.

B. APA: Notice-and-Comment
Plaintiffs also assert that the rescission of
DACA is in fact a substantive rule under the
APA, and that it therefore could not be
validly accomplished without notice-andcomment procedures.
As touched on above with respect to DACA
itself, an agency pronouncement is excluded
from the APA's requirement of notice-andcomment procedures if it constitutes a
"general statement[] of policy." General
statements of policy are those that "advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which

292

For its part, the government asserts that the
rescission memorandum made clear that,
despite the rescission, "future deferred action
requests will be 'adjudicat[ed] . . . on an
individual, case-by-case basis.'" Mildly put,
this
assertion
mischaracterizes
the
memorandum. The quoted language refers to
the treatment of only (a) initial applications
pending on the date of the rescission, and (b)
renewal applications filed within the onemonth wind-down period. It does not refer to
how future requests for deferred action
outside the DACA program would be
handled. Still, the rescission memorandum
also did not forbid the agency from granting
such requests, and it acknowledged the
background principle of deferred action as
"an act of prosecutorial discretion meant to be
applied only on an individualized case-bycase basis." And the memorandum closed by
stating that "no limitations are placed by this
guidance on the otherwise lawful
enforcement or litigation prerogatives of
DHS"—presumably including granting
deferred action on a case-by-case basis to
some people who would have been eligible
for DACA.

action program without undergoing noticeand-comment rulemaking." But as the district
court noted, the key factor in that case was
the contention that under the policy at issue,
"'discretion' was exercised favorably in all
cases of a certain kind and then, after repeal
of the regulation, unfavorably in each such
case." DACA, by contrast, explicitly
contemplated case-by-case discretion, and its
rescission appears to have left in place
background
principles
of
prosecutorial discretion.
Plaintiffs also argue that the DACA
rescission is not a general policy statement
because it is binding as a legal interpretation
that a DACA-like program would be illegal.
But again, this argument answers the wrong
question. The Acting Secretary's legal
conclusion that a DACA-like program is
unlawful does not constrain the discretion of
line-level DHS employees to grant deferred
action on a case-by-case basis, and those
employees lack authority to institute such an
agency-wide program in the first place. And
plaintiffs do not point to any reason
why this Acting Secretary's legal conclusion
about DACA would bind subsequent
Secretaries if they were to disagree with its
reasoning—just as Acting Secretary Duke
reversed course from previous Secretaries
who concluded DACA was legal. This is not
a "new 'binding rule of substantive law,'" ,
affecting the rights of the people and entities
regulated by the agency; it is an interpretation
of the agency's own power, and plaintiffs do
not explain why it should be read as binding
future DHS Secretaries. The district court
correctly dismissed plaintiffs' notice-andcomment claims.

If allowed to go into effect, the rescission of
DACA would undoubtedly result in the loss
of deferred action for the vast majority of the
689,800 people who rely on the program. But
the rescission memorandum does not
mandate that result because it leaves in place
the background principle that deferred action
is available on a case-by-case basis.
Plaintiffs' primary argument against this
conclusion is a citation to United States ex
rel. Parco v. Morris, which is said to be "the
only other decision to address an Executive
Branch decision to terminate a deferred293

C. Due Process: Deferred Action

their benefits and protection on an ongoing
basis so long as they fulfilled the program's
criteria." But this argument is undercut by the
DACA FAQs published by DHS, which
explicitly state that "USCIS retains the
ultimate discretion to determine whether
deferred action is appropriate in any given
case even if the [renewal] guidelines are
met." The FAQs also state that any
individual's "deferred action may be
terminated at any time, with or without a
Notice of Intent to Terminate, at DHS's
discretion," and Secretary Napolitano's
DACA memorandum claims that it "confers
no substantive right, immigration status or
pathway to citizenship." Whether or not these
provisions are legally operative, they do not
indicate that the government shared
plaintiffs' expectation of presumptive
renewal.

The Garcia plaintiffs—individual
DACA
recipients—have brought a substantive due
process claim alleging that the rescission
deprived them of protected interests in their
DACA designation, including the renewal of
their benefits. The district court dismissed
this claim, holding that there is no protected
entitlement in either the initial grant of
deferred action under DACA or the renewal
of benefits for existing DACA enrollees. On
appeal, the Garcia plaintiffs challenge this
ruling only as it applies to the renewal of
DACA benefits, not as to the initial grant.
"A threshold requirement to a substantive or
procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's
showing of a liberty or property interest
protected by the Constitution." It is possible
to have a property interest in a government
benefit, but "a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for [the
benefit]. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to
it." Although "a benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may grant
or deny it in their discretion," , a legitimate
claim of entitlement may exist where there
are "rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support [a plaintiff's] claim of
entitlement to the benefit . . . ." The dispute
here focuses on whether such "mutually
explicit understandings" existed between the
government and DACA recipients with
respect to the renewal of DACA benefits.

Attempting to overcome this facially
discretionary language, plaintiffs emphasize
several factors. First, they say, the very
nature of the DACA project was such that
presumptive renewal was required to
encourage people to participate; a two-year
term with no presumption of renewal would
not have been attractive enough to outweigh
the risks to the applicants. Moreover,
Secretary Napolitano's DACA memorandum
itself states that grants of deferred action
under DACA will be "subject to renewal,"
and the actual criteria for renewal were
"nondiscretionary" in nature. Finally, the
plaintiffs point to a more than 99% approval
rate for adjudicated DACA renewal
applications. This, they assert, is powerful
evidence of a mutual understanding of
presumptive renewal.

The Garcia plaintiffs assert that they and the
government "'mutually' understood that
DACA recipients would be able to renew
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All these points might have revealed a
question of fact as to whether a mutually
explicit understanding of presumptive
renewal existed—thereby avoiding dismissal
on the pleadings—if plaintiffs were bringing
a claim that, for example, their individual
DACA renewals were denied for no good
reason. But it is hard to see how an
expectation of renewal within the confines of
the existing DACA policy could have created
a mutually explicit understanding that the
DACA
program itself would
not
be
terminated wholesale. That is, a 99% renewal
rate under DACA provides no evidence that
the government shared an understanding that
the DACA program would continue existing
indefinitely to provide such renewals. None
of plaintiffs' cited authorities appear to
address this kind of claim.

the government violated this interest by
changing its policy to allow such use. The
district court held that the plaintiffs had
plausibly alleged facts that state a claim
under this theory.
As with their other due process claim, the
question whether DACA recipients enjoy a
protected due process right protecting them
from having the government use their
information against them for enforcement
purposes turns on the existence of a
"mutually explicit understanding[]" on that
point between the government and DACA
recipients. The DACA FAQs published by
DHS state the following information-use
policy:
Information provided in this request is
protected from disclosure to ICE and CBP
for the purpose of immigration enforcement
proceedings unless the requestor meets the
criteria for the issuance of a Notice to Appear
or a referral to ICE under the criteria set forth
in USCIS' Notice to Appear guidance.
Individuals whose cases are deferred
pursuant to DACA will not be referred to
ICE. The information may be shared with
national
security
and
law
enforcement agencies, including ICE and
CBP, for purposes other than removal,
including for assistance in the consideration
of DACA, to identify or prevent fraudulent
claims, for national security purposes, or for
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal
offense. The above information sharing
policy covers family members and guardians,
in addition to the requestor. This policy,
which may be modified, superseded, or
rescinded at any time without notice, is not
intended to, does not, and may not be relied

While we may agree with much of what
plaintiffs say about the cruelty of ending a
program upon which so many have come to
rely, we do not believe they have plausibly
alleged a "mutually explicit understanding"
that DACA—created by executive action in a
politically polarized policy area and
explicitly
couched
in
discretionary
language—would
exist
indefinitely,
including through a change in presidential
administrations. On that basis, we affirm the
district court's dismissal.
D. Due Process: Information-Sharing
Several of the complaints allege a different
due process theory: DACA recipients had a
protected interest based on the government's
representations that the personal information
they submitted with their applications would
not be used for enforcement purposes, and
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upon to create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable by law
by any party in any administrative, civil, or
criminal matter.

The government argues in the alternative that
plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that
DHS actually changed its policy. Plaintiffs'
allegations rest on a set of FAQs about the
DACA rescission that DHS published the
same day it issued the rescission
memorandum, September 5, 2017. In those
rescission FAQs, the previous language
stating that personal information "is
protected from disclosure" has been replaced
with the following:

The statement that applicant information "is
protected from disclosure" to the
enforcement arms of DHS is a strong
commitment, and plaintiffs plausibly allege
that DACA recipients reasonably relied on it.
The government of course points to the
express caveat that the information-sharing
policy "may be modified, superseded or
rescinded at any time." But as the district
court held, this qualifier is ambiguous as to
whether it allows the government to change
its policy only prospectively, or also with
respect to information already received—and
this ambiguity presents a fact question not
amenable to resolution on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs' interpretation that a policy change
would only apply prospectively is a plausible
one, given that the policy is written in terms
of what will happen to "[i]nformation
provided in this request," rather than DACAderived information generally. (emphasis
added). It is at least reasonable to think that a
change in the policy would apply only to
those applications submitted after that change
takes effect. And while the government also
relies on the language stating that the policy
does not create enforceable rights, such a
disclaimer by an agency about what its
statements do and do not constitute as a legal
matter are not dispositive. Plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged a mutually explicit
understanding that DACA applicants'
information would be protected from
disclosure.

Information provided to USCIS in DACA
requests will not be proactively provided to
ICE and CBP for the purpose of immigration
enforcement proceedings, unless the
requestor meets the criteria for the issuance
of a Notice to Appear or a referral to ICE
under the criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice
to Appear guidance.
The government's first response—that the
differing language in the two FAQs does not
actually reflect a difference in policy—is
hard to swallow. It does not take much
parsing of the text to see the significant
difference between "protect[ing]" something
from "disclosure" on the one hand, and
merely declining to "proactively provide[]" it
on the other. This is especially so when the
entities in question (and to which USCIS
presumably would now
provide
information reactively)
are
fellow
components of the same umbrella agency.
Changing gears, the government also points
to yet a third set of FAQs, published months
after the rescission and not part of the record
in this case, which state:
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Information provided to USCIS for the
DACA process will not make you an
immigration priority for that reason alone.
That information will only be proactively
provided to ICE or CBP if the requestor
meets the criteria for the issuance of a Notice
To Appear or a referral to ICE under the
criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice to Appear
guidance. This information-sharing policy
has not changed in any way since it was first
announced, including as a result of the Sept.
5, 2017 memo starting a wind-down of the
DACA policy.

have plausibly alleged that DHS has changed
its policy.
Finally, in order to state a substantive due
process claim, plaintiffs must allege conduct
that "shock[s] the conscience and offend[s]
the community's sense of fair play and
decency." The government makes a passing
argument that this standard is not satisfied
because the information-sharing policy has
always contained some exceptions, but as
the Garcia plaintiffs put it, "[a]pplicants
accepted those limited, acknowledged risks
when they applied for DACA. They did not
accept the risk that the government would
abandon the other assurances that were
'crucial' to 'inducing them to apply for
DACA.'" (alterations incorporated). We
agree. Plaintiffs have stated a due process
claim based on the alleged change in DHS's
information-sharing
policy.

The government notes that a district court
relied on FAQs containing this language in
parallel litigation to dismiss a nearly identical
information-use due process claim.
But this case is critically different because
in Batalla Vidal the plaintiffs had attached
the new version of the FAQs to their
complaint. As the court there explained,
"Plaintiffs . . . have effectively pleaded
themselves out of court by relying on a
document that contradicts their otherwiseunsupported allegation of a change to DHS's
information-use policy." By contrast, here
the most recent FAQs were not attached to or
referenced in any of the complaints—indeed,
they postdate the filing of the complaints.
Therefore, the normal rule applies: materials
outside the complaint cannot be considered
on a motion to dismiss.

E. Equal Protection
The district court also held that plaintiffs
stated a viable equal protection claim by
plausibly alleging that the DACA rescission
disproportionately affected Latinos and
individuals of Mexican descent and was
motivated by discriminatory animus.
Because the district court denied the
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
equal protection claim at the pleading stage,
we take all of the complaints' allegations as
true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs We agree with the
district court that plaintiffs plausibly alleged
an equal protection claim.

Even if it could be considered, this newest
FAQ would not conclusively resolve the
question of fact surrounding DHS's current
information-sharing policy because it still
contains the language that suggests a change
from the pre-rescission policy. Plaintiffs
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Most significantly, plaintiffs allege that the
rescission of DACA disproportionately
impacts Latinos and individuals of Mexican
heritage, who account for 93% of DACA
recipients. The complaints also allege a
history of animus toward persons of Hispanic
descent evidenced by both pre-presidential
and post-presidential statements by President
Trump, who is alleged to have decided to end
DACA, even though the directive to the
Acting Secretary was issued from Attorney
General Sessions. Finally, the district court
properly considered "the unusual history
behind the rescission," all of which appeared
in the record submitted by the government.
As the district court noted, "DACA received
reaffirmation by the agency as recently as
three months before the rescission, only to be
hurriedly cast aside on what seems to have
been a contrived excuse (its purported
illegality). This strange about-face, done at
lightning speed, suggests that the normal care
and consideration within the agency was
bypassed."

Court in AADC and underscored by the
government:
inhibiting
prosecutorial
discretion, allowing continuing violations of
immigration law, and impacting foreign
relations. The two cases cited by the
government do not support its position, as
both of them involved an individual
noncitizen making an equal protection
argument in an attempt to avoid his own
deportation. Plaintiffs' challenge to the
rescission of DACA—which is itself
discretionary—is not such a case.
The government also contends that even if
not totally barred by AADC, plaintiffs' claims
must be subject to the heightened pleading
standard applied to selective-prosecution
claims in the criminal context. But this
argument meets the same objection: as the
district court held, plaintiffs' challenge is not
a selective-prosecution claim. We are
therefore not persuaded by the government's
arguments.
The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Trump v. Hawaii, does not foreclose this
claim. There, statements by the President
allegedly revealing religious animus against
Muslims were "[a]t the heart of plaintiffs'
case . . . ." The Court assumed without
deciding that it was proper to rely on the
President's statements, but nevertheless
upheld the challenged executive order under
rational basis review. Here, by contrast,
plaintiffs provide substantially greater
evidence of discriminatory motivation,
including the rescission order's disparate
impact on Latinos and persons of Mexican
heritage, as well as the order's unusual
history. Moreover, our case differs
from Hawaii in several potentially important

The government contends that the equal
protection claim is foreclosed by AADC, in
which the Supreme Court stated that "as a
general matter . . . an alien unlawfully in this
country has no constitutional right to assert
selective enforcement as a defense against his
deportation." But in the context of this case,
the challenge to the rescission of DACA is
not raised "as a defense against []
deportation," and is not a claim of "selective
enforcement." Rather, it is a freestanding
claim that the Executive Branch, motivated
by animus, ended a program that
overwhelmingly benefits a certain ethnic
group. Thus, the equal protection claim does
not implicate the concerns motivating the
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respects, including the physical location of
the plaintiffs within the geographic United
States, the lack of a national security
justification for the challenged government
action, and the nature of the constitutional
claim raised.

plaintiffs' APA notice-and-comment claim,
and their claim that the DACA rescission
violates their substantive due process rights.
The district court also properly denied the
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim, their
claim that the new information-sharing
policy violates their due process rights, and
their claim that the DACA rescission violates
their right to equal protection.

Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs have
stated a plausible equal protection claim.
VII.

***

The rescission of DACA—based as it was
solely on a misconceived view of the law—is
reviewable, and plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on their claim that it must be set
aside under the APA. We therefore affirm the
district court's entry. The district court also
properly dismissed plaintiffs' APA noticeand-comment claim, and their claim that the
DACA rescission violates their substantive
due process rights. The district court also
properly denied the government's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' APA arbitrary-andcapricious claim, their claim that the new
information-sharing policy violates their due
process rights, and their claim that the DACA
rescission violates their right to equal
protection. of a preliminary injunction. The
district court also properly dismissed

The Executive wields awesome power in the
enforcement of our nation's immigration
laws. Our decision today does not curb that
power, but rather enables its exercise in a
manner that is free from legal misconceptions
and is democratically accountable to the
public. Whether Dulce Garcia and the
hundreds of thousands of other young
dreamers like her may continue to live
productively in the only country they have
ever known is, ultimately, a choice for the
political branches of our constitutional
government. With the power to make that
choice, however, must come accountability
for the consequences.
AFFIRMED.
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Trump v. NAACP
Ruling Below: NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D.D.C. 2018).
Overview: This is a case concerning whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to
wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and
whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim.
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et
al., Plaintiffs
v.
Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants
United States District Court, District of Columbia
Decided on August 17, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
BATES, District Judge:
Before the Court is the government's motion
for a stay pending appeal of the April 24,
2018 order vacating the rescission of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
("DACA") program and the August 3, 2018
order denying reconsideration of the April
24, 2018 order. Also before the Court is the
government's unopposed motion for
clarification that the August 3, 2018 order
was a final, appealable judgment.

of Homeland Security ("DHS") to begin
accepting applications for initial grants of
DACA benefits and for advance parole under
the DACA program. Plaintiffs oppose the
government's motion in part, urging the Court
not to stay its orders in their entirety, but
agreeing that a stay as to initial DACA
applications would be proper. For the
reasons that follow, the government's motion
to clarify will be granted, and its motion for a
stay pending appeal will be granted in part.
The Court will stay its order as to new DACA

The government seeks a stay of the Court's
orders in their entirety or, in the alternative,
at least insofar as they require the Department
300

applications and applications for advance
parole, but not as to renewal applications.

Supreme Court have called this approach into
question, "the district judges in this Circuit
continue to adhere to binding precedent and
apply the sliding scale approach to determine
whether a movant is entitled to an injunction
pending resolution of its appeal," , and
plaintiffs do not dispute the propriety of that
approach here. Thus, if "the three other
factors strongly favor issuing" a stay, then the
government "need only raise a 'serious legal
question' on the merits" for that stay to issue.

The Court is mindful that continuing the stay
in this case will temporarily deprive certain
DACA-eligible individuals, and plaintiffs in
these cases, of relief to which the Court has
concluded they are legally entitled. But the
Court is also aware of the significant
confusion and uncertainty that currently
surrounds the status of the DACA program,
which is now the subject of litigation in
multiple federal district courts and courts of
appeals. Because that confusion would only
be magnified if the Court's order regarding
initial DACA applications were to take effect
now and later be reversed on appeal, the
Court will grant a limited stay of its order and
preserve the status quo pending appeal, as
plaintiffs
themselves
suggest.

As to the first factor, the Court finds that the
government's appeal raises "serious legal
question[s]." Those questions include
whether DHS's decision to rescind DACA
was subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
and, if so, whether that decision was arbitrary
and capricious. Of course, this Court has
already answered both questions in the
affirmative: as the Court has explained at
length elsewhere, DACA's rescission was
both reviewable and unlawful because it was
based chiefly on a "virtually unexplained"
conclusion
that
DACA
was
unlawful. Nevertheless, the government has
assembled a "substantial case on the merits,"
and the fact that the Court has thus far been
unpersuaded by that case does not preclude
the issuance of a stay,

I. MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c),
district courts generally have the authority to
stay their orders pending appeal In
determining whether to grant such a stay,
courts consider four factors: "(1) whether the
stay applicant has made a strong showing that
he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of
the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies."

The remaining factors lend sufficient support
to plaintiffs' proposal for a limited stay
pending appeal to render that stay appropriate
in light of the government's "substantial"
legal case. But they do not support the
government's request for a stay of the Court's
order in its entirety.

Traditionally, courts in this Circuit have
considered these factors on a "'sliding scale,'
whereby 'a strong showing on one factor
could make up for a weaker showing on
another.'" Although recent decisions of the
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The second factor—the risk of irreparable
injury to DHS—favors a stay, but only as to
initial DACA applications and applications
for DACA-based advance parole. The Court
is unmoved by the government's assertion of
injury resulting from its being "enjoined from
implementing an act of Congress." Gov't's
Mot. at 8. As the Court has already explained,
DHS has been implementing that act of
Congress (the Immigration and Nationality
Act) under an ill-considered (and hence
possibly incorrect) understanding of its
enforcement authority. Unlike an injunction
prohibiting the exercise of statutory authority
altogether, this Court's order simply corrects
the improper exercise of that authority. To
the extent that such an injury is cognizable at
all, it is insufficient to justify staying the
Court's order here.

The third factor, the risk of injury to
plaintiffs, again favors continuing the stay as
to initial DACA applications and applications
for advance parole, but not as to renewal
applications. Although the government
maintains that the termination of existing
DACA benefits—which would immediately
end
DACA
beneficiaries'
work
authorizations and could lead to their
removal from the United States—is not an
irreparable harm, this untenable proposition
has been rejected by this Court and by several
others. And although there are currently two
preliminary injunctions in place requiring
DHS to continue accepting renewal
applications, as the Court has previously
noted, "those injunctions are both on
expedited appeals and hence could be
reversed in the not-too-distant future." This
Court's order—which, unlike the preliminary
injunctions entered in parallel litigation, is a
final judgment—will therefore prevent
irreparable harm to plaintiffs and all current
DACA beneficiaries should those other
injunctions be reversed. Hence, it will not be
stayed as to renewal applications.

The Court accepts, however, that the
additional staff and other resources required
for DHS to process initial DACA
applications would constitute a cognizable
injury.
DHS
estimates
that
full
implementation of the Court's order would
lead to the filing of over 100,000 initial
DACA applications and 30,000 requests for
advance parole, which would in turn require
the hiring of 72 temporary employees and the
reassignment or hiring of 60 full-time
employees. But these burdens apply only as
to initial DACA applications, since DHS has
been accepting renewal applications since
mid-2012, with the exception of a brief
period in late 2017 and early 2018. The
second factor therefore favors plaintiffs'
proposed limited stay, not the government's
full stay.

By contrast, the Court agrees with the district
court in Regents that "while plaintiffs have
demonstrated that DACA recipients . . . are
likely to suffer substantial, irreparable harm
as a result
The second factor therefore favors plaintiffs'
proposed limited stay, not the government's
full stay. of the rescission, they have not
made a comparable showing as to individuals
who have never applied for or obtained
DACA" benefits. The same is true of advance
parole. Thus, like the second factor, the third
factor supports a stay as to initial DACA
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applications and applications for advance
parole, but not as to renewal applications.

Finally, the government has moved for
clarification that the Court's August 3, 2018
order was a final, appealable judgment. The
government also seeks an order dismissing
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to
DACA's rescission as moot. Plaintiffs oppose
the dismissal of their constitutional claims
but agree that the Court's August 3, 2018
order is final and appealable.

The fourth and final factor—the public
interest—also favors this limited stay. The
Court has already recognized the disruption
that would ensue if DHS were to begin
accepting initial DACA applications
pursuant to the Court's order but that order
were later reversed on appeal. Just as this
potential for disruption previously counseled
in favor of a 90-day stay of the Court's order
of vacatur, it now suggests that the public
interest would be served by a stay pending
appeal as to initial DACA applications. Like
the second and third factors, however, this
fourth factor does not support a stay as to
renewal applications, since DHS is already
accepting those applications.

Initially, the Court deferred ruling on
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to
DACA's rescission pending DHS's response
to the April 24, 2018 order vacating DACA's
rescission
on
administrative
grounds. Because the Court has since
declined to reconsider its April 24, 2018
order, a decision on plaintiffs' constitutional
challenges to DACA's rescission is
unnecessary. Moreover, the Court has
already entered final judgment on plaintiffs'
remaining administrative and constitutional
claims. Thus, the Court's August 3, 2018
order denying reconsideration "adjudicat[ed]
all the claims and all the parties' rights and
liabilities" in this action and was therefore a
final, appealable order.

In sum, because the government's appeal
raises "serious legal questions," and because
the remaining factors—harm to DHS, harm
to DACA beneficiaries, and the public
interest—favor a stay of the Court's order of
vacatur as to initial DACA applications and
applications for DACA-based advance
parole, the Court will grant the government's
request for a stay as to those applications. But
because the three equitable factors do not
favor a stay as to applications for the renewal
of DACA benefits, pursuant to the "sliding
scale" approach employed in this Circuit, the
Court will not stay its order as to renewal
applications. And the Court notes again that
plaintiffs agree to this limited stay of the
Court's
order
pending
appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, the government's
motion for a stay pending appeal will be
granted in part, and the Court will stay its
order of vacatur as it applies to initial DACA
applications and applications for DACAbased advance parole. The government's
motion to clarify will also be granted. A
separate order has been issued on this date.
ORDER

II. MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Upon consideration of [the government's
unopposed motion for clarification and the
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government's motion for a stay pending
appeal, and for the reasons given in the
Memorandum Opinion issued on this date, it
is hereby

government's appeal in this matter to the
extent that those orders require the
Department of Homeland Security to begin
accepting initial DACA applications or
applications for advance parole under the
DACA program; it is further

ORDERED that the motion for clarification
is GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED that, in all other respects, the
stay of the April 24, 2018 and August 3, 2018
orders is LIFTED and those orders shall take
immediate effect; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court's April 24, 2018
and August 3, 2018 orders are clarified to
constitute together a final, appealable
judgment that "adjudicat[ed] all the claims
and all the parties' rights and liabilities" in
this action.

ORDERED that the motion for a stay
pending appeal is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART; it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62(c), [69] the April 24, 2018
order vacating the rescission of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA")
program and [77] the August 3, 2018 order
denying reconsideration of the April 24, 2018
order
are STAYED pending
the

SO ORDERED.
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McAleenan v. Vidal
Ruling Below: Nielsen v. Vidal., F.2d (2nd Cir. 2018).
Overview: This is a case concerning whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to
wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and
whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim.
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.
Kirstjen M. NIELSEN, Secretary of Homeland Security, Et Al., Petitioner
v.
Martin Jonathan Batalla VIDAL, Et Al., Plaintiff-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on July 5, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
POOLER, RAGGI, HALL, Circuit Judges:
It is further ORDERED that these appeals, as
well as the appeals docketed under 2d Cir.
18-1521 and 18-1525, be heard in tandem
with Petitioners’ appeals of the district
court’s February 13, 2018, preliminary
injunction, 2d Cir. 18-485 and 18-488.

Petitioners move, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), for leave to appeal November 9,
2017, and March 29, 2018, orders of the
district court denying their motions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim. Upon due consideration, it is
hereby ORDERED that the petitions are
GRANTED.

Petitioners are directed to file a scheduling
notification within 14 days of the
date of entry of this order pursuant to Second
Circuit Local Rule 31.2.
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“It’s Now the Supreme Court’s Turn to Try to Resolve the Fate of the Dreamers”
The New York Times
Michael D. Shear and Adam Liptak
June 28, 2019
For seven years, the so-called Dreamers —
nearly 800,000 young men and women who
were brought to the United States illegally as
children — have lived in limbo, protected
from immediate deportation but without the
guarantee of any permanent future in the
United States.

Members of both parties, as well as Mr.
Trump on several occasions, have expressed
sympathy for the Dreamers, many of them
fully assimilated young men and women in
school or with careers. But there is no
evidence that a deal is likely.
For years, lawmakers have failed to reach any
kind of consensus despite repeated attempts
at negotiation. In 2018, a possible deal
collapsed amid demands from Mr. Trump for
restrictive changes to immigration laws and
billions of dollars to build a wall along the
southwestern border.

On Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to
resolve their fate, an announcement that sets
in motion what is likely to be a yearlong legal
clash over immigration policy and the power
of the presidency that will probably
culminate next summer with a ruling by the
justices.

This month, the Democrat-led House passed
sweeping legislation that would provide a
path to citizenship for Dreamers and other
immigrants whose legal status Mr. Trump has
targeted. But the legislation is already
languishing in the Republican-controlled
Senate, where opponents view it as amnesty
for lawbreakers.

But by agreeing to take the case, the Supreme
Court also provided a window of opportunity
during which the Republicans and Democrats
in Congress could permanently resolve the
status of the young immigrants, perhaps by
giving them a chance to earn citizenship.
At stake is a program that protects Dreamers
known as Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA, that President Barack
Obama created through executive action in
2012. Mr. Trump tried to end the program in
2017, calling it an “end-run around
Congress” and saying that Mr. Obama’s use
of executive authority to protect the
immigrants violated “the core tenets that
sustain our Republic.”

“We will continue to fight tirelessly to protect
these outstanding young men and women as
we work to ensure America remains a nation
of hope, freedom and opportunity for all,”
Speaker Nancy Pelosi said in a statement
after the court’s announcement on Friday.
Immigration advocacy groups have said they
plan to urge Dreamers to renew their
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protections under DACA, which expire every
two years, until the fate of the program is
decided by Congress or the Supreme Court.
Since July 1, the federal government has
approved more than 373,000 renewal
requests.

reach a deal. But that faded when a lower
court judge blocked his decision to end
DACA and ordered the government to
continue operating it.
In November, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco, ruled against the administration. It
acknowledged that presidents have broad
powers to alter the policies of earlier
administrations but said the legal rationale
offered by the Trump administration did not
withstand scrutiny. The court also questioned
“the cruelty and wastefulness of deporting
productive young people to countries with
which they have no ties.”

During his 2016 presidential campaign, Mr.
Trump vowed to end the DACA program,
making it part of the anti-immigrant message
that helped fire up his supporters. When he
won, he promised to follow through even as
he expressed sympathy for the Dreamers, a
group of whom he had met with years earlier.
On the day of his inauguration, he told a
Democratic senator that he should not worry
about the young immigrants.

In May, a second federal appeals court, the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Va., issued a
similar ruling.

But by September 2017, a group of
conservative state attorneys general were
threatening to sue the government if the
president refused to make good on his
promise to end the DACA program. Against
the advice of lawmakers in both parties, Mr.
Trump ordered that the program be
terminated.

The Trump administration has long sought to
persuade the Supreme Court to rule on
whether it had the authority to cancel the
program. But the justices turned down an
unusual petition seeking review in January
2018, before any appeals court had ruled. The
administration asked again in November, not
long before the Ninth Circuit ruled.

At the same time, Mr. Trump delayed the
program’s end by six months, saying he
wanted to give Congress time to pass
legislation that would permanently protect
the Dreamers from deportation and give them
an eventual path to citizenship.

For many months, the Supreme Court took
no action on the request, which was at odds
with the court’s usual practice.
On Friday, before the justices left for their
summer break, the court agreed to hear an
appeal of the Ninth Circuit decision,
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents
of the University of California, No. 18-587,
along with two others in which appeals courts
have not yet ruled: Trump v. NAACP, No.

“We will resolve the DACA issue with heart
and compassion — but through the lawful
Democratic process,” Mr. Trump said in a
statement after ending the program. “It is
now time for Congress to act!”
Mr. Trump’s six-month deadline initially put
pressure on lawmakers in both parties to
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18-588, and McAleenan v. Vidal, No. 18589.

In its decision in November, the Ninth Circuit
said the two programs differed in important
ways, rejecting the administration’s legal
analysis. The appeals court affirmed a
nationwide
injunction
ordering
the
administration to retain major elements of the
program while the case moved forward.

The administration has argued that the
program was an unconstitutional exercise of
executive authority, relying on a ruling from
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, that shut down
a related program created by Mr. Obama,
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents, or DAPA,
saying he had exceeded his statutory
authority.

Such nationwide injunctions, which have
been used by courts to block executive
actions in both the Obama and the Trump
administrations, have been the subject of
much commentary and criticism.

In his executive action establishing DAPA,
which was blocked by courts before it went
into effect, Mr. Obama would have allowed
as many as five million unauthorized
immigrants who were the parents of citizens
or of lawful permanent residents to apply for
a program sparing them from deportation and
providing them work permits.

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in
the case during its next term, which starts in
October. If a deal is not reached, a decision
by the court next summer could roil the
presidential campaign, no matter which way
the court rules.
A decision to let the Trump administration
end the program could energize angry
Democratic
voters and
immigration
advocates to campaign even more
aggressively against the president. If the
court prevents Mr. Trump from ending
DACA, that could fire up his base of voters.

After the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in
2016, the Supreme Court deadlocked, 4 to 4,
in an appeal of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling,
leaving it in place and ending what Mr.
Obama had hoped would become one of his
central legacies.
The Trump administration has argued that the
DAPA ruling meant that DACA was also
unlawful.
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“Supreme Court to Review DACA Program Protecting Young Undocumented
Immigrants”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
June 28, 2019
The Supreme Court announced Friday it will
consider next term whether the Trump
administration illegally tried to end the
program that shields from deportation young
undocumented immigrants brought to the
United States as children.

no end, so far — between Congress and the
White House. Initiated in 2012 by a
proclamation from President Barack Obama,
DACA has protected from deportation nearly
700,000 people brought to the United States
as children, a group that’s been labeled
“dreamers.”

Lower courts have said that President
Trump’s decision to terminate the Obama-era
program was based on faulty legal reasoning
and that the administration has failed to
provide a solid rationale for ending it.

The justices have considered since January
whether to review a ruling against the
administration from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit in California. It
recently denied a request to expedite review
of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit.

The Supreme Court’s somewhat reluctant
review of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program means that, for the
third consecutive year, the high court will
pass judgment on a Trump priority that has
been stifled by federal judges — this time in
a presidential election year and in a case with
passionate advocates and huge consequences.

A political solution that would relieve the
court of having to decide the program’s
legality has not been forthcoming. Some
experts in the field have wondered if the
court’s acceptance of the case, or a decision
next term, might spur action.

The Supreme Court ended its term Thursday
by putting on hold the Trump
administration’s plan to put a citizenship
question on the 2020 Census. In 2018, it
narrowly approved the president’s travel
ban on arrivals from a handful of mostly
Muslim countries.

The Trump administration moved to scuttle
the program in 2017 after Texas and other
states threatened to sue to force its end. ThenAttorney General Jeff Sessions advised the
Department of Homeland Security that the
program was probably unlawful and that it
could not be defended.

The DACA program has become politically
volatile and the object of negotiations — to
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Sessions based that decision on a ruling by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit,
which said that another Obama program
protecting immigrants was beyond the
president’s constitutional powers. The
Supreme Court deadlocked 4 to 4 in 2016
when considering the issue.

The fight over the young people protected by
the program — the average age is around 24
— has been a fierce battle between Trump
and Democrats, who largely defend the
initiative.
Trump at times has said he would like to find
a way to protect those in the program, but
attempts to work out a political compromise
have foundered amid the larger partisan
debate over immigration and border security.

But other courts have rejected that theory,
saying DACA is different. They have kept
the program in place, requiring that those
already enrolled be allowed to renew their
participation. California Attorney General
Xavier Becerra (D), who is among those
fighting the administration’s decision, said
that more than 373,000 two-year renewals
have been approved since January 2018.

The administration has been eager to get the
issue before the Supreme Court, where it
believes the more conservative wing will be
on its side.
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco,
representing the administration at the
Supreme Court, said in a brief that the cases
“concern the Executive Branch’s authority to
revoke a discretionary policy of nonenforcement that is sanctioning an ongoing
violation of federal immigration law by
nearly 700,000 aliens.”

Those approved to be in the program are
allowed work permits and are protected from
deportation, as long as they abide by its
regulations and do not violate laws.
“DACA reflects our nation’s commitment to
helping hardworking people and creates hope
and opportunity for a new generation —
many of whom were brought to our country
as toddlers,” Becerra said in a statement after
the Supreme Court announcement.

So far, appeals courts in California, New
York, Virginia and a district judge in the
District of Columbia have said that reasoning
is wrong. (A judge in Texas said the program
was illegal but declined to rule that it should
cease.) The judges who have ruled against the
Department of Homeland Security’s
justification for ending DACA say it must be
based on more than just a belief about its
legal underpinnings.

“So far, both lower courts in our legal fight to
protect DACA have agreed with us that the
Trump Administration’s attempt to end it was
unlawful.”
Judges who have blocked ending the program
have said the administration could remedy
the legal impasse by providing a detailed
reasoning of why the program should be
abolished. Instead, it has continued to combat
the orders in court.

“To be clear: we do not hold that DACA
could not be rescinded as an exercise of
Executive Branch discretion,” Judge Kim
McLane Wardlaw said in the 9th Circuit’s
opinion. “We hold only that here, where the
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Executive did not make a discretionary
choice to end DACA — but rather acted
based on an erroneous view of what the law
required — the rescission was arbitrary and
capricious under settled law.”

University of California; Trump v. NAACP
and McAleenan v. Vidal.
The court accepted a bundle of new cases
Friday before the justices scattered for
vacations and summer teaching gigs.

The regents of the University of California,
one of the parties challenging the
administration, told the Supreme Court there
was no hurry to take the case because each
DACA recipient had been vetted by the
federal government.

In one, it granted petitions from Bridget
Kelly and Bill Baroni, two former aides to
former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R)
who were convicted of felonies in 2016 for
their parts in causing gridlock near the
George Washington Bridge as retaliation
against a mayor who did not support their
boss.

The university leadership quoted a tweet
from Trump to argue that not even this
administration was advocating immediate
deportation.

The case is Kelly v. United States.
The justices said they will also review a
Montana Supreme Court ruling invalidating a
state program offering tax credits for funding
scholarships. The scholarships could be used
at private schools, including religious
schools, and the court said that violated a
prohibition in the state constitution.

“Does anybody really want to throw out
good, educated and accomplished young
people who have jobs, some serving in the
military? Really!” the president tweeted in
September.
The court accepted three cases, which will be
consolidated for hearing in the new term that
starts in October. They are Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the

The case is Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue.
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“Supreme Court Doesn’t Act on Trump’s Appeal in ‘Dreamers’ Case”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
January 22, 2019
The Supreme Court took no action on
Tuesday on the Trump administration’s plans
to shut down a program that shields some
700,000 young undocumented immigrants
from deportation.

But federal judges have ordered the
administration to maintain major pieces of
the program, Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA, while legal challenges
move forward.

The court’s inaction almost certainly means
it will not hear the administration’s challenge
in its current term, which ends in June. The
justices’ next private conference to consider
petitions seeking review is scheduled for Feb.
15.

In November, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco, ruled against the administration. It
acknowledged that presidents have broad
powers to alter the policies of earlier
administrations but said that the legal
rationale
offered
by
the
Trump
administration did not withstand scrutiny.
The court also questioned “the cruelty and
wastefulness of deporting productive young
people to countries with which they have no
ties.”

Even were they to agree to hear the case then,
it would not be argued until after the next
term starts in October under the court’s usual
procedures. A decision would probably not
arrive until well into 2020.
The move left the program in place and
denied negotiating leverage to President
Trump, who has said he wanted to use a
Supreme Court victory in the case in
negotiations
with
Democrats
over
immigration issues.

Mr. Trump has criticized that ruling and has
said he would be vindicated in the Supreme
Court. He also predicted that a Supreme
Court victory in the case, United States
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents
of the University of California, No. 18-587,
would strengthen his hand in negotiations
with
Democratic
lawmakers
over
immigration issues.

Mr. Trump tried to end the program in 2017,
calling it an unconstitutional use of executive
power by his predecessor and reviving the
threat of deportation for immigrants who had
been brought to the United States illegally as
young children.

“I think it’s going to be overturned in the
United States Supreme Court, and I think it’s
going to be overwhelmingly overturned,” Mr.
Trump said at a cabinet meeting this month,
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adding, “So if we win that case — and I say
this for all to hear — we’ll be easily able to
make a deal on DACA and the wall as a
combination.”

ordering the administration to retain major
elements of the program while the case
moved
forward.
Such
nationwide
injunctions, which have been used by courts
to block executive actions in both the Obama
and the Trump administrations, have been the
subject of much commentary and criticism.

Mr. Trump has taken inconsistent positions
on the program. Even as he tried to end it, he
called upon Congress to give legal status and
an eventual path to citizenship to the young
immigrants, who are sometimes called
“Dreamers.” More recently, he offered to
extend the program in exchange for
concessions on a border wall.

Also on Tuesday, the administration told the
court that it would ask it to hear an appeal
of a trial judge’s ruling barring the addition
of a question on citizenship to the next
census. The administration’s filing said it
would ask the justices to bypass the appeals
court and put the case on a very fast track,
culminating in arguments in April or May.

The administration has argued that the
program, instituted by the Obama
administration, was an unconstitutional
exercise of executive authority, relying on a
ruling from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans,
concerning a related program. The Supreme
Court deadlocked, 4 to 4, in an appeal of that
ruling.

That was necessary, the solicitor general,
Noel J. Francisco, wrote, because “the
government must finalize the census
questionnaire by the end of June 2019 to
enable it to be printed on time.”
“It is exceedingly unlikely that there is
sufficient time for review in both the court of
appeals and in this court by that deadline,”
Mr. Francisco wrote.

But the Ninth Circuit said the two programs
differed in important ways, undermining the
administration’s legal analysis. The appeals
court affirmed a nationwide injunction
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“Appeals court finds Trump administration’s move to end DACA ‘arbitrary and
capricious’”
The Washington Post
Ann E. Marimow and Robert Barnes
May 17, 2019
A federal appeals court ruled Friday that the
Trump administration had been “arbitrary
and capricious” in its bid to end an Obamaera
program
that
shields
young
undocumented immigrants from deportation.

justices are waiting for all of the appeals
courts considering the issue to weigh in;
another case challenging the administration’s
DACA decision has been argued in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
partially reversed an earlier ruling in the case
brought by the immigrant advocacy
organization CASA de Maryland.

In the case decided Friday, Judge Julius N.
Richardson said in his dissent that the
administration had acted within its authority
and noted the limited role of the judiciary.

In a 2-to-1 decision, the court said the
government had failed to “give a reasoned
explanation for the change in policy,
particularly given the significant” interests
involved, according to the majority opinion
written by Judge Albert Diaz and joined by
Judge Robert King.

“It is not our place to second-guess the
wisdom of the discretionary decisions made
by the other branches. The rescission of
DACA was a controversial and contentious
decision, but one that was committed to the
executive branch,” wrote Richardson, who
was recently named to the court by President
Trump. Diaz was nominated by President
Barack Obama, and King by President Bill
Clinton.

The decision is similar to one reached by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The
Trump administration has asked the Supreme
Court to intervene. But the request has been
pending for months, and the justices have
stopped putting the case on their weekly
discussion list.

The Justice Department declined to comment
on the ruling Friday.
“We recognize the struggle is not over and
there are more battles to fight in the Supreme
Court on this road to justice, but our families
are emboldened by knowing that they are on
the right side of history — the only question
is whether all this country’s institutions can
be certain of the same,” said Gustavo Torres,

It is expected that the Supreme Court will
have to deliver the final word on the program,
called Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA, most likely in the term
that begins in October. It could be that the
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executive director of CASA de Maryland, the
immigrant organization that was the lead
plaintiff in the case.

Judge in Maryland has just ruled that
‘President Trump has the right to end
DACA,’ ” Trump wrote.

A series of lower-court judges ruled against
the administration, finding that Trump’s
decision to end the program was based on
faulty legal reasoning. Those decisions
allowed immigrants already enrolled to
renew their participation — meaning DACA
remained in place. The program has shielded
nearly 700,000 young people, often referred
to as “dreamers.”

In his decision, Titus, who was appointed to
the federal bench in Maryland by President
George W. Bush and died in March,
criticized Trump for his “unfortunate and
often inflammatory rhetoric,” and noted that,
were he not a judge constrained to
interpreting the law, he would opt for a
different result.
“An overwhelming percentage of Americans
support protections for ‘Dreamers,’ yet it is
not the province of the judiciary to provide
legislative or executive actions when those
entrusted with those responsibilities fail to
act,” Titus wrote, adding later, “This Court
does not like the outcome of this case, but is
constrained by its constitutionally limited
role to the result that it has reached.
Hopefully, the Congress and the President
will finally get their job done.”

The ruling from the Richmond-based 4th
Circuit partly reverses a decision from the
late U.S. District Judge Roger W. Titus of
Maryland, who last year said — in a ruling
that broke with the views from lower courts
— that the administration had the authority to
wind down the program.
Trump cited that decision in his favor in a
message at the time on Twitter: “Federal
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“Federal Appellate Court Sides with UC Regents in Fight to Preserve DACA”
Daily Bruin
Megana Sekar
November 8, 2018
A federal appeals court supported the
University of California Board of Regents in
their case against the current federal
administration’s decision to end Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals on Thursday.

because it made the choice about how to
direct deportation resources. She said
executive agencies do not have the resources
to deport every undocumented individual,
which led Obama to pause deportation
proceedings for minors through the creation
of DACA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit blocked the Department of
Homeland Security’s decision to terminate
DACA benefits and discontinue applications.
The three-judge panel supported past
decisions that required the Trump
administration
continue
accepting
applications and renewals.

The Court said the government’s decision to
repeal DACA was based on an arbitrary and
possibly misguided view of the law, and is
therefore subject to review by the courts.
UC spokesperson Claire Doan said in a
statement the University welcomes the
appellate court’s decision and is now calling
on the Trump administration to stop its
efforts to repeal DACA.

DACA is an executive action issued by
former President Barack Obama in 2012 to
help undocumented individuals who arrived
to the country as children to obtain work
permits, college degrees and driver’s
licenses. Trump announced he would rescind
the program in September 2017, and the UC
countered immediately, saying the repeal
violated undocumented persons’ due process
rights.

Doan added while Thursday’s ruling was a
win for the UC, Congress must enact
permanent protections for DACA recipients
including a path to citizenship, so students
will not have to worry about their futures.
On Monday, the United States Department of
Justice and the U.S. solicitor general filed a
petition asking the Supreme Court to decide
the issue before the ninth circuit court made
its decision. The Supreme Court previously
rejected a similar request to pre-emptively
intervene in February. The Trump
administration is expected to appeal this

UC President Janet Napolitano was the U.S.
secretary of Homeland Security under
President Obama when he created DACA.
One of the ninth circuit judges, Kim McLane
Wardlaw, said the Obama administration did
not overreach the executive branch’s powers
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decision until the issue reaches the highest
court.
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“U.S Court Orders Trump Administration to Fully Reinstate DACA Program”
Reuters
Andrew Chung
August 3, 2018
A federal judge on Friday ruled that the
Trump administration must fully restore a
program that protects from deportation some
young immigrants who were brought to the
United States illegally as children, including
accepting new applications for the program.

The program was created in 2012 under
former President Barack Obama, a Democrat.
Two other federal courts in California and
New York had previously ordered that
DACA remain in place while litigation
challenging Trump’s decision to end it
continued. Those rulings only required the
government to process DACA renewals, not
new applications.

U.S. District Judge John Bates in
Washington, D.C., said he would stay
Friday’s order, however, until August 23 to
give the administration time to decide
whether to appeal. Bates first issued a ruling
in April ordering the federal government to
continue the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA, program, including
taking applications. He stayed that ruling for
90 days to give the government time to better
explain why the program should be ended.

Another lawsuit in a Texas federal court is
seeking to end DACA.
A spokesman for the U.S. Department of
Justice said on Friday that the government
would continue to defend its position that it
“acted within its lawful authority in deciding
to wind down DACA in an orderly manner.”

On Friday Bates, who was appointed by
former President George W. Bush, a
Republican, said he would not revise his
previous ruling because the arguments of
President Donald Trump’s administration did
not override his concerns.

Congress so far has failed to pass legislation
to address the fate of the Dreamers, including
a potential path to citizenship.
Friday’s ruling came in lawsuits filed by
several groups and institutions, including the
National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and Princeton University.

Under DACA, roughly 700,000 young
adults, often referred to as “Dreamers”, were
protected from deportation and given work
permits for two-year periods, after which
they must re-apply to the program.
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“Federal Judge Says Trump Administration Failed to Justify DACA Rescission”
Politifact
Miriam Valverde
August 6, 2018
A federal judge said the Trump
administration's rescission of a program
deferring the deportation of young
immigrants was "arbitrary and capricious"
because it "failed adequately to explain its
conclusion that the program was unlawful."

"We believe the judge's ruling is
extraordinarily broad and wrong on the law,"
White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee
Sanders said at an April 25 briefing.
The case before Bates, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, was
brought by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and the
Trustees of Princeton University.

U.S. District Judge John D. Bates on April 24
gave the administration 90 days to issue a
new memo rescinding Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (or DACA) that gives a
"fuller explanation" on why the program
lacks statutory and constitutional authority.

Bates said the Trump administration had not
cited any statutory provision with which
DACA was in conflict.

Without a new memo, the initial September
directive rescinding DACA will be vacated,
and the original program will be
restored, Bates wrote. That means the
administration would have to resume
accepting and processing new applications
for DACA, in addition to renewal requests.

The Justice Department said the ruling did
not change its stance challenging DACA's
constitutionality.
"DACA was implemented unilaterally after
Congress declined to extend benefits to this
same group of illegal aliens," said Justice
Department spokesman Devin O'Malley.

Earlier this year, and in separate cases,
federal judges in California and New
York ordered the Trump administration to
continue the program and accept renewal
applications. The September memo said no
new renewal applications would be accepted
after Oct. 5, 2017. The administration in
those previous cases had not been ordered to
accept new applications.

O'Malley said DACA "was an unlawful
circumvention of Congress" and susceptible
to the same legal challenges that "effectively
ended" another Obama-era program,
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents.
Pending a new memo and the judge's
evaluation of its merits, we continue to rate
this promise as In the Works.
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“Supreme Court Says White House Can Withhold DACA Documents for Now”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall
December 8, 2017
A divided Supreme Court on Friday
temporarily blocked a lower court from
requiring the Trump administration to release
internal documents related to its September
decision to end a program protecting
undocumented immigrants who came to the
U.S. as children.

overstepped his authority on behalf of illegal
immigrants.
“The Department of Justice is pleased with
the Supreme Court’s decision today putting
on hold the district court’s overreach,” said
department spokesman Devin O’Malley.
“The Department of Homeland Security
acted within its lawful authority in deciding
to wind down DACA in an orderly manner,
and the Justice Department believes the
courts will ultimately agree.”

The court’s emergency action halting the
document release comes just days after it
issued an emergency order for the White
House in another major case, allowing
President Donald Trump’s latest travel ban
affecting six predominantly Muslim
countries to be fully implemented during
litigation over the policy.

“What is the Trump administration trying so
hard to hide?” California Attorney General
Xavier Becerra said after the court’s action.
“The administration owes the American
people a real explanation for its decision to
upend the lives of 800,000 Dreamers,
stripping them of their ability to work and
study, stirring fear and threatening our
economy.”

Federal courts in San Francisco had ordered
the White House and several agencies to turn
over the materials in response to suits filed by
the states of California, Maine, Maryland and
Minnesota, among other parties, over plans to
end the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, an Obama administration program
that has allowed some 800,000 young
people to work in the U.S. since 2012.

The challengers argue that the termination
violates both the Constitution and the
Administrative Procedure Act, and sought
records documenting the method by which
the government reached its decision. They
argued that access to the records was crucial
in assessing whether the administration
changed policy positions in an arbitrary
manner.

DACA, as the program is known, is
scheduled to end in March. Attorney General
Jeff Sessions recommended the policy shift
in September, reiterating his long-held belief
that President Barack Obama had
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The government produced 256 pages, of
which 192 were court opinions from
litigation over a separate Obama-era
program, never implemented because of
court orders, that would have temporarily
protected
from
deportation
illegal
immigrants whose children are U.S. citizens.

“Judicial review cannot function if the
agency is permitted to decide unilaterally
what documents it submits to the reviewing
court as the administrative record,” Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote in a 10-page dissent,
joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.

U.S. District Judge William Alsup, of the
Northern District of California, said the
administration released very few documents
related to its decision and “excluded highly
relevant materials from the administrative
record.” He ordered the government to
provide DACA-related materials considered
by Elaine Duke, who was then-acting
secretary of Homeland Security, and by
officials who provided input or advice on
canceling the program. Judge Alsup’s
decision was upheld by the Ninth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals.

“Effective review depends upon the
administrative record containing all relevant
materials presented to the agency, including
not only materials supportive of the
government’s decision but also materials
contrary to the government’s decision,” the
dissent said.
In an unusual move, Judge Alsup submitted a
statement to the Supreme Court explaining
his discovery orders.
The government’s petition “leaves the
incorrect impression that the district court
endorsed unfettered discovery toward
defendants,” Judge Alsup wrote. Instead, he
says, “any discovery should be ‘limited,
narrowly directed, [and] reasonable.’ ”

The Trump administration asked the
Supreme Court to block that disclosure,
maintaining that its decision to cancel DACA
fell beyond judicial review, and that even if
the lawsuits could proceed, it had no
obligation to disclose the records.

Judge Alsup wrote that he reviewed 84
DACA-related documents the government
produced and ruled that 48 of them didn’t
qualify for a privilege allowing the
government to withhold them.

The Supreme Court, voting 5-to-4 along
conservative-liberal lines, halted release of
the materials while considering the
government’s arguments. The court gave the
challengers until Dec. 13 to file their legal
response.

Additionally, he said that while the
government acknowledged that “verbal
inputs” likely influenced the decision to
cancel DACA, they were omitted from the
administrative record.

The majority acted without comment.
The dissenters, however, contended that the
government had scant justification to
withhold the documents.

Separately, the Trump administration has
been fighting a similar order to produce
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documents in a New York lawsuit filed by 16
states and DACA recipients.

administration’s
withdrawal
of
the
immigration policy was “immune from
judicial review,” as Justice Department
lawyers had argued.

A federal trial judge in Brooklyn ordered the
government in October to turn over materials
considered by the departments of Justice and
Homeland Security in connection with
ending DACA.

Judge Garaufis rejected those arguments in a
ruling last month, clearing the way for the
lawsuit to move forward. The Second Circuit
is considering whether to lift the hold on his
order requiring the government to turn over
DACA-related documents.

The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
had paused the order until U.S. District Judge
Nicholas Garaufis considered whether the
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“DACA Has Not Been Saved—And It May Be In Its Last Days”
Pacific Standard
Jack Herrera
November 26, 2018
If you read headlines in the last month, you
might think that the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program, known as
DACA, was in good shape. "Dreamers Win
Round in Legal Battle to Keep DACA,"
the New
York Times
announced on
November 8th, the day a federal appeals court
upheld a California judge's injunction
forbidding the Trump administration from
rescinding the program. "Today's decision is
a tremendous victory," Xavier Becerra,
California's attorney general, said in a
statement.

For the past 14 months, as her DACA status
has remained uncertain, Marquez Robles and
her mother have taken turns sending each
other news and updates from the courts. Their
near-daily check-ins about the program
began in September of 2017, when the
Trump administration announced its decision
to end the Obama-era program that protects
certain undocumented immigrants who
arrived in the country as children from
deportation.
That announcement threw DACA recipients
like Marquez Robles into a state of
deep uncertainty. Besides
the
sudden
inability to renew their DACA status,
Dreamers had to contend with a new threat:
The government had their names on a list of
all DACA applicants. What if the immigranthostile Trump administration used that list to
locate and deport young immigrants and their
families?

For many Dreamers (as DACA recipients are
commonly called), however, the month's
news, like other supposed wins for DACA,
inspired little optimism.
"I see a lot of people call [these court
decision] victories," says Indira Marquez
Robles, a DACA recipient attending
university in Atlanta. "In a way, I do see it as
a victory. But with these victories, there's no
real change. I always feel like it's more like
just holding on."

A slew of subsequent court cases assuaged
these immediate worries, at least temporarily.
Three judges, in three separate cases in
California, Washington, D.C., and New
York, issued injunctions preventing the
Trump administration from rescinding the
program. Though the administration can still
reject new applications, the injunctions
mandate that the government continue to
accept DACA renewals, as ending the

Legal experts tend to agree with Marquez
Robles. Though DACA has scored a string of
legal
successes
since
the
Trump
administration attempted to end the program,
these have done little to protect the program.
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program for existing recipients would be,
according to the California judge, "arbitrary
and capricious." (That judge's opinion,
in Regents of the University of California v.
Department of Homeland Security, was the
one that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit
earlier this month.) Marquez Robles renewed
her status this year, as have thousands of
other Dreamers since the California court
first issued the injunction.

winding their way through an appeals
process. Depending on how higher courts
rule in the coming months, the injunctions
protecting Dreamers could disappear for
good.
But Marquez Robles says she's noticed that
the public's attention toward the program's
fate has steadily diminished since last year.
Teachers and other people in her life used to
check in on her, but now the issues facing
DACA recipients seems to have slipped out
of many peoples' minds.

Another court case, this one in Maryland,
dealt with the issue of the list—the
government's collection of DACA-recipient
names. Two different agencies come into
play in the decision. The first, United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services, is the
agency that actually has the list. The
Department
of
Homeland
Security
houses USCIS, as well as the primary agency
tasked with immigration enforcement:
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

"There was this whole surge of 'Defend
DACA' when it first got canceled," Marquez
Robles says. "Nowadays, some people still
talk about it. But I have to rely on the people
I've worked with in advocacy organizations,
or [other DACA recipients]. We check up on
each other."
Though DACA recipients and their advocates
remain anxious about DACA's status, the
program seems to have lost the
public's attention. And the periodic headlines
declaring new "victories" might create the
illusion, for those less informed, that DACA
is winning its fight.

As of now, USCIS has not shared the list of
names with ICE, and is barred from doing so
by the federal court in Maryland. In
the case, Casa de Maryland v. DHS, the court
issued an injunction barring the federal
government from sharing DACA-related
information with immigration enforcement,
except in limited scenarios—for instance, if a
DACA recipient has already been served a
notice to appear in court.

In reality, DACA is on the ropes. Right now,
the most immediate threats to the program
come from a judge in Houston, Texas, and the
Supreme Court.

As a result of these court decisions, DACA
recipients have gained back many of the
protections that disappeared back in
September of 2017. But those protections are
not set in stone. There has been no final
decision that determines DACA's status; all
the aforementioned court decisions are still

In Texas, U.S. District Judge Andrew Hanen,
one of the most notoriously anti-immigrant
judges
in
the
country—under
President Barack Obama, Hanen struck down
parts of DACA and prohibited a program that
would have protected undocumented parents
of U.S. citizens—is currently hearing Texas
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v. Nielsen, a case that could end DACA.
Unlike the court cases in California and other
states, Texas v. Nielsen does not consider
whether or not the Trump administration has
a right to end DACA, but instead considers
whether or not DACA is constitutional in the
first place. A coalition of states, led by Texas,
sued the federal government, alleging that the
program is illegal. Though Hanen surprised
legal observers by declining to issue a
preliminary injunction suspending DACA, he
has given strong indications that he intends to
rule DACA illegal. "If the nation truly wants
a DACA program it is up to Congress to say
so," Hanen said in August.

"Where do I think this is going to go? I don't
have a crystal ball," says Shoba Wadhia, a
law professor and director of the Center for
Immigrants' Rights Clinic. "But I think one
thing is clear: No court has found DACA to
be unconstitutional, and multiple courts
believe the government's justification for
ending DACA was arbitrary and a mistake of
law."
Wadhia co-authored a letter signed by over
100 law professors nationwide that argued
DACA is perfectly constitutional. However,
despite many legal scholars' belief in the
program's legality, the fact that the Trump
administration has asked the Supreme Court
to take up the Regents case could indicate
that they believe the Court—full with
Trump's
two
recent
conservative
appointees—will rule in the administration's
favor.

With the possibility of multiple competing
court rulings in the country, it's likely that the
nation's highest court will soon weigh in—
and when it comes to ending DACA, the
Trump administration has given indication
that it likes its chances. As Mayra Joachin, a
staff attorney with the National Immigration
Law Center, explains, the Trump
administration took the "rare and unusual"
step of asking the Supreme Court to take up
the Regentscase in California before it even
got to the Ninth Circuit.

With so many court cases, the future of
DACA is impossible to predict, but it's likely
that the judicial process protecting the
program will soon run out of steam, and the
program will lose its last defense. The
Supreme Court could rule against DACA in
the Regents case, or could confirm Hanen's
ruling if he eventually rules against the
program. The Casa de Marylandcase, which
stops ICE from getting a list of DACA
recipients, is still being appealed, so even that
last protection could vanish.

Joachin says that there is a "high likelihood"
that the Supreme Court will soon take up
the Regents case. Though the timeline is
difficult to predict, Joachin says that the
Court will likely announce its decision to take
up the case by early January, and then hear
oral arguments sometime in March and April.
Until then, the DACA program's status will
likely remain the same, unless the Supreme
Court cancels the lower court's injunction.

For Joachin and others in the undocumented
advocacy community, there is some hope that
Congress will step in and save the program
before it meets its end in the courts.
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"It's difficult to predict what will actually
pass within the new Congress, but statements
from [likely Speaker of the House] Nancy
Pelosi indicate that protecting DACA will be
a priority for Democrats," Joachin says.
The Congressional Progressive Caucus has
also indicated that DACA is a priority.

constantly changing legal situation. "It's been
a normalized process, being in this limbo,"
she says. With her future, and the future of
thousands of other Dreamers still in question,
she says all she can do now is focus on her
studies. "So much is uncertain and unclear,
but I'm still in college," she says. "I don't
want to disregard that privilege, and I want to
keep studying because that's the dream."

As so much remains up in the air, Marquez
Robles says she's begun to feel numb to the
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Kansas v. Garcia
Ruling Below: State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588 (2017).
Overview: Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding and, upon further information, police found
out that he illegally used social security number on various federal and state forms. He was charged
with identity theft under state law.
Issue: (1) Whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act expressly pre-empts the states from
using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common
information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person
(citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA
documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications; and (2) whether the
Immigration Reform and Control Act impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents.
STATE OF KANSAS, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
RAMIRO GARCIA, Defendant- Appellant
Supreme Court of Kansas
Decided on September 8, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
BEIER, Supreme Court Judge:
This companion case to State v. Morales
and State v. Ochoa-Lara, this day decided,
involves defendant Ramiro Garcia's
conviction on one count of identity theft.

defraud," an element of identity theft; (2)
whether the federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) preempted the
prosecution; and (3) whether it was clearly
erroneous for the district court judge not to
give a unanimity instruction. Because we
decide that Garcia's conviction must be
reversed because the State's prosecution
based on the Social Security number was
expressly preempted, we do not reach
Garcia's two other issues.

The State's basis for the charge was Garcia's
use of the Social Security number of Felisha
Munguia to obtain restaurant employment. A
Court of Appeals panel affirmed Garcia's
conviction in an unpublished opinion.
We granted Garcia's petition for review on
three issues: (1) whether there was sufficient
evidence that Garcia acted with an "intent to

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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On August 26, 2012, Officer Mike Gibson
pulled Garcia over for speeding. Gibson
asked Garcia where he was going in such a
hurry. Garcia replied that he was on his way
to work at Bonefish Grill. Based on the
results of a routine records check on Garcia,
Gibson contacted Detective Justin Russell,
who worked in the financial crimes
department of the Overland Park Police
Department. Russell was in the neighborhood
and came to the scene to speak with Garcia.

in violation of K.S.A. 21-6107, K.S.A. 216804 and K.S.A. 21-6807.
Before trial, Garcia filed a motion to suppress
the I-9 form he had filled out during the
hiring process, relying on an express
preemption provision in IRCA. At the
hearing on the motion, Garcia noted, and the
State agreed, that the State did not intend to
rely on the I-9 as a basis of prosecution.
Garcia then argued that, because the
information contained on the I-9 was
transferred to a W-4 form, the W-4 should be
suppressed as well. The district judge refused
to suppress the W-4.

The day after speaking with Garcia, Russell
contacted Bonefish Grill and obtained
Garcia's
"[e]mployment
application
documents, possibly the W-2, the I-9
documents." Russell then spoke with Special
Agent Joseph Espinosa of the Social Security
Office of the Inspector General. Espinosa
told Russell that the Social Security number
Garcia had used on the forms belonged to
Felisha Munguia of Edinburg, Texas.

At trial, Khalil Booshehri, a manager at
Bonefish Grill, testified that Garcia had been
a line cook for the restaurant and had been a
good employee. Booshehri testified that
Garcia was paid for his work as a line cook,
was allowed to eat while on duty, and was
eligible for overtime pay.

As a result of the investigation, Garcia was
charged with one count of identity theft. The
complaint alleged:

Jason Gajan, a managing partner at Bonefish
Grill, testified about the restaurant's hiring
process. The process typically begins with a
short, informal interview when a person
comes in looking for an application. If the
manager determines that the person meets the
restaurant's basic requirements, he or she is
given a card with instructions explaining how
to fill out an online application.

"That on or about the 25th day of May, 2012,
in the City of Overland Park, County of
Johnson, and State of Kansas, RAMIRO
ENRIQUEZ GARCIA did then and there
unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously obtain,
possess, transfer, use, sell or purchase any
personal identifying information, or
document containing the same, to wit:
[S]ocial [S]ecurity number belonging to or
issued to another person, to wit: Felisha
Munguia, with the intent to defraud that
person, or anyone else, in order to receive any
benefit, a severity level 8, nonperson felony,

With respect to Garcia's hiring specifically,
the State introduced his employment
application into evidence. The application
contained basic information about Garcia's
work history and education. The application
did not disclose a Social Security number,
although it contained a statement by Garcia
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that, if hired, he could verify his identity and
legal right to work in the United States.

Garcia would have received workers
compensation benefits had he been injured on
the job.

After receiving Garcia's application,
Bonefish Grill decided to hire Garcia.

The State's final witness was Espinosa. He
testified that he had searched the "Social
Security Master File Database" and
determined that the Social Security number
Garcia had used was not assigned to Garcia.
The number was assigned to Felisha Mari
Munguia, who was born in 1996. The
database showed that Munguia had been
issued a second Social Security card in 2000.
Espinosa also provided examples of
hypothetical consequences that might be
caused by a person using someone else's
Social Security number. In a "case
specifically like this," if a person were to

Once a hiring decision has been made, the
restaurant sends an e-mail to the new hire
with a packet of information, including
documents to fill out. Gajan believed that in
addition to the information packet, new hires
also received W-4 and I-9 forms.
Garcia filled out electronic W-4 and K-4 tax
forms, both of which were admitted into
evidence. Each of the forms contained a
Social Security number and was digitally
signed by Garcia. Gajan testified that, in
addition to the employee filling out the
forms, Gajan would have had to see a paper
Social Security card and then manually input
the number from the card into an electronic
document. After verifying the documents,
Gajan would also have digitally signed the
document himself. According to Gajan, he
could not have proceeded with the hiring
process if Garcia had not filled out the
required forms.

"come and work under your [S]ocial
[S]ecurity number, it would report
back wages for you[,] presumably
making you insured into federal
government programs that you may
have not otherwise been entitled to.
"Conversely to that, let's say that you
were receiving some disability or
retirement benefits from one of these
government
programs.
These
earnings could adversely affect you,
because it would indicate that you are
working when in fact you might not
be working, and you could be
terminated from those benefits."

Gajan also testified about the benefits
Bonefish Grill offered to employees and the
benefits Garcia received. According to
Gajan, Garcia was paid for the hours he
worked at Bonefish Grill, including overtime
pay on occasion. During his shifts, Garcia
was allowed to eat at the restaurant. In
addition, Bonefish Grill offered employees
health and dental insurance, as well as paid
vacation; but Gajan conceded that Garcia had
not worked at Bonefish Grill long enough to
receive these benefits. Gajan believed that

During cross-examination, Espinosa testified
that he had never spoken to Munguia.
In closing argument, the prosecutor
acknowledged that Garcia was "a hard
worker" and "did well at his job." He
329

conceded that "Mr. Booshehri did everything
but tell you he was a very valuable employee.
Mr. Gajan had nothing bad to say about him.
He worked hard for Bonefish." But,
according to the State, those facts did not
matter because "in the State of Kansas, you
cannot work under someone else's [S]ocial
[S]ecurity number." The prosecutor also
noted that Gajan "would not have hired
[Garcia] if he did not have a [S]ocial
[S]ecurity number."

discern eight possible ways a party may
challenge an application of state law, alleging
it is preempted by federal law.
First, there are traditionally two basic types
of such challenges: facial and asapplied. When a party raises a facial
challenge to application of state law, he or
she claims that the law is preempted in all or
virtually all cases.
In contrast, when a party raises an as-applied
preemption challenge, he or she argues that
state law may be constitutional when applied
in some cases but not in the particular
circumstances of his or her case. In an asapplied challenge, the law under scrutiny can
itself be "textually neutral," meaning "one
[cannot] tell that the" law undermines federal
policy "by looking at the text [alone]. Only
when studying certain applications of the
laws" do conflicts arise.

After deliberations, the jury found Garcia
guilty of identity theft. The district judge later
sentenced Garcia to 7 months in prison but
granted 18 months' probation.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Garcia challenges his conviction because, in
his view, this identity theft prosecution
against him was preempted by IRCA.

All of this said, "facial" and "as-applied"
labels "parties attach to claims are not
determinative" of the analysis a court will
ultimately employ in a preemption case. And
the boundary between the two types of
challenges is not impenetrable. Still, as with
other types of cases alleging that a law is
unconstitutional, "[t]he distinction is both
instructive and necessary, for it goes to the
breadth of the remedy employed by the
Court, not what must be pleaded in a
complaint." Garcia challenges the use of law
of general application to himself alone, i.e.,
advances an as-applied claim. The State does
not challenge his characterization. The relief
provided in this case will flow solely to
Garcia. The fact that the holding in his favor
may have wider application, Morales

All preemption arguments, including the asapplied one advanced by Garcia in this case,
are based upon the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. The Supremacy
Clause gives Congress the power to preempt
state law. When evaluating whether a state
law is preempted, "'[t]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone.'
Before focusing on the use of the Kansas
identity theft statute challenged here, it is
helpful to review the general law of
preemption under the precedents of the
United States Supreme Court and this court.
When all types, categories, and subcategories
of preemption claims are considered, we
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and Ochoa-Lara, does not mean his
preemption argument should be labeled
"facial."

federal and state law is, practically speaking,
impossible.
Conflict-obstacle
preemption
involves
circumstances in which application of state
law erects an obstacle to achievement of
Congress' objectives.

Regardless of whether a particular challenge
qualifies as facial or as-applied, any
preemption claim also fits one of two other
categories: express and implied.

As we turn to evaluating the applicability of
these preemption concepts in this case, we
first address two preliminary matters:
preservation of the preemption issue and the
potential applicability of a presumption
against preemption.

Express preemption depends upon the words
used by Congress, which may explicitly limit
a state's ability to legislate or apply its own
constitutional or common law. "There is no
doubt that Congress may withdraw specified
powers from the States by enacting a statute
containing
an
express
preemption
provision."

Preservation of Preemption Issue
As stated above, a party's label on his or her
preemption challenge does not inevitably
control the analysis a court can
employ. Simply put, a court's analysis of a
preemption challenge is not bound to color
within any party's lines. This approach to
preemption challenge analysis is consistent
with the more widely applicable practice of
allowing a party who properly preserves a
federal claim to make any appellate argument
in support of that claim.

Implied preemption arises when a federal
statute's "structure and purpose" demonstrate
that state law can have no application.
Implied preemption is further analytically
divided into two subcategories: field and
conflict.
A field preemption claim involves
circumstances in which Congress has
legislated so comprehensively on a subject
that it has foreclosed any state regulation in
that area. "Where Congress occupies an
entire field, . . . even complementary state
regulation is impermissible."

Here, Garcia's preemption issue was
preserved in the district court through
defense IRCA arguments in favor of
suppression and a subsequent evidentiary
objection. In his brief to the Court of Appeals,
Garcia advanced express, field, and conflictobstacle preemption challenges—all asapplied to Garcia only. The State responded
in kind in its brief. In Garcia's petition for
review to this court, he repeated his threepronged approach to preemption. It was not
until oral argument that his counsel, when
pressed, concentrated his argument on as-

Conflict preemption involves just that—
conflict between federal law and state law. A
conflict preemption claim can arise in one of
two situations, which have been labeled
"impossibility" and "obstacle."
Conflict-impossibility preemption arises in
circumstances in which compliance with both
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applied, field preemption. Again, even after
this limitation, we are free to consider any
type, category, or subcategory of preemption
supported by the appellate record and
applicable law.
Potential Application
Against Preemption

of

and implied warranty in a case regarding the
manufacture of a balloon catheter.
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority
including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito,
interpreted an express preemption clause
without applying the presumption and held
that state law was preempted. Justice Stevens
concurred in part and in the judgment; he
would not have applied the presumption and
agreed that the state law was preempted.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg dissented. She
would have applied the presumption and
would have held that the state law was not
preempted.

Presumption

The United States Supreme Court has
sometimes recited that it presumes no
preemption. And we have recited and applied
such a presumption in some but not all of this
court's earlier preemption cases.
But the reality is that under United States
Supreme Court precedent, the necessity of
indulging such a presumption in an express
preemption case is far from clear.

Lacking contrary clarity from the United
States Supreme Court, we hold that it is
unnecessary to apply a presumption against
preemption when a court evaluates the merit
of an express preemption claim, as long as the
language of the congressional enactment at
issue is clear. This makes logical and legal
sense. There is simply no need to presume
congressional intent when Congress has
stated its intent explicitly. We agree that

Three members of the current Court—Chief
Justice John
G.
Roberts and
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito—and the now departed Justice Antonin
G. Scalia have recognized that the Court has
not consistently applied the presumption to
express preemption cases and have said it
should not be so applied. And the wording of
opinions authored by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy betray at least some ambivalence
about the merit of applying a presumption of
Congressional intent when Congress has
already included express preemption
language in a statute.

"[w]hen Congress has considered the
issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision
explicitly addressing that issue, and
when that provision provides a
'reliable indicium of congressional
intent with respect to state authority,'
'there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state
laws from the substantive provisions'
of the legislation.

Indeed, careful review of a single case
exposes the range of positions on application
of the presumption in an express preemption
case held by Court members. In that
case, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court
considered whether federal law preempted
state-law claims of negligence, strict liability,

This approach also has the considerable
virtue of consistency with our modern rubric
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for statutory interpretation and construction
in all other contexts. "The fundamental rule
of statutory interpretation is that the intent of
the legislature is dispositive if it is possible to
ascertain that intent. Our "primary
consideration in ascertaining the intent of the
legislature" is the language of a statute; we
think "the best and only safe rule for
determining the intent of the creators of a
written law is to abide by the language that
they have chosen to use." This court does not
move from interpretation of plain statutory
language to the endeavor of statutory
construction, including its reliance on extratextual legislative history and canons of
construction
and
other
background
considerations, unless the plain language of
the legislature or Congress is ambiguous.

goal predominantly
sanctions.

through

employer

Section 101 of IRCA became 8 U.S.C. §
1324a. It provides in pertinent part that the
employment of unauthorized aliens is
unlawful. It also establishes an employment
verification system that requires employers to
attest to their employee's immigration status.
Failure to comply with the requirements can
result in civil penalties, and a pattern or
practice of violations can result in both civil
and criminal penalties against an employer.
In turn, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 was promulgated
in 1987 by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, which was then part
of the Department of Justice, to implement 8
U.S.C. § 1324a. The regulation provides for
an employment verification system, and its §
274a.2 identifies Form I-9 as the form to be
used by an employer when verifying such
eligibility. The employer must ensure that a
potential employee completes the I-9, must
examine
the
potential
employee's
identification and work authorization
documents, must complete the employer
portion of the I-9, and must sign an
attestation. A Social Security card is one of
the documents an employer may examine to
establish employment eligibility.

Express Preemption
"The Government of the United States has
broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens." In line
with that power, Congress enacted
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
which "established a 'comprehensive federal
statutory scheme for regulation of
immigration and naturalization' and set 'the
terms and conditions of admission to the
country and the subsequent treatment of
aliens lawfully in the country.'"

Congress included an express preemption
clause having to do with employers in IRCA.
It also included the following language:

In 1986, Congress supplemented the INA by
enacting IRCA, which comprehensively
regulates employment of aliens. According to
a 1986 House Report, Congress sought "to
close the back door on illegal immigration so
that the front door on legal immigration may
remain open," and it attempted to achieve this

"A form designated or established by
Attorney
General
under
this
subsection and any information
contained in or appended to such
form, may not be used for purposes
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other than for enforcement of this
chapter
and
sections
1001,
1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18."

Garcia has relied heavily on Arizona, to
support what his counsel termed his field
preemption argument. But Arizona actually
has limited influence on that particular
argument.

Title 18 of the United States Code (2012)
deals
with
Crimes
and
Criminal
Procedure. Section 1001 deals with fraud and
false statements generally; § 1028 deals with
fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents, authentication
features, and information; § 1546 deals with
fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other
documents; and § 1621 deals with perjury
generally. Despite references in the
legislative history to Congress emphasizing
penalties for employers rather employees,
IRCA specifically amended § 1546 to
include criminal sanctions against an alien
who commits fraud in the employment
eligibility verification process.

In Arizona, the Supreme Court determined
that Congress has fully occupied the field of
alien registration. On the other hand, the only
provision considered in that case that is
somewhat analogous to the prosecution's use
of the identity theft statute in this case
was section 5(C), which made it a
misdemeanor for an alien to seek or engage
in work. Section 5(C) was not field
preempted. Rather, it was preempted under
conflict-obstacle
theory
because
it
"involve[d] a conflict in the method of
enforcement."
Garcia has also directed our attention to
the Puente Arizona v. Arpaio series of federal
decisions.

Of course, the case before us does not arise
under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). Rather, it is a
State prosecution under a generally
applicable statute prohibiting identity
theft. The State seeks to punish an alien who
used the personal identifying information of
another to establish the alien's work
authorization. Again, this means that Garcia's
preemption challenge, no matter which
category, is an as-applied type. He does not
seek to prevent all prosecutions under the
state law. His challenge can fairly be
characterized as "facial" in the traditional
sense only insofar that its holding will apply
to other aliens in his position, i.e., those who
use the Social Security card or other
document listed in federal law of another for
purposes of establishing employment
eligibility.

The first time Puente Arizona came before a
district judge, the judge was considering
whether two Arizona state statutes were
constitutional. The plaintiffs were a civil
rights organization and separate individuals,
including at least one who had been
convicted under the challenged laws, which
criminalized "the act of identity theft done
with the intent to obtain or continue
employment" and forgery generally.
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction,
asking the district judge to enjoin
enforcement of the laws. The plaintiffs
invoked IRCA to claim that the laws were
facially preempted and as applied, under both
field and conflict principles. The district
judge ruled that the plaintiffs had
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demonstrated a likelihood of success for
facial field and facial conflict preemption and
granted a temporary injunction.

In a still later decision in the series, the
district judge addressed the plaintiffs'
argument that its November 2016 preemption
decision in favor of the plaintiffs was
narrower than it should be, and he "clarified"
his preemption holding. Specifically, the
judge recognized that the federal I-9
verification system, which requires a
prospective employee to present certain
documents demonstrating employment
eligibility to the prospective employer and
permits the employer to retain copies of those
documents, potentially including among
them a Social Security card,

On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the neutral application of the laws to all
defendants was fatal to the facial challenge.
The circuit panel remanded to the same
district judge for consideration of the
plaintiffs' as-applied challenges.
On remand, the district judge considered the
plaintiffs' conflict and field preemption
arguments. He treated the language in 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) as a "use limitation"
and ruled that Congress intended "to preempt
a relatively narrow field: state prosecution of
fraud in the I-9 process." "[U]se limitation
certainly is relevant in assessing Congress's
intent for preemption purposes, but the focus
of the provision is quite narrow. It applies
only to Form I-9 and documents appended to
the form." On field preemption, the judge
ruled that he could not conclude that
Congress had "expressed a clear and manifest
intent to occupy the field of unauthorized
alien fraud in seeking employment. The
focus of the criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1546, is the I-9 process." The district judge
also determined prosecution of aliens under
the state statutes was not preempted because
of conflict either because of the impossibility
of enforcing both state and federal law or
because enforcement of state law erected a
barrier or obstacle to full realization of
federal policy goals. "The Court sees no
strong showing of conflict between the
application of the identity theft and forgery
statutes outside the I-9 process and federal
statutes that are limited to that process."

"suggests that Congress intended to
protect more than the I-9 and
documents physically attached to it.
The Court sees no logical reason why
Congress would prohibit state lawenforcement officers from using the
Form I-9 and documents physically
attached to it, and yet permit them to
use
[designated
employment
eligibility documents
including
Social Security cards] submitted with
[the] I-9 simply because they were
never stapled to the I-9 or were
stored by the employer in a folder
separate from the I-9. This is
particularly true when one considers
other statutory sections.
"Section 1324a(d) provides guidance for
future variations of the federal employment
verification system. It makes clear that even
if the Form I-9 is replaced or new
documentation requirements are created, the
use limitation will continue to prohibit use of
the employment verification system for nonenumerated purposes. The statute sates that
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'[t]he system may not be used for law
enforcement purposes, other than for
enforcement of this chapter or sections
1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18. This
suggests that Congress intended to bar the use
of the verification process itself, not just the
I-9 and physically attached documents, in
state law enforcement. Additionally, §
1324a(d)(2)(C) provides that '[a]ny personal
information utilized by the system may not be
made available to Government agencies,
employers, and other persons except to the
extent necessary to verify that an individual
is not an unauthorized alien.' This limitation
is not restricted to information contained in
or appended to any specific document, but
applies generally to the federal employment
verification system.

preemption can be inferred . . . where there is
a regulatory framework so pervasive . . . that
Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.'

"Statutes imposing criminal, civil, and
immigration penalties for fraud committed in
the employment verification process also
reflect a congressional intent to regulate more
than the Form I-9 and physically attached
documents. . . .

"The Court's conclusion is also supported by
recent
decisions
from
other
courts. Reviewing the use limitation and
several other provisions of § 1324a, the
Supreme Court found that 'Congress has
made clear . . . that any information
employees submit to indicate their work
status "may not be used" for purposes other
than prosecution under specific federal
criminal statues for fraud, perjury, and
related conduct.' The Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion.

"This conclusion is supported by the
legislative history of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act, which reflects Congress's
'[c]oncern . . . that verification information
could create a "paper trail" resulting in the
utilization of this information for the purpose
of apprehending undocumented aliens. If
documents presented solely to comply with
the federal employment verification system
could be used for state law enforcement
purposes so long as they were not physically
attached to a Form I-9, this congressional
intent easily would be undermined.

....
". . . The Court continues to hold the view that
Congress did not intend to preempt state
regulation of fraud outside the federal
employment verification process, as stated in
its summary judgment ruling . . . . But the
Court concludes from the provisions
reviewed above that Congress's preemptive
intent was not limited to the Form I-9 and
physically attached documents. Congress
also regulated—and intended to preempt
state use of—other documents used to show
employment authorization under the federal
system. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, 'field

"In summary, the Court concludes that
Congress clearly and manifestly intended to
prohibit the use of the Form I-9, documents
attached to the Form I-9, and documents
submitted as part of the I-9 employment
verification process, whether attached to the
form or not, for state law enforcement
purposes . . . . Defendants are preempted from
(a) employing or relying on (b) any
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documents or information (c) submitted to an
employer solely as part of the federal
employment verification process (d) for any
investigative or prosecutorial purpose under
the Arizona identi[t]y theft and forgery
statutes. As Plaintiffs concede, Defendants
may use [designated employment eligibility
documents including Social Security cards]
submitted in the I-9 process if they were also
submitted for a purpose independent of the
federal employment verification system, such
as to demonstrate the ability to drive or as
part of a typical employment application."

attached to the I-9 at some point still ignored
the "information contained in" plain language
of the statute.
We do not ignore this language. It is
Congress' plain and clear expression of its
intent to preempt the use of the I-9 form and
any information contained in the I-9 for
purposes
other
than
those
listed
in §1324a(b)(5). Prosecution of Garcia—an
alien who committed identity theft for the
purpose of establishing work eligibility—is
not among the purposes allowed in IRCA.
Although the State did not rely on the I-9, it
does not follow that the State's use of the
Social Security card information was allowed
by Congress. "A State may not evade the preemptive force of federal law by resorting to
creative
statutory
interpretation
or
description at odds with the statute's intended
operation and effect."

Although we might be inclined to agree with
the ultimate Puente Arizona decision from
the district judge, it nevertheless has
limited influence today because we dispose
of this case under the plain and unambiguous
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), an
effective express preemption provision
having to do with employees as well as
employers. When the Puente Arizona district
judge was considering the plaintiffs' asapplied challenges, he was focused only on
field and conflict preemption analysis. No
party was urging express preemption, which
provides a much more direct route to a similar
result. The language in 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(b)(5) explicitly prohibited state law
enforcement use not only of the I-9 itself but
also of the "information contained in" the I-9
for purposes other than those enumerated. In
short, in March of this year, the Puente
Arizona district judge admirably recognized
that he had unduly narrowed his
interpretation of the "use limitation" in the
statute. It had simply been incorrect to say
that only use of the I-9 and attached
documents was covered. But his focus on
whether other documents need or need not be

The "key question" when evaluating whether
a state law is preempted is congressional
intent. That intent is spelled out for us in 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5): States are prohibited
from using the I-9 and any information
contained within the I-9as the bases for a state
law identity theft prosecution of an alien who
uses another's Social Security information in
an I-9. The fact that this information was
included in the W-4 and K-4 did not alter the
fact that it was also part of the I-9.
Because we can dispose of Garcia's
preemption claim based on the express
preemption language in 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(b)(5), we need not decide the merits of
any other possible or actual preemption
argument.
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CONCLUSION

a person's authority to work in the United
States.

We reverse Garcia's conviction because the
State's identity theft prosecution of him based
on the Social Security number contained in
the I-9 used to establish his employment
eligibility was expressly preempted.
BILES, Senior Supreme Court
dissenting:

Under these circumstances, the question put
to us is whether Garcia's use of someone
else's identifying information within the
employment setting sufficiently implicates
the narrow area controlled by Congress
through the federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). In answering
that question, the majority holds states cannot
use the Form I-9 or any information
contained in it, and the fact that one uses the
information elsewhere―the W-4, K-4, and
employment application―does not save the
case from the preemption explicitly intended
by Congress when it passed IRCA. The
majority concludes this is an as-applied,
express preemption, which states: "A form
designated or established by the Attorney
General under this subsection and any
information contained in or appended to such
form, may not be used for purposes other than
for the enforcement of this chapter
and sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of
Title 18."

Judge,

I disagree that 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5)
(2012) creates an as-applied, express federal
preemption barring Ramiro Garcia's state law
prosecution for identity theft when he used
someone else's Social Security number to
complete tax forms while being hired as a
restaurant worker. The majority's rationale
sets up a sweeping prohibition against
identity theft prosecutions for such crimes
generally occurring in the employment
process. I also cannot conclude any other
federal preemption theory carries the day
under these facts, so I dissent.
Garcia was convicted under our state's
identity theft law for using someone else's
Social Security number to receive a
benefit, i.e., employment. The statute does
not make it illegal to attempt to secure
employment as an unauthorized alien. The
specific conduct for which Garcia was
convicted was using someone else's Social
Security number in completing his federal
W-4 and state K-4 tax forms. Garcia's
immigration status was not relevant to
whether this conduct was unlawful, and the
conduct was independent of the federal
employment verification system. The tax
forms are used solely to calculate federal and
state income tax withholdings—not to verify

This rationale is sweeping because 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(b) requires an employer to verify
that an "individual" is not an unauthorized
alien, which means employers must verify all
job applicants irrespective of their immigrant
or nonimmigrant status. Under the majority's
view,
federal
law
effectively
prevents any prosecution under the Kansas
identity theft crime occurring in the
employment context if it relies on
information that also just happens to be on or
attached to a Form I-9. This cannot reflect
congressional intent.
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The crux of the express preemption question
is whether the phrase "any information
contained in" the form applies literally to all
information on the Form I-9, wherever else it
might be found; or more narrowly to the
contents of the completed Form I-9.
While the majority takes the former view, I
take the latter because the Form I-9 and the
W-4 and K-4 forms were supplied for
different and independent purposes. In
Garcia's case, the Form I-9 was not admitted
into evidence, so no information necessarily
gleaned from it was "used" in the State's
prosecution. Garcia was not convicted for
using someone else's identity on Form I-9 to
deceive his employer as to his work
authorization. Instead, Garcia was convicted
for using another person's Social Security
number on tax withholding forms.

Form I-9, documents attached to the
Form I-9, and documents submitted
as part of the I-9 employment
verification process, whether attached
to the form or not, for state law
enforcement purposes. Further, as the
Supreme Court found in Smith v.
United States, the ordinary meaning
of the term 'use' is '"to employ" or "to
derive service from."' The Court will
adopt this ordinary meaning of the
word 'use.' Thus, the Court holds that
Defendants are preempted from (a)
employing or relying on (b) any
documents or information (c)
submitted to an employer solely as
part of the federal employment
verification process (d)
for
any
investigative or prosecutorial purpose
under the Arizona identify theft and
forgery
statutes. As
Plaintiffs
concede, Defendants may use List A,
B, or C documents submitted in the I9 process if they were also submitted
for a purpose independent of the
federal employment verification
system, such as to demonstrate ability
to drive or as part of a typical
employment application.”

The majority reaches its decision through a
unique and overly literal interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). The majority reads the
provision to create a congressional
"information-use preemption" rather than a
"Form I-9-use limitation." In doing so, the
majority stretches statutory interpretation
past the breaking point and dismisses
contrary caselaw.
In Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, a federal district
court looked at this same statutory language
and ruled Congress preempted "a relatively
narrow field: state prosecution of fraud in the
I-9 process." That same court in a follow-up
opinion most recently explained the scope of
this preemption by stating:

The Garcia majority attempts to minimize
the Puente Arizona court's analysis by
asserting "no party was urging express
preemption." 306 Kan. at , slip op. at 18.
But a careful review of both the 2016 and
2017 district court decisions demonstrate that
the court did not "overlook" the language in 8
U.S.C.
§
1324a(b)(5).
The Puente
Arizona court was familiar with the statutory
language and the arguments arising from it—
including express preemption. The court

"In summary, the Court concludes
that Congress clearly and manifestly
intended to prohibit the use of the
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simply interpreted the law differently than
the majority does.

falsification of state-issued identification
cards, let alone to prohibit all use of such
cards merely because they are also used to
support the federal employment-verification
application." The Reynua court's rationale
fully protects federal interests, while
the Garcia majority's broad reading of 8
U.S.C.
§
1324a(b)(5) constitutes
a
"significant limitation" on our state's police
power to protect its citizens from identity
theft.

Indeed, no other court has interpreted 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) as the majority has.
There are several decisions, including those
from our own state, that have come to
opposite or unsupportive conclusions. For
instance, in Arizona v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court noted, "IRCA's
express preemption provision, which in most
instances bars [s]tates from imposing
penalties on employers of unauthorized
aliens, is silent about whether additional
penalties may be imposed against the
employees." The Arizona Court recognized
IRCA's express preemption provision on the
employer side but not on the employee side
of the equation.

The Garcia majority's rationale also runs
counter to a unanimous string of Kansas
Court of Appeals decisions that have
expressly considered this question.
Despite my conclusion that as-applied
express preemption is not applicable, I admit
to being attracted to the notion that the
Kansas statute is preempted as applied in this
case under implied theories of either field or
conflict preemption, as the Iowa Supreme
Court majority recently held. The possibility
of dual enforcement tracks—state and
federal—is concerning because of the
prosecutorial discretion contemplated in the
federal IRCA statutory scheme and the
discretion our state affords to its prosecutors.
Spotty statewide enforcement would seem to
manifest the evil—robing the federal
government of its discretion—foreseen by
Iowa's Chief Justice Cady in his
separate Martinez concurring opinion.

The Iowa Supreme Court recently held that
state's identity theft law is not facially
preempted by IRCA. Instead, a bare majority
of
the Martinez court
held implied preemption theories applicable
to that state's identity theft law, which is
largely similar to ours. Both Kansas' and
Iowa's statutes are alike in that they apply to
any person, regardless of immigration status,
and they apply in any situation―not just the
employment
authorization
verification
process.
Another example is State v. Reynua. In that
case, the Reynua court stated, "[W]e cannot
read [8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5)] so broadly as
to preempt a state from enforcing its laws
relating to its own identification documents."
The court reasoned, "It would be a significant
limitation on state powers to preempt
prosecution of state laws prohibiting

This apprehension is particularly noteworthy
because the identity theft cases reaching our
Kansas
appellate
courts
involving
unauthorized immigrants seem to be arising
from just one prosecuting jurisdiction, which
suggests other Kansas prosecutors may be
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exercising their discretion differently. I
would view an as-applied conflict
preemption challenge raised under the proper
facts to be a close call. But in the end, the
balance is tipped by our state's longstanding
caselaw recognizing that "'"[i]n the absence
of express preemption in a federal law, there
is a strong presumption that Congress did not
intend to displace state law."

preemption have been crafted to guard the
prerogatives of states in order not to "disturb"
the "federal-state balance."
Even if the majority's interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) (2012) is correct, and
Congress intended to expressly preempt state
use of all information contained in a person's
I-9 form, it is doubtful Congress has such
sweeping powers to interfere with the
legitimate government of the states. Can it
really be true that the state of Kansas is or
could be expressly preempted from using—
for any purpose—the name of any citizen
who has completed an I-9 form? A name is
"information" after all. To ask the question is
to answer it.

This strong presumption, combined with the
caselaw recited above and my concern about
the sweeping potential impact of the
majority's rationale, cause me to dissent.
STEGALL,
dissenting:

Supreme

Court

Judge,

I join Justice Biles' dissent fully with respect
to express preemption. Today's decision
appears to wipe numerous criminal laws off
the books in Kansas—starting with, but not
necessarily ending with, laws prohibiting
identity theft. For this reason, I doubt the
logic of today's decision will be extended
beyond the narrow facts before us. But rather
than take solace in this hope, I find in it the
irrefutable fact that today's logic is wrong.

Therefore, even if I were convinced by the
majority's statutory analysis—I am not—I
would question the majority's implicit
holding that Congress has, in the first place,
the constitutional power to prohibit states
from using any information found on a
federal I-9 form. If such a power did exist,
the delicate federal-state balance achieved by
our system of federalism would not merely be
disturbed, it would be obliterated.

"It is well established that within
Constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt
state authority by so stating in express
terms." Thus, as a first principle, Congress
cannot preempt state law in matters that lie
outside Congress' limited, prescribed powers.
Moreover, additional limits on federal

Finally, I likewise join my colleague in
dissent
with
respect
to
implied
preemption. Unlike Justice Biles, however, I
do not find the question a particularly close
call.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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“Supreme Court to Rule on Identity Fraud by Undocumented Immigrants”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
March 18, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider letting
states prosecute undocumented immigrants
for identity theft if they use someone else’s
Social Security number to apply for a job,
agreeing to take up what could be a polarizing
fight.

In throwing out the convictions, the top
Kansas court said the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act bars state
prosecutions based on information contained
in the federal I-9 form, which employers use
to verify work eligibility. The court pointed
to a provision in the law that lets prosecutors
use the I-9 “and any information contained in
or appended to such form” only for specified
federal crimes.

Heeding calls from Kansas and the Trump
administration, the justices said they’ll
decide whether the Kansas Supreme Court
was right to say that only the federal
government has the power under U.S.
immigration law to press those types of
prosecutions.

“It is Congress’s plain and clear expression
of its intent to preempt the use of the I-9 form
and any information contained in the I-9 for
purposes other than those listed,” the Kansas
Supreme Court said in one of the cases,
involving Ramiro Garcia.

A victory for Kansas would give states a new
tool for battling illegal immigration, letting
them be more aggressive on an issue handled
primarily at the federal level. The court will
hear the case during the nine-month term that
starts in October.

Withholding Forms
Kansas says prosecutors didn’t rely on the I9 form and instead used Garcia’s tax
withholding forms, which also contained the
stolen Social Security number. The state said
the “most natural reading” of the disputed
provision is that it bars the use of the I-9 form
itself and any attached documents, but not
information that also appears on other forms.

Kansas says the dispute is more about
identity theft than illegal immigration. The
state is trying to reinstate the convictions of
three men who got restaurant jobs using
another person’s Social Security number.
“Identity crime is a problem that far exceeds
the capacity of the United States alone to
prosecute,” Kansas Attorney General Derek
Schmidt argued in court papers.

The Supreme Court said in a 2012 case
involving Arizona that Congress had set up a
“comprehensive framework” for preventing
the employment of people who are illegally
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in the country. The 1986 law doesn’t impose
criminal penalties on undocumented
immigrants but does allow federal
prosecutions for fraud.
Lawyers for Garcia and the other two men
say Kansas’s position can’t be squared with
the 2012 ruling. “State prosecutions of
offenses relating to employment eligibility
conflict with the comprehensive federal
regime,” they argued.
The Trump administration disagrees, saying
state prosecutions won’t interfere with
federal authority.
Kansas’s identity-theft law “does not regulate
employment,” U.S. Solicitor General Noel
Francisco argued. “It regulates the use of
another person’s identity with the intent to
commit fraud.”
The case is Kansas v. Garcia, 17-834.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Kansas Identity Theft Case”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
March 18, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to consider a bid by Kansas to revive the
state’s policy of prosecuting people for
identity theft for using other people’s Social
Security numbers to gain employment in a
case linked to immigration issues.

given by the U.S. government to all legal
residents.
The number is primarily used to identify
people for employment and tax purposes. Its
original purpose was to track each person’s
payments into the Social Security program,
which provides money for retirees and people
eligible for other social welfare programs.

The justices will hear the state’s appeal of a
2017 Kansas Supreme Court ruling that
voided the convictions of three restaurant
workers and found that a 1986 federal law,
the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
prevents states from pursuing such
prosecutions.

The state appeals court found that the federal
law defined the circumstances under which
immigrants can be penalized for providing
incorrect information to employers. The law
required employers to fill out a form, known
as the I-9, attesting that they have reviewed
prospective employees’ documents and can
confirm they are authorized to work in the
United States. The law also stated that the
form “may not be used for purposes other
than for enforcement of this act.”

The three men - Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo
Morales and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara - had
provided their employers Social Security
numbers that were not their own before being
prosecuted for identity theft.
President Donald Trump has taken a hard line
against
illegal
immigrants.
His
administration filed court papers siding with
Kansas urging the justices to take up the
appeal.

Lawyers for the three men said that because
they were using the Social Security numbers
listed on their I-9 forms to establish their
eligibility to work, they cannot be prosecuted
under state law. The cases were prosecuted in
Johnson County, located near Kansas City,
Missouri.

Lawyers on both sides refused to comment on
why the three men did not have or did not use
their own Social Security numbers, saying it
was not relevant to the legal question. People
who enter the country illegally do not get
assigned Social Security numbers, which are

The U.S. Justice Department said the federal
law, signed by former President Ronald
Reagan, does not prevent the use of
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information contained on the I-9 form if the
same false information is also included on
other forms, namely federal and state tax
forms. During the prosecutions, the state
specifically said it was not relying on the I-9
forms.

to generally applicable state laws for the
exclusive benefit of unauthorized aliens,”
Solicitor General Noel Francisco, the Trump
administration’s top Supreme Court lawyer,
said in the court filing.
Kansas is one of several conservative-leaning
states that has sought to crack down on illegal
immigrants.

“Nothing in the statute suggests that
Congress intended to carve out an exception
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“Feds, Conservatives Weigh States’ Use of I-9s In Prosecutions”
Law360
Tiffany Hu
June 3, 2019
The federal government and several others
have urged the U.S. Supreme Court to
reinstate the state convictions of three
unauthorized immigrants who used stolen
Social Security numbers to gain employment,
saying the Immigration Reform and Control
Act does not preempt the use of information
on I-9 documents for state identity theft
prosecutions.

Furthermore, under the Kansas Supreme
Court's ruling, the state would not be able to
use any information contained in an I-9 form,
including an individual's name, even if the
information was actually obtained from
different and unrelated documents, the
solicitor general argued.
"Because virtually everyone who has a job —
citizens and aliens alike — must submit an I9, the decision below would preclude the use
of basic identity information in most state and
many federal law-enforcement operations,"
the
government's
brief
states.
"Unsurprisingly, every other court to
consider the question has found that result
irreconcilable with the statutory text,
structure and purpose."

The solicitor general, a state coalition led by
Indiana, and conservative groups the Eagle
Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund and
the Immigration Reform Law Institute each
penned amicus briefs Friday backing the state
of Kansas' challenge of a Kansas Supreme
Court ruling that the state convictions of
Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales and
Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were preempted by
the IRCA, which requires employers to verify
their employees' immigration status through
the use of the I-9 form. The justices agreed to
take up the case in March.

The prosecutions were also not impliedly
preempted, as the immigrants had contended,
the solicitor general said. Congress has not
yet "occupied" the area of law concerning the
employment of unauthorized immigrants,
and even if it had, the three prosecutions
would not be preempted because they were
for identity theft and falsifying documents,
which does not apply only to those who
unlawfully entered the U.S., according to the
solicitor general.

In its brief to the high court, the solicitor
general's office told the justices that the
relevant statute only bars the use of
information on I-9 documents in criminal
prosecutions. Nothing in the statute
prevented the state from prosecuting the trio
based on the tax forms on which the Social
Security numbers were entered, the solicitor
general said.

"Respondents' contrary position would mean
that Kansas could prosecute a U.S. citizen or
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authorized alien who presents an employer
with a false social security number, but could
not prosecute an unauthorized alien who does
the same," the brief states. "Nothing in IRCA
or elsewhere suggests that Congress intended
to carve out an exception to generally
applicable state laws for the exclusive benefit
of unauthorized aliens."

brief focused on the constitutionality of the
Kansas Supreme Court's reading of the
statute.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also filed a
brief on Friday, though it said that it was not
taking any sides in the case. Instead, the
Chamber urged the justices to use the case to
make clear that a presumption against
preemption should be rejected when a statute
has an express preemption clause, noting the
"lingering uncertainty" from the lower courts.

The amicus brief filed by the state coalition
similarly argued that the Kansas Supreme
Court improperly determined that the state
could not use information on the I-9
regardless of whether it had an independent
source, saying that this ruling encouraged
"would-be thieves" to skirt prosecution by
including information that was stolen in their
I-9 forms.

An attorney for the Chamber declined to
comment Monday. Counsel for the other
parties and a representative for the U.S.
Department of Justice did not immediately
respond to requests for comment.
Garcia, Morales and Ochoa-Lara, who all
used other Social Security numbers to be
employed at various restaurants, were
separately prosecuted and convicted of
identity theft or making false statements after
law enforcement officers found that the three
had used other people's Social Security
numbers on various government forms,
including the I-9 form and the W-4 and K-4
tax withholding forms. In each case, the I-9
form-related charge was dismissed, and the
three were convicted based on their false
statements in the other forms.

Indiana Solicitor General Thomas Fisher told
Law360 on Tuesday that the Kansas Supreme
Court's ruling was based on a "clear
misinterpretation" of the statute and, if kept
in place, would "dramatically diminish" the
state's ability to crack down on identity theft
crimes.
"If the Kansas decision were affirmed, states
would be left unable to enforce laws against
identity theft," Fisher said by email. "In fact,
under such a scenario, individuals
committing identity theft could effectively
immunize themselves from state prosecution
by simply falsifying federal employment
eligibility verification forms among whatever
other documents they falsify."

The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld those
convictions, but in September 2017, the
Kansas Supreme Court reversed, finding in
all three cases that their state convictions
were preempted by the IRCA.

The Immigration Reform Law Institute
argued that the prosecutions were not
preempted by the statute, while the Eagle
Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund's

"Prosecution of Garcia — an alien who
committed identity theft for the purpose of
establishing work eligibility — is not among
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the purposes allowed in IRCA," the opinion
in Garcia's case says. "Although the state did
not rely on the I-9, it does not follow that the
state's use of the Social Security card
information was allowed by Congress."

Chalmers, Dwight R. Carswell and Steven J.
Obermeier of the Office of the Attorney
General of Kansas.
Garcia, Morales and Ochoa-Lara are
represented by Paul W. Hughes and Michael
B. Kimberly of McDermott Will & Emery
LLP.

Kansas filed its petition for a writ of certiorari
in December 2017, arguing that the Kansas
Supreme Court's ruling raises "serious
constitutional questions" about whether
federal immigration law can trump states'
power to enact and enforce criminal laws.
Identity theft is also becoming increasingly
common and has broad implications for U.S.
citizens and immigrants alike, the state said.

The government is represented by U.S.
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco and
Joseph H. Hunt, Jeffrey B. Wall, Hashim M.
Mooppan, Christopher G. Michel, Mark B.
Stern and Lindsey Powell of the DOJ's Civil
Division.
The state coalition is represented by Curtis T.
Hill Jr., Thomas M. Fisher, Kian J. Hudson
and Julia C. Payne of the Indiana Attorney
General's Office, and other attorneys.

Kansas also argued that the state supreme
court's overly broad reading of the IRCA
effectively prevents the state from
prosecuting even citizens and lawful
immigrants who have included false
information on their I-9 forms, which would
"not even arguably be interfering with federal
immigration law prerogatives" outlined in the
IRCA. Allowing such an outcome "does not
pass the laugh test," it said.

The Eagle Forum Education & Legal
Defense Fund is represented by Lawrence J.
Joseph.
The Immigration Reform Law Institute is
represented in-house by Christopher J. Hajec
and Lew J. Olowski.

In a March 2018 reply brief, the immigrants
implicated in the case countered that the
Kansas Supreme Court had reached the right
decision in respecting the federal
government's "sole authority to determine
who is authorized to work." States, however,
cannot expand or restrict work authorization,
they said.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is
represented by Daryl Joseffer and Jonathan
Urick of the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center
and Kathleen M. Sullivan of Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.
The case is Kansas v. Ramiro Garcia, case
number 17-834, in the U.S. Supreme Court.

The state of Kansas is represented by Derek
Schmidt, Jeffrey A. Chanay, Toby Crouse,
Kristafer Ailslieger, Bryan C. Clark, Natalie

348

“Shocker: Kansas Supreme Court Licenses Identity Theft–But Only By Illegal
Aliens”
The Sentinel
Jack Cashill
September 8, 2017
Friday, in a stunning decision, the Kansas
Supreme Court ruled in essence that the State
of Kansas cannot prosecute illegal aliens for
most common forms of identity theft. The
ruling in State of Kansas v. Ramiro
Garcia grants Kansas citizens no such
license.

Garcia had secured his job using someone
else’s social security number. As a result of
the investigation, Garcia was charged with
one count of identity theft under Kansas law
and eventually convicted in a jury trial. The
district judge sentenced Garcia to seven
months in prison but granted 18 months’
probation.

What follows may read like an article from
the Onion, but unfortunately it is not. Writing
in dissent, Justice Dan Biles observed, “The
majority’s rationale sets up a sweeping
prohibition against identity theft prosecutions
for such crimes generally occurring in the
employment process.” Justice Caleb Stegall
agreed, “Today’s decision appears to wipe
numerous criminal laws off the books in
Kansas—starting with, but not necessarily
ending with, laws prohibiting identity theft.”
These Justices did not overstate the enormity
of this decision whose majority opinion was
written by the predictably liberal Justice
Carol Beier. Said Biles, “The majority
stretches statutory interpretation past the
breaking point.”

On appeal, Garcia’s attorneys argued that the
federal government has preemptive power
over immigration and the status of aliens,
specifically in regards to an alien who
commits fraud in the employment eligibility
verification process. In a nutshell, the
majority on the court bought that argument.
Wrote Beier, “States are prohibited from
using the I-9 and any information contained
within the I-9 as the bases for a state law
identity theft prosecution of an alien who
uses another’s Social Security information in
an I-9. The fact that this information was
included in the W-4 and K-4 did not alter the
fact that it was also part of the I-9.” Implied,
but not stated, was that citizens have no such
immunity from state prosecution.

The facts in the case are beyond dispute. In
August 2012, an Overland Park police officer
pulled Garcia over for speeding. When asked
where he was going in such a hurry, Garcia
said he was on his way to work at Bonefish
Grill. A routine records check revealed that

Biles dissented vigorously. “The specific
conduct for which Garcia was convicted was
using someone else’s Social Security number
in completing his federal W-4 and state K-4
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tax forms,” he argued. “Garcia’s immigration
status was not relevant to whether this
conduct was unlawful, and the conduct was
independent of the federal employment
verification system.”

to be on or attached to a Form I-9. This
cannot reflect congressional intent.”
The irony of this decision is that in most
instances–sanctuary city edicts, federal vote
fraud investigation–the left supports the
rights of states to resist federal oversight of
immigration related issues. But then again,
consistency has never been one of the left’s
virtues.

Continued Biles: “Under the majority’s view,
federal law effectively prevents any
prosecution under the Kansas identity theft
crime occurring in the employment context if
it relies on information that also just happens
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Hernandez v. Mesa
Ruling Below: Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018).
Overview: U.S. Customs & Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa shot and killed 15-year-ago Mexican
national Hernandez. The Hernandez family filed charged against Mesa. Hernandez claimed that
the federal law enforcement officer violated Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there
is no alternative legal remedy.
Issue: Whether, when the plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law-enforcement officer
violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth amendment rights for which there is no alternative
legal remedy, the federal courts can and should recognize a damages claim under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
Jesus C. HERNANDEZ, Individually and as the surviving father of Sergio Adrian
Hernandez Guereca, and as Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of Serio Adrian Hernandez
Guereca; Maria Guadalupe Guereca Bentacour, Individually and as the surviving mother
of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, and as Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of Serio
Adrian Hernandez, Plaintiff-Appellants
v.
Jesus MESA, Jr., Defendant- Appellee
Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit
Decided on March 20, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
JONES, Circuit Judge:
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

craft an implied damages action for alleged
constitutional violations in this case. We hold
that this is not a garden variety excessive
force case against a federal law enforcement
officer. The transnational aspect of the facts
presents a "new context" under Bivens, and
numerous "special factors" counsel against
federal courts' interference with the
Executive and Legislative branches of the
federal government.

This appeal returned to the court en banc
following remand from the United States
Supreme Court. Prompted by the High Court,
we have carefully considered a question
antecedent to the merits of the Hernandez
family's claims against United States
Customs & Border Patrol Agent Mesa:
whether federal courts have the authority to
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BACKGROUND

Abbasi. In Abbasi, the Court reversed the
Second Circuit and refused to imply
a Bivens claim
against
policymaking
officials involved in terror suspect detentions
following the 9/11 attacks. The Court,
however, remanded for reconsideration by
the appeals court whether a Bivens claim
might still be maintained against a prison
warden.

Because the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed
on the pleadings, the alleged facts underlying
this tragic event are taken as true. Sergio
Hernandez was a 15-year-old Mexican
citizen without family in, or other ties to, the
United States. On June 7, 2010, while at play,
he had taken a position on the Mexican side
of a culvert that marks the boundary between
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and El Paso,
Texas. The FBI reported that Agent Mesa
was engaged in his law enforcement duties
when a group of young men began throwing
rocks at him from the Mexican side of the
border. From United States soil, the agent
fired several shots toward the assailants.
Hernandez was fatally wounded.

The Court's decision in this case tagged
onto Abbasi by rejecting this court's
approach and ordering a remand for us to
consider
the
propriety
of
allowing Bivens claims to proceed on behalf
of the Hernandez family in light of Abbasi's
analysis.
DISCUSSION

Hernandez's parents alleged numerous claims
in a federal lawsuit against Agent Mesa, other
Border Patrol officials, several federal
agencies, and the United States government.
The federal district court dismissed all
claims, but was reversed in part by a divided
panel of this court. The panel decision
allowed only a Bivens claim, predicated
on Fifth
Amendment substantive
due
process, to proceed against Agent Mesa
alone. This court elected to rehear the appeal
en banc. Without ruling on the cognizability
of a Bivens claim in the first instance, we
concluded unanimously that the plaintiffs'
claim under the Fourth Amendment failed on
the merits and that Agent Mesa was shielded
by qualified immunity from any claim under
the Fifth Amendment. We rejected the
plaintiffs' remaining claims.

The plaintiffs assert that Agent Mesa used
deadly force without justification against
Sergio
Hernandez,
violating
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, where the
fatal shot was fired across the international
border. No federal statute authorizes a
damages action by a foreign citizen injured
on foreign soil by a federal law enforcement
officer under these circumstances. Thus,
plaintiffs' recovery of damages is possible
only if the federal courts approve
a Bivens implied
cause
of
action. Abbasi instructs
us
to
determine initially
whether
these
circumstances present a "new context"
for Bivens purposes, and if so, whether
"special factors" counsel against implying a
damages claim against an individual federal
officer. To make these determinations, we
review Abbasi's pertinent discussion about
"Bivens and the ensuing cases in [the

The Supreme Court granted certioriari and
heard this case in conjunction with Ziglar v.
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Supreme Court] defining the reach and the
limits of that precedent."

principles. Consequently,
the
current
approach renders implied Bivens claims a
"disfavored" remedy. The Court then lists the
many subsequent cases that declined to
extend Bivens under varying circumstances
and proffered constitutional violations.

In Abbasi, the Court begins by explaining
that when Congress passed what is now 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in 1871, it enacted no
comparable law authorizing damage suits in
federal court to remedy constitutional
violations by federal government agents. In
1971, the Bivens decision broke new ground
by authorizing such a suit for Fourth
Amendment violations by federal law
enforcement officers who handcuffed and
arrested an individual in his own home
without probable cause. Within a decade, the
Court
followed
up
by
allowing
a Bivens action
for
employment
discrimination, violating equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment, against a
Congressman. The Court soon after approved
a Bivens claim
for
constitutionally
inadequate inmate medical care, violating
the Eighth Amendment, against federal
jailers. According to the Court in Abbasi,
these three cases coincided with the "ancien
regime in which "the Court followed a
different approach to recognizing implied
causes of action than it follows now."

Abbasi goes on to reiterate with an exacting
description the two-part analysis for
implying Bivens claims. We turn to the two
inquiries by comparing Abbasi's separationof-powers considerations and its facts to the
present case
A. NEW CONTEXT
The plaintiffs assert that because the
allegedly unprovoked shooting of a civilian
by a federal police officer is a prototypical
excessive force claim, their case presents no
"new context" under Bivens. This court,
including our colleagues in dissent,
disagrees. The fact that Bivens derived from
an unconstitutional search and seizure claim
is
not
determinative. The
detainees
in Abbasi asserted claims for, inter alia, strip
searches under both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, but the Supreme Court found a
"new context" despite similarities between
"the right and the mechanism of injury"
involved
in
previous
successful Bivens claims. As Abbasi points
out,
the Malesko case
rejected
a
"new" Bivens claim
under
the Eighth
Amendment,
whereas
an Eighth
Amendment Bivens claim
was
held
cognizable
in Carlson;
and Chappell rejected a Bivens employment
discrimination claim in the military, although
such a claim was allowed to proceed in Davis
v. Passman. The proper inquiry is whether

The "ancien regime" was toppled step by step
as the Court, starting in the late 1970s,
retreated from judicially implied causes of
action and cautioned that where Congress
"intends private litigants to have a cause of
action," the "far better course" is for
Congress to confer that remedy explicitly.
Abbasi acknowledges that the Constitution
lacks as firm a basis as congressional
enactments for implying causes of action; but
the "central" concern in each instance arises
from
separation-of-powers
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"the case is different in a meaningful way"
from prior Bivens cases.

extend the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to a foreign citizen residing in
the United States against American law
enforcement agents' search of his premises in
Mexico. Language in Verdugo's majority
opinion strongly suggests that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to American
officers' actions outside this country's
borders. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court
itself described the plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment claims as raising "sensitive"
issues.

Among the non-exclusive examples of such
"meaningful" differences, the Court points to
the constitutional right at issue, the extent of
judicial guidance as to how an officer should
respond, and the risk of the judiciary's
disruptive intrusion into the functioning of
the federal government's co-equal branches.
The Court found it an easy conclusion that
there were meaningful differences between
prior Bivens claims and claims alleged
in Abbasi for unconstitutional "confinement
conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant
to a high-level executive policy created in the
wake of a major terrorist attack on American
soil." Even more significant, the Court
decided that claims against the prison warden
for "compelling" allegations of detainee
abuse and prison regulation violations also
arose in a "new context" under Bivens.
Despite close parallels between claims
alleged against the warden and Carlson, the
Court explained that "even a modest
extension [of Bivens] is still an extension,"
and the Court remanded for additional
consideration of the "special factors."

Likewise, the plaintiffs can prevail on a
substantive
due
process Fifth
Amendment claim only if federal courts
accept two novel theories. The first would
allow a Bivens action to proceed based upon
a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim
simply because Verdugo might prevent the
assertion
of
a
comparable Fourth
Amendment claim. The second theory would
require
the
extension of
the Boumediene decision, both beyond its
explicit constitutional basis, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2,
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, and
beyond the United States government's de
facto control of the territory surrounding the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
Moreover, even nine years later, no federal
circuit court has extended the holding
of Boumediene either substantively to other
constitutional provisions or geographically to
locales where the United States has neither de
facto nor de jure control. Indeed, the courts
have unanimously rejected such extensions.

Pursuant to Abbasi, the cross-border shooting
at issue here must present a"new context" for
a Bivens claim. Because Hernandez was a
Mexican citizen with no ties to this country,
and his death occurred on Mexican soil, the
very existence of any "constitutional" right
benefitting him raises novel and disputed
issues. There has been no direct judicial
guidance concerning the extraterritorial
scope of the Constitution and its potential
application to foreign citizens on foreign soil.
To date, the Supreme Court has refused to

The plaintiffs assert that because this is just a
case in which one rogue law enforcement
officer engaged in misconduct on the
operational level, it poses no "new context"
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for Bivens purposes. On the contrary, their
unprecedented claims embody not merely a
"modest
extension"—
which Abbasi describes
as
a
"new" Bivens context—but
a
virtual
repudiation of the Court's holding. Abbasi is
grounded in the conclusion that Bivens
claims are now a distinctly "disfavored"
remedy and are subject to strict limitations
arising from the constitutional imperative of
the separation of powers. The newness of this
"new context" should alone require dismissal
of
the
plaintiffs'
damage
claims.
Nevertheless, we turn next to the "special
factors" analysis assuming arguendo that
some type of constitutional claims could be
conjured here.

common-law tribunal." Underscoring the
Court's steady retreat from the "ancien
regime" discussed above, that language
appears
nowhere
in Abbasi. Instead, Abbasi instructs courts to
"concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well
suited, absent congressional action or
instruction, to consider and weigh the costs
and benefits of allowing a damages action to
proceed." In light of this guidance, the
question for this court is not whether this case
is distinguishable from Abbasi itself—it
certainly is—but whether "there are sound
reasons to think Congress might doubt the
efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy."
If such reasons exist, "the courts must refrain
from creating the remedy in order to respect
the role of Congress in determining the nature
and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under
Article III."

B. SPECIAL FACTORS
The plaintiffs argue that this case involves no
"special factors"—no reasons the court
should hesitate before extending Bivens.
However remarkable this position may seem,
it is unremarkable that the plaintiffs hold it.
Indeed, they must. The presence of "special
factors"
precludes
a Bivens extension.
Given Abbasi's elucidation of the "special
factors" inquiry, there is more than enough
reason for this court to stay its hand and deny
the extraordinary remedy that the plaintiffs
seek.

Applying Abbasi's separation-of-powers
analysis reveals numerous "special factors" at
issue in this case. To begin with, this
extension of Bivens threatens the political
branches'
supervision
of
national
security. "The Supreme Court has never
implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving
the military, national security, or
intelligence." In Abbasi, the Court stressed
that "[n]ational-security policy is the
prerogative of the Congress and the
President." The plaintiffs note the Court's
warning that "national security" should not
"become a talisman used to ward off
inconvenient claims." But the Court stated
that "[t]his danger of abuse" is particularly
relevant in "domestic cases." Of course, the
defining characteristic of this case is that it
is not domestic. National-security concerns

Abbasi clarifies the concept of "special
factors" by explicitly focusing the inquiry on
maintaining the separation of powers:
"separation-of-powers principles are or
should be central to the analysis."
Before Abbasi, the Court had instructed
lower courts to perform "the kind of remedial
determination that is appropriate for a
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are hardly "talismanic" where, as here, border
security is at issue.

the
"systemwide"
impact
of
this Bivens extension, there are "sound
reasons to think Congress might doubt [its]
efficacy."

In particular, the threat of Bivens liability
could undermine the Border Patrol's ability to
perform duties essential to national
security. Congress has expressly charged the
Border Patrol with "deter[ring] and
prevent[ing] the illegal entry of terrorists,
terrorist weapons, persons, and contraband."
Although members of the Border Patrol like
Agent Mesa may conduct activities
analogous to domestic law enforcement, this
case involved shots fired across the border
within the scope of Agent Mesa's
employment. In a similar context—airport
security—the Third Circuit recently denied
a Bivens remedy for a TSA agent's alleged
constitutional violations. Relying on Abbasi,
the Third Circuit's analysis is instructive:

Extending Bivens in this context also risks
interference with foreign affairs and
diplomacy more generally. This case is
hardly sui generis: the United States
government is always responsible to foreign
sovereigns when federal officials injure
foreign citizens on foreign soil. These are
often delicate diplomatic matters, and,
as such, they "are rarely proper subjects for
judicial intervention." In fact, in 2014 the
United States and Mexican governments
established the joint Border Violence
Prevention Council as a forum for addressing
these sorts of issues. The incident involving
Agent Mesa initiated serious dialogue
between the two sovereigns, with the United
States refusing Mexico's request to extradite
Mesa but resolving to "work with the
Mexican government within existing
mechanisms and agreements to prevent
future incidents."

[The plaintiff] asks us to imply
a Bivens action for damages against a
TSA agent. TSA employees [ ] are
tasked with assisting in a critical
aspect of national security—securing
our nation's airports and air
traffic. The threat of damages liability
could indeed increase the probability
that a TSA agent would hesitate in
making split-second decisions about
suspicious passengers. In light of
Supreme Court precedent, past and
very recent, that is surely a special
factor that gives us pause.

Given the dialogue between Mexico and the
United States, the plaintiffs are wrong to
suggest that Mexico's support for a
new Bivens remedy obviates foreign affairs
concerns. It is not surprising that Mexico,
having requested Mesa's extradition, now
supports a damages remedy against him. But
the Executive Branch denied extradition and
refused to indict Agent Mesa following a
thorough investigation. It would undermine
Mexico's respect for the validity of the
Executive's prior determinations if, pursuant
to a Bivens claim, a federal court entered a
damages judgment against Agent Mesa. In

The same logic applies here. Implying a
private right of action for damages in this
transnational context increases the likelihood
that Border Patrol agents will "hesitate in
making split second decisions." Considering
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any event, diplomatic concerns "involve[ ] a
host of considerations that must be weighed
and appraised"—a sign that they must be
"committed to those who write the laws
rather than those who interpret them."

is not credible that Congress would favor the
judicial invention of those rights.
Nor, under Abbasi, does the plaintiffs' lack of
a damages remedy favor extending Bivens.
The Supreme Court has held that "even in the
absence of an alternative" remedy, courts
should not extend Bivens if any special
factors
counsel
hesitation.
Thus,
the absence of a remedy is only significant
because the presence of one precludes
a Bivens extension. Here, the absence of a
federal remedy does not mean the absence of
deterrence. Abbasi acknowledges
the
"persisting concern [ ] that absent
a Bivens remedy there will be insufficient
deterrence to prevent officers from violating
the
Constitution."
For
cross-border
shootings like this one, however, criminal
investigations and prosecutions are already a
deterrent. While it is true that numerous
federal agencies investigated Agent Mesa's
conduct and decided not to bring charges, the
DOJ is currently prosecuting another Border
Patrol agent in Arizona for the crossborder
murder of a Mexican citizen. The threat of
criminal prosecution for abusive conduct is
not hollow. In some instances, moreover, a
state-law tort claim may be available to
provide both deterrence and damages. That
claim is unavailable here because the DOJ
certified that Agent Mesa acted within the
scope of his employment, and so the Westfall
Act protects him from liability. The
plaintiffs concede that Agent Mesa was
acting within the scope of his employment.
Regardless, Abbasi makes clear that, when
there is "a balance to be struck" between
countervailing policy considerations like
deterrence and national security, "[t]he

Congress's failure to provide a damages
remedy in these circumstances is an
additional
factor
counseling
hesitation. Abbasi emphasized
that
Congress's silence may be "relevant[] and . .
. telling," especially where "Congressional
interest" in an issue "has been frequent and
intense." It is "much more difficult to believe
that congressional inaction was inadvertent"
given the increasing national policy focus on
border security.
Relevant statutes confirm that Congress's
failure to provide a federal remedy was
intentional. For instance, in section 1983,
Congress expressly limited damage remedies
to "citizen[s] of the United States or other
person[s] within the jurisdiction thereof."
Given that Bivens is a judicially implied
version of section 1983, it would violate
separation-of-powers principles if the
implied remedy reached further than the
express one. Likewise, under the Federal Tort
Claims Act—a law that comprehensively
waives federal sovereign immunity to
provide damages remedies for injuries
inflicted by federal employees—Congress
specifically excluded "[a]ny claim arising in
a foreign country." Congress also exempted
federal officials from liability under the
Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991. Taken together, these statutes represent
Congress's repeated refusals to create private
rights of action against federal officials for
injuries to foreign citizens on foreign soil. It
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proper balance is one for the Congress, not
the Judiciary, to undertake."

and stacks the deck against extending Bivens.
But Abbasi explicitly states that one rationale
for finding a "new context" is "the presence
of potential special factors." To the extent
that this court double counts the significance
of extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court has
not foreclosed our doing so.

Finally, the extraterritorial aspect of this case
is itself a special factor that underlies and
aggravates the separation-of-powers issues
already discussed. The plaintiffs argue that
extraterritoriality cannot constitute a special
factor because this would multiply
extraterritoriality's significance. But this
misunderstands
the Bivens inquiry
and
misreads Supreme Court precedent. The
plaintiffs' argument relies on Davis v.
Passman, in which the defendant argued that
his conduct was immunized by the Speech or
Debate Clause and, alternatively, that the
Clause
was
a
"special
factor"
for Bivens purposes. The Court held that the
scope of the immunity and weight of the
special factor were "coextensive." In other
words, if the Clause did not immunize the
defendant's conduct, then it was not a special
factor. Similarly, the plaintiffs here suggest
that extraterritoriality is not a "special factor"
if the Constitution applies extraterritorially.
This argument conflates the applicability of a
constitutional immunity with the scope of a
constitutional right, and thereby turns
the Bivens inquiry
upside
down. Bivens remedies are not "coextensive"
with the Constitution's protections. Indeed,
in United States v. Stanley, the Supreme
Court rejected a similar Davis-based
argument, finding it "not an application but a
repudiation of the 'special factors'
limitation."

Indeed, the novelty and uncertain scope of an
extraterritorial Bivens remedy
counsel
hesitation. As the Eleventh Circuit recently
averred, the legal theory itself may constitute
a special factor if it is "doctrinally novel and
difficult
to
administer.
An
extraterritorial Bivens extension
is
"doctrinally novel." The Supreme Court "has
never created or even favorably mentioned a
non-statutory right of action for damages on
account of conduct that occurred outside the
borders of the United States." Nor has any
court
of
appeals
extended Bivens extraterritorially.
Extraterritoriality, moreover, involves a host
of administrability concerns, making it
impossible to assess the "impact on
governmental operations systemwide."
But novelty is by no means the only problem
with an extraterritorial Bivens remedy. The
presumption
against
extraterritoriality
accentuates the impropriety of extending
private rights of action to aliens injured
abroad. According to the Supreme Court,
"[t]he presumption against extraterritorial
application helps ensure that the Judiciary
does not erroneously adopt an interpretation
of U.S. law that carries foreign policy
consequences not clearly intended by the
political branches." Even when a statute's
substantive
provisions
do
apply
extraterritorially, a court must "separately

Plaintiffs also suggest that relying on
extraterritoriality as an indicator of a "new
context" and as a "special factor" double
counts the significance of extraterritoriality
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apply
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality" when it determines
whether to provide a private right of action
for damages. By extension, even if the
Constitution applies extraterritorially, a court
should hesitate to provide an extraterritorial
damages remedy with "potential for
international friction beyond that presented
by merely applying U.S. substantive law to
that foreign conduct."

threshold— that a factor 'counsels
hesitation'—is remarkably low." Here,
extending Bivens would interfere with the
political branches' oversight of national
security and foreign affairs. It would flout
Congress's consistent and explicit refusals to
provide damage remedies for aliens injured
abroad. And it would create a remedy with
uncertain limits. In its remand of Hernandez,
the Supreme Court chastened this court for
ruling on the extraterritorial application of
the Fourth Amendment because the issue is
"sensitive and may have consequences that
are far reaching." Similar "consequences" are
dispositive of the "special factors" inquiry.
The
myriad
implications
of
an
extraterritorial Bivens remedy require this
court to deny it.

The D.C. Circuit squarely addressed the issue
of extraterritoriality in the Bivens context and
concluded that it constituted a "special
factor." Like this case, the D.C. Circuit's
decision
in Meshal
v.
Higgenbotham involved a challenge to "the
individual actions of federal law enforcement
officers" for an injury that occurred on
foreign soil. Refusing to extend Bivens, the
court noted that "the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a settled principle that the
Supreme Court applies even in considering
statutory remedies." Given this presumption,
the court concluded that extraterritoriality
was a special factor. Concurring, Judge
Kavanaugh stressed that "[i]t would be
grossly
anomalous
.
.
.
to
apply Bivens extraterritorially when we
would not apply an identical statutory cause
of
action
for
constitutional
torts
extraterritorially." We agree. Not only would
it be "anomalous," it would contravene the
separation-of-powers concerns that lie at the
heart of the "special factors" concept.

For these reasons, the district court's
judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT
BANC

ON

REHEARING

EN

This cause was considered on the record on
appeal and was argued by counsel.
It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment
of the District Court is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffsappellants pay to defendant-appellee the
costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of
this Court.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

Having weighed the factors against
extending Bivens, we conclude that this is not
a close case. Even before Abbasi clarified the
"special factors" inquiry, we agreed with our
sister circuits that "[t]he only relevant

In my view, we need not decide the difficult
question of whether a Bivens remedy should
be available under the circumstances of this
case because, under Supreme Court
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precedent, Agent Mesa is entitled to qualified
immunity. I find compelling the plaintiffs'
arguments that Hernández was entitled to
protections under the Fourth Amendment in
light of Boumediene v. Bush, and the
circumstances surrounding the border area
where Mesa shot and killed him. But the
extraterritorial
application
of
these
protections to Hernández was not clearly
established at the time of Mesa's tortious
conduct. Mesa is therefore entitled to
qualified immunity.

was shockingly unlawful cannot succeed. I
am therefore compelled to concur in
affirming the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims.
HAYNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the judgment and with the
majority
opinion's
conclusion
that Bivens should not extend to the
circumstances of this case. I write separately
to note that when we previously heard this
case en banc, it was consolidated with two
other appeals, which alleged issues arising
under the Alien Tort Statute and Federal Tort
Claims Act. Those appeals and claims are not
before us today, and they need not be
addressed to resolve the Bivens claim against
Mesa.

The plaintiffs contend that questions about
the
extraterritorial
application
of
constitutional protections do not preclude
Mesa's liability. After all, according to the
complaint, Mesa essentially committed a
cold-blooded
murder.
Surely
every
reasonable officer would know that Mesa's
conduct was unlawful, the plaintiffs argue.
While that is a fair point, I believe this
argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent, which holds that the right giving
rise to the claim—here, Hernández's Fourth
Amendment rights—must
be
clearly
established.

PRADO, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Today's en banc majority denies Sergio
Hernandez's parents a Bivens remedy for the
loss of their son at the hands of a United
States Border Patrol agent. The majority
asserts that the transnational nature of this
case presents a new context under Bivens and
that special factors counsel against this
Court's interference. While I agree that this
case presents a new context, I would find that
no special factors counsel hesitation in
recognizing a Bivens remedy because this
case centers on an individual federal officer
acting in his law enforcement capacity. I
respectfully dissent.

In Davis v. Scherer, the Supreme Court held,
"A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation
of constitutional or statutory rights may
overcome the defendant official's qualified
immunity only by showing that those rights
were clearly established at the time of the
conduct at issue." The Court stated that
"officials can act without fear of harassing
litigation only if they reasonably can
anticipate when their conduct may give rise
to liability for damages." In light of Davis,
the plaintiffs' argument that Mesa forfeited
his qualified immunity because his conduct

I do not take issue with the majority's
framework for analyzing whether there are
special factors counseling hesitation.
"[S]eparation-of-powers principles are or
should be central to the analysis." the
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majority's analysis purports to consider these
principles by appropriately asking "whether
the Judiciary is well suited, absent
congressional action or instruction, to
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing
a
damages
action
to
proceed." However, in conducting this
analysis, the majority is quickly led astray
from the familiar circumstances of this case
by empty labels of national security, foreign
affairs, and extraterritoriality. These labels—
as we say in Texas—are all hat, no cattle.

immigration violations following the
September 11 attacks brought a class action
suit against high-level federal executive
officials and detention facility wardens. The
detainees alleged that they had been detained
in harsh conditions, including that they were
confined in tiny cells for over 23 hours a day,
subjected to regular strip searches, denied
basic hygiene products and most forms of
communication, and subjected to regular
verbal and physical abuse by guards.
Detainee-plaintiffs
brought
their Bivens claims alleging that the
detention and policies authorizing it violated
their Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. After finding the case
presented a new Bivens context because it
challenged "confinement conditions imposed
on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level
executive policy created in the wake of a
major terrorist attack"—a far cry from the
three Bivens cases the Court had approved in
the past—the Court determined that several
special factors counseled hesitation that
precluded a Bivens remedy against the
executive officials.

The majority repeatedly attempts to frame
this case around the issue of whether aliens
injured abroad can pursue Bivens remedies.
That characterization, however, overlooks
the critical who, what, where, when, and how
of the lead actor in this tragic narrative. This
case involves one federal officer "engaged in
his law enforcement duties" in the United
States who shot and killed an unarmed,
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy standing a few
feet away. The Supreme Court in Abbasi
went to great lengths to indicate support for
the availability of a Bivens remedy in exactly
the circumstances presented here: an instance
of individual law enforcement overreach. As
the Court recently reaffirmed in no uncertain
terms, Bivens is "settled law . . . in [the]
common and recurrent sphere of law
enforcement." For the following reasons, I
would retain Bivens in that common sphere
and recognize a remedy for this senseless and
arbitrary cross-border shooting at the hands
of a federal law enforcement officer.

The Supreme Court's analysis of four special
factors in Abbasi is particularly relevant
given the vastly different circumstances
presented in this case. First, the Court took
issue with the fact that the detainees sought
to hold high-level federal executive officials
liable for the unconstitutional activity of their
subordinates. The Court warned that
"Bivens is not designed to hold officers
responsible for the acts of their
subordinates." Because "[t]he purpose
of Bivens is
to
deter
the officer,"
a Bivens claim should be "brought against the
individual official for his or her own acts, not

The Supreme Court directed this Court "to
consider how the reasoning and analysis
in Abbasi may bear on this case," so that is
where I begin. In Abbasi, aliens detained for
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the
acts
of
others."
Relatedly,
the Abbasi Court found it problematic that
that the detainees challenged a broad
governmental policy, specifically the
government's response to the September 11
attacks. The Court noted that "a Bivens action
is not 'a proper vehicle for altering an entity's
policy.'" Third, the Court disapproved of the
fact that the detainees' claims challenged
"more than standard 'law enforcement
operations.'" Specifically, the Court found
the detainees' claims involved "major
elements of the Government's whole
response to the September 11 attacks, thus . .
. requiring an inquiry into sensitive issues of
national security." Finally, the Court found it
of "central importance" that Abbasi was not a
"damages or nothing" case. In contrast to
suits challenging "individual instances of
discrimination
or
law
enforcement
overreach," the Abbasi plaintiffs challenged
"large-scale policy decisions concerning the
conditions of confinement imposed on
hundreds of prisoners" which could be
remedied with injunctive and habeas relief.

agents. Department of Homeland Security
regulations and guidelines already require
Border Patrol agents to adhere to
constitutional standards for the use of lethal
force, regardless of the subject's location or
nationality. Furthermore, as a case against a
single federal officer, this suit would not
require unnecessary inquiry or discovery into
governmental deliberations or policymaking—certainly not any more than any
other
regularly
permissible Bivens suit
alleging unconstitutional use of force by a
Border Patrol agent. Third, this case has
nothing to do with terrorism, nor does it
involve a high-level governmental response
to a major national security event. Rather,
plaintiffs merely challenge "standard 'law
enforcement operations.'" While the majority
attempts to link this case to border security,
which I address separately below, there is no
question that a case which involves only one
Border Patrol agent and a fifteen-year-old
boy is a far cry from Abbasi, which involved
broad and sensitive national security policies
following the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S.
history. Finally, unlike the detainees
in Abbasi, who had several alternative
remedies including habeas relief, this is a
"damages or nothing" case for Hernandez's
parents. It is uncontested that plaintiffs find
no alternative relief in Mexican law, state
law, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), or federal
criminal law for their tragic loss. Nor can
injunctive or habeas relief redress the
irreparable loss of life here. Indeed,
individual instances of law enforcement
overreach—as alleged here—are by "their
very nature . . . difficult to address except by
way of damages actions after the fact." Given

Not only are all four of these special factors
notably absent here, but this case also
presents the limited circumstances in
which Abbasi indicated
a Bivens remedy
would exist. First, Hernandez's parents do not
seek to hold any high-level officials liable for
the acts of their subordinates. Instead, and
strictlycomporting with Bivens, plaintiffs are
suing an individual federal agent for his own
actions. Relatedly, in suing an individual
officer, Hernandez's parents do not challenge
or seek to alter any governmental policy. To
the contrary, the constitutional constraints
Hernandez's parents seek mirror existing
Executive Branch policy for Border Patrol
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that a Bivens cause of action is plaintiffs' only
available remedy, compensatory relief by
way
of Bivens is
both
necessary and appropriate in this case.

unconstitutional actions taken in the course
and scope of his or her employment. Yet, as
the majority recognizes, Border Patrol agents
are unquestionably subject to Bivens suits
when they commit constitutional violations
on U.S. soil. It make little sense to argue that
a suit against a Border Patrol agent who
shoots and kills someone standing a few feet
beyond the U.S. border implicates border and
national security issues, but at the same time
contend that those concerns are not
implicated when the same agent shoots
someone standing a few feet inside the
border.

The special factors identified by the majority
do not convince me that the Judiciary is not
"well suited . . . to consider and weigh the
costs and benefits of allowing a damages
action to proceed"—particularly given the
relatively straight-forward events here. I
disagree that recognizing a Bivens remedy in
this case "threatens the political branches'
supervision of national security." According
to the majority, national security is
implicated because the events giving rise to
this suit took place at the border, thereby
affecting border security and the operations
of the Border Patrol. Relying on the Third
Circuit's rejection of Bivens liability in the
airport security context for a First
Amendment retaliation claim, the majority
also reasons that implying a Bivens remedy
in the transnational context "increases the
likelihood that Border patrol agents will
'hesitate in making split second decisions.'"

Moreover, the practical rationale given by the
majority
for
not
recognizing
a Bivens remedy—that Border Patrol agents
will hesitate making split-second decisions—
is one more commonly and more
appropriately invoked in the qualified
immunity context. Given that the qualified
immunity analysis already incorporates this
practical concern, it is odd to invoke it at this
stage, particularly when such concerns could
be raised in nearly any Bivens suit against a
federal law enforcement officer. Indeed,
although [**38] the majority does not reach
the issue of qualified immunity, Agent Mesa
has and could continue to raise it as a possible
defense to the constitutional claims against
him.

While the shooting in this case took place at
the border, it does not follow that border
security and the operations of the Border
Patrol are significantly implicated. As the
original panel majority noted, this case
"involves questions of precisely Bivens-like
domestic law enforcement and nothing
more." Plaintiffs allege that an individual
Border Patrol agent while on duty on U.S.
soil shot and killed an unarmed fifteen-yearold boy. If recognizing a Bivens remedy in
this context implicates border security or the
Border Patrol's operations, so too would any
suit against a Border Patrol agent for

Finally, I am troubled by the majority's
reliance on a First Amendment retaliation
case to raise this "national security" concern.
In Vanderklok, the Third Circuit considered
whether
under Bivens "a First
Amendment claim against a TSA employee
for retaliatory prosecution even exists in the
context
of
airport
security
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screenings." Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 194.
While the court refused to recognize such a
claim in light of the new context presented
and various special factors counseling
hesitation, one such special factor the court
found particularly relevant was the fact that
"TSA employees typically are not law
enforcement officers and do not act as such."
The court noted that "TSA employees are not
trained on issues of probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, and other constitutional
doctrines that govern law enforcement
officers." Here, by contrast, Agent Mesa is a
federal law enforcement officer well-trained
on relevant constitutional doctrines and
permissible use of force. In light of Agent
Mesa's status as a federal law enforcement
officer, the practical concerns raised
in Vanderlock pertaining to non-officer TSA
employees
in
the First
Amendment retaliation context have little
bearing here.

against a federal agent than a case involving
a true inquiry into sensitive national security
and military affairs, which are properly
committed to the Executive Branch. On this
record, I would not so readily abdicate our
judicial role given the fundamental rights at
stake here.
The majority also invokes concerns about
interference with foreign affairs and
diplomacy as a special factor counseling
hesitation. Asserting that the United States is
always responsible to foreign sovereigns
when federal officials injure foreign citizens
on foreign soil, the majority argues that
extending a Bivens remedy here implicates
"delicate diplomatic matters." However, isn't
the United States equally answerable to
foreign sovereigns when federal officials
injure foreign citizens on domestic soil?
Again, the majority's argument proves too
much. As plaintiffs persuasively argue, if
there is a "U.S. foreign policy interest
[implicated] in granting or denying
a Bivens claim to foreign nationals, it is
difficult to see how that interest would apply
only if the injury occurred abroad." It also
bears repeating that Agent Mesa's actions
took place within the United States.

Indeed, Abbasi itself cautions against taking
the very path the majority errantly takes in
this case. "[N]ational-security concerns must
not become a talisman used to ward off
inconvenient claims—a 'label' used to 'cover
a multitude of sins.'" As one prominent legal
scholar has warned, "national security"
justifications are "increasingly becom[ing]
the rule in contemporary civil litigation
against government officers" and threaten to
"dilute the effectiveness of judicial review as
a deterrent for any and all unlawful
government action—not just those actions
undertaken in ostensibly in defense of the
nation." When one looks to substantiate the
invocation of national security here, one is
left with the impression that this case more
closely resembles ordinary civil litigation

I also fail to see how recognizing
a Bivens remedy here would undermine
Mexico's respect for the Executive Branch or
create tension between Executive and
Judicial determinations. No case holds that a
court must first consider whether the
Executive Branch has found evidence of
criminality before determining whether a
civil Bivens remedy exists for a given
constitutional violation. Further, the majority
fails to acknowledge that distinct standards of
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proof govern civil and criminal proceedings
making different outcomes in these
proceedings hardly the stuff of an
international diplomatic crisis. Even if one
accepts
that
a
Judicial
finding
of Bivens liability combined with an
Executive Branch refusal to prosecute or
extradite would undermine a foreign
country's respect for the Executive Branch, it
is difficult to explain how such concerns are
only present when a foreign national is
injured abroad, but not when a foreign
national is injured in the United States. It is
unclear how recognizing a Bivens remedy for
the unconstitutional conduct of a single
federal law enforcement officer acting
entirely within the United States would
suddenly inject this Court into sensitive
matters of international diplomacy. Much as
with national security, "the Executive's mere
incantation of . . . 'foreign affairs' interests do
not suffice to override constitutional rights."

Southern States and the inability or
unwillingness of authorities in those States to
protect those rights or punish wrongdoers."
Furthermore, while a Bivens action is often
described as "analogous" to a § 1983 claim,
Butts v. Martin, the Supreme Court has
"never expressly held that the contours of
Bivens and § 1983 are identical."
The other statutes highlighted by the majority
fail to indicate that Congress expressly
intended to preclude a remedy in the
circumstances presented here. For instance,
the FTCA's exclusion of "claim[s] arising in
a foreign country," was meant to codify
"Congress's "unwilling[ness] to subject the
United States to liabilities depending upon
the laws
of
a
foreign
power." Notably, Bivens seeks to remedy
violations of United States constitutional
protections, and the FTCA expressly does
"not extend or apply to a civil action . . . for a
violation of the Constitution of the United
States." Additionally, any exception for
federal officials under the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA") has little to
say about the availability of a Bivens claim
here. The TVPA provides a remedy for
extrajudicial killings and torture at the hands
of individuals acting under color of foreign
law. However, these individuals would not
have been subject to Bivens liability anyways
because Bivens is limited to federal officials
acting pursuant to federal law.

The majority also points to Congress's failure
to provide a damages remedy as an additional
factor counseling hesitation. Noting that the
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 limits damage
remedies to "citizen[s] of the United States or
other person[s] within the jurisdiction
thereof," the majority first argues
that Bivens as the "judicially implied version
of section 1983" cannot reach further than §
1983. However, it is just as likely that by
specifying "other persons within the
jurisdiction" Congress intended to extend a §
1983 remedy beyond U.S. citizenship, rather
than commenting on its availability for
wrongful conduct by state actors with
extraterritorial effects. Indeed, Congress
enacted § 1983 "in response to the
widespread deprivations of civil rights in the

It is also important to note that Abbasi found
Congress's failure to provide a remedy to the
detainees in that case notable because
Congressional interest in the government's
response to the September 11 terrorist attack
"ha[d] been 'frequent and intense' and some
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of that interest ha[d] been directed to the
conditions of confinement at issue." By
contrast here, Congressional interest in crossborder shootings has been negligible making
it more likely that congressional inaction is
inadvertent rather than intentional. Indeed, as
courts have recognized in the statutory
interpretation context, drawing inferences
from Congress's silence is a difficult and
potentially dangerous exercise.

Mesa was acting from the American side of
the culvert. It is hard to understand how the
mere fact that a plaintiff happens to be
standing a few feet beyond an unmarked and
invisible line on the ground would suddenly
create a host of administrability concerns or a
systemwide impact on governmental
operations that would not otherwise exist if
the plaintiff was standing a few feet within
the United States. As ordinary Bivens
litigation against a federal law enforcement
officer seeking damages for unconstitutional
use of force, "the legal standards for
adjudicating the claim pressed here are wellestablished and easily administrable."

Finally, the majority asserts that "the
extraterritorial aspect of this case" is itself a
special factor counseling hesitation. Looking
to the fact that Hernandez was standing on
Mexican soil when he was shot, the majority
fears the uncertain scope of Bivens liability—
extending even to U.S.-based military drone
operators—were we to recognize a Bivens
remedy here. The majority's concern about
the effects of such a decision is
understandable and I do not take it lightly.
However, the limited and routine
circumstances presented here of individual
law enforcement action as well as established
Supreme Court precedent on Bivens claims
in the military context assure me that there is
little danger that recognizing a Bivens
remedy here will open a Pandora's Box of
liability.

But even the majority's concerns about
liability for overseas drone operations are
also unlikely to materialize. Even assuming
foreign nationals injured at the hands of U.S.
military personnel overseas could state valid
constitutional claims—a hotly debated
topic—the Supreme Court has already
repeatedly rejected Bivens claims in the
military context. Furthermore, it is likely that
such claims would actually implicate various
special factors counseling hesitation
specifically identified in Abbasi such as
requiring a true inquiry into national security
issues, intruding upon the authority of the
Executive Branch in military affairs, and
actually causing officials "to second-guess
difficult but necessary decisions concerning
national-security policy."

First, as I emphasize above, this case is
not sui generis among Bivens cases. In the
"common and recurrent sphere of law
enforcement," courts across the country
routinely administer Bivens claims against
federal officers for unconstitutional actions
occurring within the United States. I readily
acknowledge Hernandez was standing on the
Mexican side of the culvert when he was
shot, but it cannot be forgotten that Agent

In sum, this Court is more than qualified to
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing a damages action to proceed. This
case simply involves a federal official
engaged in his law enforcement duties acting
on United States soil who shot and killed an
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unarmed fifteen-year-old boy standing a few
feet away. I would elect to recognize a
damages remedy for this tragic injury. As
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury." In this case, I would recognize
a Bivens remedy for this senseless crossborder shooting at the hands of a federal law

enforcement officer. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
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“Justices to Hear Case of U.S. Agent’s Shooting of Teenage Across the
Mexican Border”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 28, 2019
The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to
decide whether the parents of a teenager
killed by an American agent shooting across
the Mexican border may sue him in federal
court.
The
justices
also issued
a
decision limiting suits by people who claim
they were arrested for exercising their First
Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has considered the case
once before, but it did not issue a definitive
ruling. It is likely to do so after it hears
arguments in the term that starts in October.

The case concerning the shooting, Hernandez
v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, started in 2010, when
Jesus Mesa Jr., a border guard, shot a fleeing
15-year-old boy in the head, killing him. The
boy, Sergio Hernández Guereca, had been
playing with friends in the dry bed of the Rio
Grande and was in Mexico when he was
struck.

In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, the Supreme Court ruled that
congressional authorization was not always
needed in suits against federal officials
claiming violations of constitutional rights.
But the court has grown increasingly uneasy
about the decision, which concerned the
unconstitutional search of a home in
Brooklyn, and it has cautioned that the ruling
should not be extended lightly to new
contexts.

The central question in the case is whether
Congress must authorize lawsuits like the one
brought by Sergio’s parents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, said Sergio’s
family could not sue Mr. Mesa.

The government of Mexico had urged the
Supreme Court to hear the case against Mr.
Mesa. “It is a priority to Mexico to see that
the United States has provided adequate
means to hold the agents accountable and to
compensate
the
victims,” Mexico’s
brief said. “The United States would expect
no less if the situation were reversed and a
Mexican government agent had killed a U.S.
national.”

“This is not a close case,” Judge Edith
Jones wrote for the majority. Congress could
pass a law allowing suits against federal
officials by “aliens injured abroad,” she said.
But without such a law, she wrote, federal
courts should not “interfere with the political
branches’ oversight of national security and
foreign affairs.”
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The First Amendment case decided on
Tuesday, Nieves v. Bartlett, No. 17-1174,
arose from an encounter at the weeklong
Arctic Man festival in Alaska, “an event
known for both extreme sports and extreme
alcohol consumption,” Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. wrote for the majority. “The
mainstays are high-speed ski and
snowmobile races, bonfires and parties.”

also avoided providing an answer in a 2012
case concerning Secret Service agents.
In 2006, the court ruled in Hartman v.
Moore that government officials could not be
sued under the First Amendment for
retaliatory prosecutions where there was
probable cause to pursue the prosecution.
On Tuesday, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
the same rule should apply to arrests, with
one exception. Suits can proceed, he said,
“when a plaintiff presents objective evidence
that he was arrested when otherwise similarly
situated individuals not engaged in the same
sort of protected speech had not been.”

“During that week,” the chief justice wrote,
“the Arctic Man campground briefly
becomes one of the largest and most raucous
cities in Alaska.”
One participant, Russell P. Bartlett, was
arrested after yelling at police officers and
refusing to answer questions. Afterward, Mr.
Bartlett said, one officer told him, “Bet you
wish you would have talked to me now.”

Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito
Jr., Elena Kagan and Brett M. Kavanaugh
joined the majority opinion in the case.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined most of the
opinion, though he would have done without
the exception.

He was charged with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest, but prosecutors dropped the
charges, saying it was too expensive to
pursue them given the distances involved.
Mr. Bartlett sued, saying he had been arrested
for exercising his First Amendment rights.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil M.
Gorsuch issued partial dissents, with Justice
Ginsburg noting that the power to arrest “can
be abused to disrupt the exercise of First
Amendment speech and press rights.”

The case was the court’s third attempt to
answer the difficult question of whether the
existence of probable cause was always
enough to defeat a lawsuit claiming
retaliatory arrest.

In her own dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
warned that “the majority’s approach will
yield arbitrary results and shield willful
misconduct from accountability.”

Last year, the court ruled that Fane Lozman,
a critic of a Florida city who was arrested at
a City Council meeting, could pursue a case
for retaliatory arrest, but only because the city
appeared to have had an established and
official policy of harassing him. The court
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“Border Patrol Agents Must Be Held Accountable”
Slate
Steve Vladeck
June 24, 2018
One need not look far these days to find
agents of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection in the news—from the frontlines
of the Trump administration’s controversial
“zero tolerance” policy along the U.S.Mexico border to citizenship checkpoints
along I-95 in northern Maine. Now more than
ever, ensuring that CBP agents are held
accountable if and when they violate
individuals’ constitutional rights seems like
an obvious imperative.

The Hernández case (in which I am cocounsel to the plaintiffs) started with the fatal
shooting, on June 7, 2010, of Sergio Adrián
Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican
national who, according to his parents’
lawsuit, was playing with friends in the
culvert along the U.S.-Mexico border outside
El Paso (and was unarmed) when Jesus Mesa,
a CBP agent, shot and killed him.
Hernández’s parents brought a wrongful
death action against Mesa, claiming, among
other things, that the shooting was in
violation of Hernández’s rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Although the
case posed interesting (and unanswered)
questions about the extent to which the
Constitution applies at (and just across) the
border, it was resolved by the 5th Circuit, the
first time around, on the basis of “qualified
immunity”—the idea that, even if Mesa did
violate Hernández’s rights, it was not “clearly
established” at the time of the shooting that
Mesa’s conduct was unconstitutional
(because it was not “clearly established” if
the Constitution applied to Hernández at all).

In March, however, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals (the federal appeals court with
jurisdiction over Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas) held that, even if a CBP agent at the
U.S.-Mexico border commits what one judge
described as a “cold-blooded murder,” the
victim’s family cannot sue him for damages.
Among other things, the court of appeals
concluded in Hernández v. Mesa that federal
judges generally should not provide such
relief in cases presenting any kind of
“national security” or “foreign policy”
concerns. In the process, the 5th Circuit
implied that damages will never be available
against CBP officers even for egregious
violations
of
clearly
established
constitutional rights, and it did so at an
especially inauspicious time to remove even
the specter of deterrence from officers of the
nation’s largest law enforcement agency.

Last June, however, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the 5thCircuit’s
decision, ruling that Mesa did not know at the
time of the shooting that Hernández was a
noncitizen, and therefore could not have
known that the person at whom he was
shooting might lack constitutional protection.
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On remand, the 5th Circuit once again sided
with Agent Mesa, this time arguing that
federal courts generally should not recognize
judge-made damages remedies, especially in
cases raising the kinds of national security
and foreign policy concerns that tend to arise
at the border. In so ruling, the 5th Circuit
purported to rely on the Supreme Court’s
decision last year in Ziglar v. Abbasi, in
which a four-justice majority (out of the six
justices who heard the case) refused to
recognize a damages remedy against senior
government officials for their role in the
roundup and detention of immigrants who
were Muslim and/or of Arab descent after
Sept. 11, 2001.

Moreover, unlike in Abbasi, the plaintiffs in
the Hernández case have no other possible
remedy. A federal statute bars them from
suing Mesa under state tort law. And as with
most claims against rogue law enforcement
officers, there is no meaningful opportunity
to challenge the officer’s conduct in advance
through a suit for declaratory or injunctive
relief. Thus, for plaintiffs like Hernández’s
parents, the alternative to judge-made
damages for Agent Mesa’s allegedly
unconstitutional conduct is, well, nothing. It
might be easy to understand, or at least
accept, the federal courts’ skepticism at going
out of their way to provide remedies in a oneoff case, where there is no real concern that
the officer’s allegedly unconstitutional
conduct could or would recur. But the tragic
facts of Hernández’s case are, unfortunately,
not the least bit aberrational. The federal
appeals court in San Francisco is currently
considering similar questions in a case
arising out of a fatal cross-border shooting in
Arizona, and there was just another fatal
shooting by a CBP agent of an unarmed
noncitizen along the border near Laredo,
Texas. More generally, one need not look far
to find CBP agents on the literal and
figurative front lines in any number of other
contemporary contexts—contexts in which
there ought to be common cause in the need
to deter constitutional abuse.

Abbasi is a deeply disturbing decision, both
in how it applies (and ignores) prior
precedent and in its more fundamental
framing of the role of the federal courts visà-vis the political branches. But for all its
flaws, Abbasi repeatedly stressed that its
holding was “not intended to cast doubt on
the continued force, or even the necessity” of
judge-made damages remedies in searchand-seizure cases, and that “[t]he settled law
… in this common and recurrent sphere of
law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance
upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are
powerful reasons to retain [them] in that
sphere.”
In
other
words,
although Abbasi frowned on judge-made
damages remedies to challenge high-level
policy decisions by senior government
officials in the midst of national security
crises, it went out of its way to not similarly
disavow damages remedies for “individual
instances of … law enforcement overreach.”
Only one of the six justices who participated
in Abbasi (Clarence Thomas) disagreed.

To that end, on June 15, we brought the
Hernández case back to the Supreme Court,
asking the justices to review (and reverse) the
5th Circuit’s ruling and to recognize that the
federal courts can indeed hold CBP agents
accountable if and when they violate the
Constitution. Now more than ever, there
ought to be common cause in ensuring that
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CBP agents act consistently with the
Constitution, and in providing remedies to
their victims in case in which they don’t.
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“Is There Liability for Cross-Border Shooting?”
Congressional Research Service
Charles Doyle
May 22, 2018
In 2010, a border patrol agent, standing in the
United States, shot and killed a 15-year old
Mexican boy standing across the border in
Mexico. The Hernandez’s parents sued. Last
June, the Supreme Court returned the case to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(Fifth Circuit) for further legal proceedings.
Hernandez v. Mesa. The Fifth Circuit has
now ruled that the Hernandez family may not
sue the border patrol agent under an impliedcause-of-action Bivens theory.

Background
Although many of the facts are in dispute, all
parties seem to agree that Border Patrol
Agent Mesa shot and killed Sergio
Hernandez across the U.S.-Mexico border.
The boy’s parents sued Agent Mesa, the
United States, and several federal agencies
under various theories. The district court
dismissed claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute. The
boy’s parents also asserted a Bivens cause of
action for violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
They
contended
unsuccessfully that the shooting and death
constituted use of excessive force and thus an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and a substantive due process
violation under the Fifth Amendment.

Bivens refers to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, a
1971 case in which the Supreme Court held
that a victim of an unconstitutional search
and seizure enjoyed an implied cause of
action against the offending agents for
damages in the absence of any other legal
remedy. In later cases, the Supreme Court has
hesitated to recognize an implied cause of
action for other constitutional violations.
Whether the Court will recognize an implied
cause of action in these new-context cases
turns on the existence of any special factors
suggesting that the existence of any remedy
for the constitutional violation should be left
to Congress. The Court returned Hernandez
to the Fifth Circuit for this “special factor”
analysis. The Fifth Circuit identified special
factors that it held precluded recognition of
an implied cause of action.

Agent Mesa for his part invoked qualified
official immunity. Qualified official
immunity precludes a suit for money
damages against government officials arising
out of actions occurring in performance of
their official duties. The immunity does not
extend to conduct that is contrary to clearly
established law with which an official would
be familiar. Agent Mesa argued that no
Fourth or Fifth Amendment precedent clearly
covered conduct in a foreign nation.
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A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the Federal Tort Claims
Act and Alien Tort statute claims. A full
complement of the judges of the Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, concluded that Agent Mesa
was entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to the Fifth Amendment Bivens claim.
The judges affirmed dismissal of the Fourth
Amendment claims because they concluded
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
outside of the United States to foreign
nationals without ties to the United States.

Fifth Circuit for a threshold determination of
whether the Hernandez family enjoyed a
Bivens implied cause of action.
Back in the Fifth Circuit
When the case returned from the Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit decided that the case
presented a “new context” for Bivens
purposes and that “special factors”
counselled against recognizing an expanded
implied Bivens cause of action. If a case does
not present a “new context” – that is, if a case
is not “different in a meaningful way” from
the cases in which the Supreme Court has
recognized a Bivens implied cause of action
– then an implied cause of action exists. The
Fifth Circuit pointed out that Hernandez
presents unresolved and novel Fourth and
Fifth Amendment claims.

The case arrived before the Supreme Court
shortly after the Court had agreed to review
another Bivens claims case, Ziglar v. Abbasi.
Writing for the Court in Abbasi, Justice
Kennedy emphasized the Court’s reluctance
to recognize implied causes of action. Justice
Kennedy explained that “Bivens will not be
extended to a new context if there are ‘special
factors’ counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress.” He stated
further that “if there are sound reasons to
think Congress might doubt the efficacy or
necessity of a damages remedy as part of the
system for enforcing the law and correcting a
wrong, the courts must refrain from creating
the remedy in order to respect the role of
Congress in determining the nature and
extent of federal-court jurisdiction under
Article III.”

As for special factors, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the possibility of an implied
cause of action in some new-context cases,
but concluded that here the special factors
were too many and too weighty for the
plaintiffs to overcome. The Fifth Circuit
identified five special factors that it believed
indicated that establishing a cause of action
should be left to Congress. First, the Border
Patrol is statutorily authorized to deter and
prevent illegal entry by terrorists, gun and
drug
smugglers,
and
unauthorized
individuals, “duties essential to national
security.” Second, “extending Bivens in this
context also risks interference with foreign
affairs and diplomacy.” Third, Congress
might have, but refrained, from establishing
a cause of action against federal officials in
the Federal Tort Claims Act and elsewhere.
Fourth, Congress has established other

The Supreme Court then turned to Mesa. The
Court concluded the Fifth Circuit’s qualified
immunity holding was in error because it
failed to address the fact that Agent Mesa had
no idea whether the boy was a U.S. citizen.
The Court set aside the question of whether
Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated and returned the case to the
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remedies for the alleged in the form of
criminal
prosecution.
Fifth,
“the
extraterritorial aspect of this case is itself a
special factor that underlies and aggravates
the separation-of-powers issues.”

At this point, the Hernandez family is free to
petition the Supreme Court to review the
Fifth Circuit’s handiwork. It remains to be
seen whether the family will petition for
review and how the Court would respond to
the petition if the family asks for review. On
one hand, the Court in Abbasi characterized
Bivens and its progeny as the work of an
“ancient regime” (i.e., the standard of a
bygone day), a view that would seem to
foreclose future recognition of virtually any
new Bivens implied causes of action. On the
other hand, the special factors the Court
identified in Abbasi were fairly unique (high
level executive policy decisions relating to
detention following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks). The Court may want to take the
opportunity to explain just how special
Bivens-defeating special factors must be. In
any event, Congress is free to address the
situation legislatively.

One judge concurred, but would have
resolved the case on the basis of qualified
official immunity. In his view, the absence of
clearly established precedent settled the case
in Agent Mesa’s favor. Two judges
dissented. They agreed that the case
presented the issue in a new context.
However, they did not consider the
majority’s special factors all that special.
Instead, in their view, the “case simply
involves a federal official engaged in his law
enforcement duties acting on United States
soil who shot and killed an unarmed fifteenyear-old boy standing a few feet away.” They
would have recognized an implied cause of
action should the Hernandez family establish
either a Fourth or Fifth Amendment
violation.
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“Supreme Court Revives Suit Against Border Agent in Shooting Death”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
June 26, 2017
The Supreme Court on Monday revived a
claim against a U.S. Border Patrol agent who
shot and killed a Mexican teenager standing
across the international border, directing a
lower court that had dismissed the case to reexamine whether youth’s parents are entitled
to sue.

Had the victim been in the U.S. or held
American citizenship, or had the shooter
worked for a state or local agency, the parents
most likely could sue for damages.
But Congress hasn’t explicitly authorized
lawsuits against federal officials for violating
constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court
has found only narrow circumstances when
they potentially are liable for such
misconduct.

In a separate case, the court was unable to
resolve whether immigrants held in longterm detention have a right to seek bail, and
ordered a new argument on the issue. The
case was heard in February by an eightmember court, which apparently divided
evenly on the issue. Justice Neil Gorsuch,
confirmed in April, likely will provide the
deciding vote when the case is argued again
in the term that begins in October.

Monday’s unsigned decision directs the Fifth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in New
Orleans, to re-examine whether the
Hernandez killing falls into such
circumstances, especially under an opinion
the high court issued last week further
elaborating the “special factors” that
determine whether federal officials may be
sued.

The cross-border shooting case was among
the most dramatic heard by the court during
the term that ended Monday. According to
the suit, 15-year-old Sergio Hernandez and
his friends were playing a tag-like game in
the dry concrete culvert built to channel the
Rio Grande, dividing the U.S. city of El Paso,
Texas, from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico.

“The facts alleged in the complaint depict a
disturbing
incident resulting
in a
heartbreaking loss of life,” the court said.
Whether Sergio’s parents “may recover
damages for that loss in this suit depends on
questions” the appeals court should first
address.

Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa Jr. arrived on
a bicycle and seized one of the youths, but
when Sergio escaped to the Mexican side of
the culvert, fatally shot him in the face.

Although unsigned, Monday’s decision was
adopted by a 5-3 vote.
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In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said the parents
should have been permitted to press their
claim at trial. Among other reasons, Mr.
Mesa “knowingly shot from United States
territory into the culvert,” Justice Breyer
wrote, without knowing on which side of the
border the bullet would land” or “whether he
was shooting at a citizen of the United States
or Mexico.”

culvert, to buttress his argument that Sergio
had been more in an international no-man’sland than deep into a foreign country, and a
photo of President Lyndon Johnson and Lady
Bird Johnson viewing the channel in 1968.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented on the
other side, writing briefly that the Fifth
Circuit properly dismissed the case. Justice
Gorsuch wasn’t on the court when the case
was argued and didn’t participate.

Justice Breyer’s dissent included a 1963
blueprint showing a cross-section of the
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“Does the Constitution protect someone on the Mexican side of the border?”
Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
February 21, 2017
The Supreme Court on Tuesday will take up
the case of a Mexican teenager who was shot
and killed by a U.S. border agent and try to
decide a question that is also at the heart of
the legal dispute over President Trump’s
foreign travel ban: Does the Constitution
protect foreign citizens who stand at the
nation’s borders?

Officer Jesus Mesa Jr. grabbed one of the
boys and turned his gun toward the other,
Sergio, who had hidden behind a pillar about
60 feet away on the Mexican side. The officer
fired three shots and killed the teenager.
Mesa initially claimed he acted in selfdefense because the boys were throwing
rocks at him. While the video appeared to
disprove
that,
Justice
Department
investigators later said Mesa was responding
to reports of smugglers and he had
encountered rocks being thrown.

Judges have blocked Trump’s order
temporarily on the grounds it may violate the
constitutional rights of foreign travelers from
seven Muslim majority nations. Some of
those foreigners live legally in this country
and had traveled abroad, while others hold
U.S. visas but have never been to the United
States. However, the law in this area is far
from clear, and it will likely remain so until
the high court rules on the issue.

The killing of the teenager, who was unarmed
and posed no apparent threat to the officer,
provoked anger on the Mexican side of the
border, but U.S. officials refused to extradite
Mesa to face charges in Mexico. They also
decided against prosecuting him under U.S.
law.

The border shooting case touches on a similar
question, and the outcome may affect the
travel ban litigation.

Sergio’s parents then sued Mesa, alleging
the shooting was an unjustified violation of
the Constitution. They cited the 4th
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable seizures
and the use of excessive force as well as the
5th Amendment, which says no person shall
“be deprived of life or liberty … without due
process of law.”

In June 2010, Sergio Hernandez, 15, was
playing with two friends in the concrete
culvert that marks the boundary between El
Paso and Juarez, Mexico. Cellphone
video shows the boys ran up the culvert on
the U.S. side and touched the high fence.
They turned to run back to the Mexican side
when a U.S. border patrol agent on a bicycle
came upon them.

A federal judge threw out the suit on the
grounds that the Constitution’s protections
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stop at the border. Since the Mexican
teenager was killed on the Mexican side, his
family could not sue the border patrol agent,
the judge said.

the Supreme Court should throw out the suit
and shield U.S. agents from all such claims.
Defending the travel ban, government
lawyers made a similar argument, contending
judges had no authority to second-guess the
president’s decision to exclude certain
foreigners from entering the country. Last
weekend, White House policy advisor
Stephen Miller said in TV interviews that
judges had no authority to block Trump’s
order on foreign travelers. “The president’s
powers here are beyond question,” he said.
“We don’t have judicial supremacy in this
country.”

A divided panel of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals briefly revived the suit. The
majority cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in
cases regarding the U.S. detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in which the justices
said the Constitution and the right to habeas
corpus extended to the naval base on Cuban
soil because U.S. authorities exercised
complete control there. Similarly, the judges
said, U.S. agents controlled the area on the
U.S-Mexico border.

As usual, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
appears to hold the key vote. In the past, he
has said the reach of the Constitution should
turn on practical concerns, including whether
U.S. officials are in control. If so, he could
join with the court’s liberals to say the
Constitution constrains U.S. agents operating
on a border, thereby clearing the family’s
lawsuit to proceed. Such a decision would
surely be cited by lawyers and judges in the
litigation over the travel ban.

The full 15-member appeals court then took
up the case and decided that because the law
was not clear, the border agent could not be
held liable for violating it.
The family appealed to the Supreme Court,
arguing the justices should not permit a “lawfree zone in which U.S. agents can kill
innocent civilians with impunity.”
The case of Hernandez vs. Mesa will be the
first argued in the Supreme Court by lawyers
representing the Trump administration.

But he could also join with the court’s
conservatives and refuse to open the door for
noncitizens outside the country to bring legal
claims against U.S. officials. If the court were
to split, 4-4, the justices could choose to place
a hold on the case and await the confirmation
of a ninth justice.

In an interview, the family’s attorney, Robert
Hilliard of Corpus Christi, Texas, said the
case has similarities to the legal battle over
Trump’s travel ban. “This is really about the
separation of powers and whether the
judiciary has a role in reviewing the conduct
of the government,” he said.

The Senate will begin hearings March 20 on
Judge Neil Gorsuch, the president’s nominee
to fill the vacancy.

He was referring to the government’s
contention in the border shooting case that

379

Barton v. Barr
Ruling Below: Barton v. United States AG, 904 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Barton, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a B-2 visitor and
became a lawful permanent resident. He was arrested and charged with three counts of aggravated
assault and one count each of first-degree criminal damage to property and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. The Department of Homeland Security charged Barton as
deportable. He challenged the charges for removal. The U.S. Government argued that his crimes
make him “inadmissible.” Barton claimed that since he is an already-admitted lawful permanent
resident, he could not be rendered inadmissible.
Issue: Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United
States can be “render[ed] … inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C.
§1229b(d)(1).
Andre Martello BARTON., Petitioner
v.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on September 25, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
The federal immigration laws give the
Attorney General the discretion to cancel the
removal of an otherwise removable lawful
permanent resident who (among other
conditions) "has resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status." Importantly for
present purposes, though, the continuousresidence requirement is subject to the socalled "stop-time rule." The provision that
embodies that rule—at issue here—states that
any period of continuous residence

terminates when the alien "commit[s] an
offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of
this
title
that renders
the
alien
inadmissible to
the
United
States
under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or
removable from
the
United
States
under section
1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of
this title, whichever is earliest."
The question before us is whether a lawfulpermanent-resident alien who has already
been admitted to the United States—and who
isn't currently seeking admission or
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readmission—can, for stop-time purposes, be
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" by virtue of a
qualifying criminal conviction. Other circuits
have divided over the answer. For slightly
different reasons, the Second and Fifth
Circuits have both held that a lawful
permanent resident needn't apply for
admission to be "render[ed] ... inadmissible"
under the stop-time rule (as has the Third
Circuit,
albeit
in
an
unpublished
opinion). More recently, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed, concluding that "a lawful
permanent resident cannot be 'rendered
inadmissible' unless he is seeking
admission."

Barton was charged with and convicted of
violating the Georgia Controlled Substances
Act. (For present purposes, only Barton's
1996 crimes are relevant to determining
whether he is eligible for cancellation of
removal. Barton's 2007 and 2008 offenses
occurred more than seven years after his
admission to the United States—which, as we
will explain, is the pertinent timeframe for
establishing continuous residence under the
cancellation statute.)
The Department of Homeland Security
subsequently served Barton with a notice to
appear, charging him as removable on several
grounds:
(1)
under 8
U.S.C.
§
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of an
aggravated felony related to drug trafficking;
(2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for
violating controlled-substance laws; (3)
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), for being
convicted of illegally possessing a firearm;
and (4) under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
for being convicted of two crimes involving
moral turpitude not arising out of a single
scheme. Barton admitted the factual
allegations in the notice and conceded
removability based on the controlledsubstance and gun-possession offenses but
denied that he had been convicted of a
trafficking-related aggravated felony or of
two crimes involving moral turpitude not
arising out of a single scheme. Barton also
indicated that he intended to seek
cancellation of removal as a lawful
permanent resident. The immigration judge
sustained the two conceded charges of
removability, and the government later
withdrew
the
other
two
charges.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, and
disagree with the Ninth.
I
A
Andre Martello Barton is a native and citizen
of Jamaica. Barton was initially admitted to
the United States on May 27, 1989 as a B-2
visitor for pleasure; approximately three
years later, he successfully adjusted his status
to lawful permanent resident. Since his
admission, Barton has run afoul of the law on
several occasions. Initially, on January 23,
1996—for reasons that will become clear, the
dates matter—Barton was arrested and
charged with three counts of aggravated
assault and one count each of first-degree
criminal damage to property and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a
felony. He was convicted of all three offenses
in July 1996. Then, a little more than a decade
later—first in 2007 and then again in 2008—
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As promised, Barton subsequently filed an
application for cancellation of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which, as already
explained, allows the Attorney General to
cancel the removal of an otherwise
removable lawful-permanent-resident alien
if—in addition to other requirements not
relevant here—the alien "has resided in the
United States continuously for 7 years after
having been admitted in any status."
Importantly, though—as also explained—the
continuous-residence
requirement
is
subject to the "stop-time rule," which
terminates the accrual of continuous
residence when the alien commits a crime
that (1) is listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and
(2) that renders the alien either
"inadmissible"
under §
1182(a)(2) or
"removable"
under 8
U.S.C.
§
1227(a)(2) or (a)(4).

scheme of misconduct constituting one crime
involving moral turpitude committed outside
his first five years in the United States,
whereas
the
cross-referenced §
1227(a)(2) establishes removability, as
relevant here,only for (i) a single crime
involving moral turpitude committed within
five years of an alien's admission or (ii)
multiple crimes involving moral turpitude not
arising out of a single scheme. The
government didn't press—and has since
abandoned—the argument that Barton's 1996
crimes rendered him "removable" for stoptime purposes. Instead, it insisted that
Barton's 1996 offenses—even if considered
as a single crime involving moral turpitude
occurring outside the five-year timeframe—
rendered Barton "inadmissible" under §
1182(a)(2), which unlike removability
under § 1227(a)(2) isn't limited by a singlescheme requirement. Barton replied—thus
teeing up the issue before us—that as an
already-admitted lawful permanent resident
not seeking admission (or readmission) to the
United States, he could not as a matter of law
be "render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the
meaning of § 1229b(d).

In his cancellation application, Barton
acknowledged his prior criminal convictions
and included as exhibits records that, as
relevant here, showed that he had committed
the crimes that resulted in his convictions for
aggravated assault, criminal damage to
property, and unlawful gun possession on
January 23, 1996. The government moved to
pretermit Barton's application, arguing that
Barton hadn't accrued the required seven
years of continuous residence after his May
27, 1989 admission because, under the stoptime rule, his continuous-residence period
ended on January 23, 1996.

The immigration judge ruled in the
government's favor, concluding that Barton's
1996
offenses
"render[ed]"
him
"inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(2), thereby
triggering § 1229b(d)(1)'s stop-time rule,
thereby prematurely ending his period of
continuous residence in the United States,
thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of
removal.

In response, Barton contended that his 1996
crimes didn't trigger the stop-time rule. As
to § 1229b(d)(1)'s "removable" prong,
Barton said that his 1996 offenses didn't
qualify because they arose from a single
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Barton sought review of the IJ's order in the
Board of Immigration Appeals, reiterating
his argument that a lawful-permanentresident alien not seeking admission to the
United States can't be "render[ed]
inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(2) for stoptime purposes. In a non-precedential singlemember decision, the Board agreed with the
IJ, concluding that Barton's 1996 offenses
triggered the stop-time rule and thus
forestalled his accrual of the requisite seven
years of continuous residence. Citing its
earlier decision in Matter of JuradoDelgado, the Board (per the lone member)
held that Barton's convictions barred him
from seeking cancellation of removal
because—so far as we can tell from a very
summary order—the phrase "renders the
alien inadmissible" in § 1229b(d)(1)'s stoptime rule requires only that the applicant be
"potentially" inadmissible, not that he be
actively seeking admission.

force when the Board of Immigration
Appeals interprets ambiguous statutory terms
in the course of ordinary case-by-case
adjudication.
But
so
do Chevron's
limitations. Accordingly, here as elsewhere,
if we determine—employing "traditional
tools of statutory construction"—that
"Congress has spoken clearly, we do not
defer to [the] agency's interpretation of the
statute," because "we must give effect to the
unambiguously
expressed
intent
of
Congress."
The threshold question before us, therefore—
at Chevron step one, so to speak—is whether
the usual rules of statutory interpretation
provide a clear answer to the following
question: Can a lawful-permanent-resident
alien who is not presently seeking admission
to the United States nonetheless be
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)?
Although it is undoubtedly true that "the
concept of inadmissibility is generally
married to situations in which an alien is
actually seeking admission to the United
States," for the reasons that follow, we hold
that an already-admitted lawful permanent
resident—who doesn't need and isn't seeking
admission—can be
"render[ed]
...
inadmissible" for stop-time purposes.

Barton now petitions for review of the
Board's decision. He asserts, as he has all
along, that as a lawful permanent resident he
"plainly cannot be inadmissible as a result of
any offense, as he is not seeking admission to
the United States."
II
Under the principle announced in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, "[a]s a general rule, an
agency's interpretation of a statute which it
administers is entitled to deference if the
statute is silent or ambiguous and the
interpretation is based on a reasonable
construction of the statute.” And to be clear,
the
Supreme
Court
has
held
that Chevron deference applies with full

A
Any application of the "traditional tools of
statutory construction," of course, must begin
"with the statutory text, and proceed from the
understanding that unless otherwise defined,
statutory terms are generally interpreted in
accordance with their ordinary meaning.” At
issue here (again) is the stop-time rule, which
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(again) terminates the seven years of
continuous residence that a lawful permanent
resident must accrue in order to qualify for
cancellation of removal. In relevant part, the
stop-time rule provides as follows:

"proper[ly]"—or doesn't "hav[e] the right to
be"—present in the United States.
On, then, to the word "renders," which
precedes "inadmissible." Barton asserts that
Congress's use of that term—such that the
alien must commit an offense that "renders"
him
"inadmissible"—"requires
certain
factual circumstances to be in existence to be
operative," and thus that it "makes most sense
for Congress to have used 'renders'
inadmissible to apply to those seeking
admission ...." We disagree that the term
"renders" necessitates (or even properly
suggests) so narrow a reading. Turning again
to the dictionaries, we find that they almost
uniformly define "render" to mean "to cause
to be or to become." Some, interestingly—
and we think tellingly—go on to explain that
the word "render" can indicate the conferral
of a particular condition, or "state."

[A]ny period of continuous residence
... in the United States shall be
deemed to end ... when the alien has
committed an offense referred to
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that
renders the alien inadmissible to the
United
States
under section
1182(a)(2) of this title or removable
from the United States under section
1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title,
whichever is earliest.
Because the parties here agree that Barton is
not ineligible for cancellation of removal on
account of having committed an offense that
rendered
him
"removable"
under §
1227(a)(2) or § 1227(a)(4), the sole question
before us is whether his 1996 convictions
rendered him "inadmissible" under §
1182(a)(2). Barton's position is simply stated:
He says that he "plainly cannot
be inadmissible as a result of any offense, as
he is not seeking admission to the United
States." Although Barton's argument has a
certain intuitive appeal, we conclude that §
1229b(d)(1)'s plain language forecloses it.

A "state"-based understanding makes
particularly good sense here, where the word
that follows "renders" is "inadmissible." By
their very nature, "able" and "ible"
words connote a person's or thing's character,
quality, or status—which, importantly for
present purposes, exists independent of any
particular facts on the ground, so to speak.
Consider, for instance, the following
example, taken from one dictionary's
definition of the word "render": "Sewage
effluent leaked into a well, grossly
contaminating the water and rendering
it undrinkable for 24 hours." The described
water isn't properly drunk for a full day—
whether or not anyone is actually trying to
drink it. It is, by its very nature, not drinkable.
Here's another, again from a dictionary
definition of "render": "[T]he rains rendered

We begin our textual analysis where Barton
does—with the word "inadmissible."
Standard English-language dictionaries all
seem to define "inadmissible" in pretty much
the same way: "Not admissible; not proper to
be allowed or received." So, in short, an alien
like Barton is "inadmissible" if he isn't
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his escape impossible." Because of the rains,
the unidentified captive's escape couldn't be
made—whether or not he was actually trying
to make it. Similar illustrations abound: A
terminal
illness
renders
its
victim untreatable regardless of whether she
is actively seeking treatment; rot renders a
piece of fish inedible regardless of whether
someone is trying to eat it; sheer weight
renders a car immovable regardless of
whether someone is trying to move it. You
get the point. So too here—an alien can be
rendered inadmissible regardless of whether
he is actually seeking admission.

status," "has been absent from the United
States for a continuous period in excess of
180 days," or "has engaged in illegal activity
after having departed the United States."
So as a matter of both linguistics and logic, at
least for stop-time purposes, a lawful
permanent resident can—contrary to Barton's
contention—be "render[ed] ... inadmissible"
even if he isn't currently seeking (and for that
matter may never again seek) admission to
the United States.
B
In resisting this plain-language interpretation,
Barton relies principally on the rule against
surplusage—which
cautions
against
needlessly reading a statute in a way that
renders (pun fully intended) certain language
superfluous. In particular, Barton asserts—

We simply cannot discern in § 1229b(d)(1)'s
text any indication that in order to be
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the
meaning of the stop-time rule, an alien must
presently be seeking admission. Rather, an
alien is "render[ed] ... inadmissible" when he
is "cause[d] to be or to become" not
"proper[ly]" or "right[ly]" admitted. In other
words, "inadmissib[ility]" is a status that an
alien assumes by virtue of his having been
convicted of a qualifying offense under §
1182(a)(2). True, for an alien like Barton,
who has already been admitted—and isn't
currently seeking admission—that status
might not immediately produce real-world
admission-related consequences. But it isn't
categorically irrelevant to admission either;
rather, it may just be that the otherwise-latent
status manifests somewhere down the road.
Barton is of course correct that, as a general
rule, an already-admitted lawful permanent
resident needn't seek readmission to the
United States. There are exceptions,
however. For instance, a once-admitted alien
may need readmission if he "has abandoned
or relinquished [lawful-permanent-resident]

If an offense referred to in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2), to wit, a [crime involving
moral
turpitude],
categorically
render[s] an alien inadmissible and
trigger[s] the stop-time rule, without
respect to whether that individual is
actually seeking admission, then there
would be no need to consider
whether, in the alternative, the
offense render[s] the alien removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) or (a)(4).
Although we find Barton's surplusage-based
argument a little hard to follow, he seems to
be saying something like the following. At
the outset, he correctly recognizes that in
order to trigger § 1229b(d)(1)'s stop-time
rule, two conditions must be met: first, the
alien must have "committed an offense
referred to in section 1182(a)(2)"; second,
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and separately, that offense must "render[]
the alien" either "inadmissible ...
under section 1182(a)(2)" or "removable ...
under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) ...."
From that starting point, and presumably
fastening on the fact that both § 1229b(d)(1)'s
prefatory "referred to" clause and the
"inadmissible" prong of the statute's
operative
clause
cross-reference §
1182(a)(2), Barton appears to contend that an
alien's commission of any § 1182(a)(2)based crime that meets the threshold
"referred
to"
condition will
also ipso facto "render[]
the
alien
inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2)."
Thus, he says, there will never be a need to
proceed to determine whether a crime
qualifies under the operative clause's
separate §
1227(a)-based
"removable"
prong—hence, the argument goes, the
surplusage. Barton's solution: Courts should
read the stop-time rule "so that the
inadmissibility part applies to permanent
residents seeking admission, and the
[removability] part applies to those
permanent residents in the United States
already, not seeking admission ...."

muddies up the statute—courts "should
prefer the plain meaning since that approach
respects the words of Congress." Because, as
we have explained, the statutory language
here is clear, it is unnecessary—and in the
Supreme Court's words, would be
"inappropriate"—to
apply
the
antisurplusage canon here.
Moreover, and in any event, Barton's
surplusage-based argument misunderstands
the stop-time rule's operation. Contrary to
Barton's assumption, answering "yes" to the
first question—whether the alien has
"committed an offense referred to in section
1182(a)(2)"—does not necessarily require a
"yes" to the second question—whether that
offense "renders the alien inadmissible ...
under section 1182(a)(2)." The reason is that
while the mere "commi[ssion]" of a
qualifying offense satisfies the prefatory
clause, actually "render[ing] the alien
inadmissible"
demands
more. Under §
1182(a)(2), an alien "is inadmissible"—here,
as a result of a "crime involving moral
turpitude"—only if he is "convicted of, or ...
admits having committed, or ... admits
committing acts which constitute the
essential elements of" the listed offense. In
short, while only commission is required at
step one, conviction (or admission) is
required at step two.

We reject Barton's argument for two reasons.
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly explained that the usual
"preference" for "avoiding surplusage
constructions is not absolute" and that
"applying the rule against surplusage is,
absent other indications, inappropriate" when
it would make an otherwise unambiguous
statute ambiguous. Rather, faced with a
choice between a plain-text reading that
renders a word or clause superfluous and an
interpretation that gives every word
independent meaning but, in the doing,

So contrary to Barton's contention, there is no
surplusage. The statutory language that he
assails as superfluous is in fact the second of
two independent requirements, both of which
are necessary to trigger the stop-time rule.
III
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For the foregoing reasons, we hold, per the
stop-time provision's plain language, that a
lawful-permanent-resident alien need not be
seeking admission to the United States
in order to be "render[ed] ... inadmissible."
Accordingly, the Board correctly concluded
that Barton is ineligible for cancellation of

removal because the stop-time rule—
triggered when he committed a crime
involving moral turpitude in January 1996—
ended his continuous residence a few months
shy of the required seven-year period.
PETITION DENIED.
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“High Court to Review Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents”
Bloomberg Law
Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson
April 22, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court could make it easier
for lawful permanent residents to remain in
the country after committing a crime.

The Ninth Circuit is the only one to hold that
immigrants can’t be “inadmissible” unless
they are actually seeking admission.

The justices agreed today to review an
Eleventh Circuit ruling regarding when
lawful permanent residents can obtain
discretionary “cancellation of removal.”

Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican citizen
and a lawful permanent U.S. resident, asked
the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute after
the Eleventh Circuit found that he was a few
months shy of qualifying for cancellation of
removal.

At issue is the “stop-time rule,” which pauses
the accumulation of the seven-year residency
requirement necessary to obtain cancellation.

The court agreed to take the case but likely
won’t hear it until next term, which begins in
October.

The rule is triggered, among other times,
whenever such non-citizens commit an
offense that renders them “inadmissible.”

There were an estimated 13.2 million lawful
permanent residents in the United States as of
January 2014, according to the Department of
Homeland Security.

The Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all said the rule is kicks in
regardless of whether an admitted immigrant
is seeking admission to the U.S.

The case is Barton v. Barr, U.S., No. 18-725,
review granted 4/22/19.
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“Court Finds Green Card Holder in the United States ‘Inadmissible’ for DecadesOld Crime”
Ramineni Shepard Legal Blog
Dayna Lally
September 25, 2018
On September 25, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit
found that a U.S. permanent resident (“green
card holder”) who has already been admitted
to the United States- and who isn’t currently
seeking admission or readmission- can, for
stop-time
purposes,
be
rendered
“inadmissible” by virtue of a qualifying
criminal conviction.

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations at §
1229b(a) gives the Attorney General the
discretion to cancel the removal of a lawful
permanent resident who (among other
conditions) “has resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status.” The continuousresidence requirement is, however, subject to
the so-called “stop-time rule.”

Andre Martello Barton, a native and citizen
of Jamaica, was initially admitted to the
United States on May 27, 1989 as a B-2
visitor. Approximately three (3) years later,
Barton adjusted his status to that of a lawful
permanent resident, On January 23, 1996,
Barton was arrested and charged with
aggravated assault, first-degree criminal
damage to property, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony.
He was convicted for all of the offenses in
July 1996.

The “stop-time rule”, embodied at §
1182(d)(1) of the Code of Federal
Regulations, provides that any period of
continuous residence in the United States is
deemed to end when the alien commits, or
has been convicted of, a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Barton argued to the Eleventh Circuit that the
language of the Immigration and Nationality
Act differentiates between those seeking
“admission” to the United States and those
already in the United States, and therefore,
that the inadmissibility part of the statute
should apply to permanent residents seeking
admission, and the removability part should
apply to those permanent residents in the
United States already, not seeking admission.

The Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) subsequently served Barton with a
notice to appear; charging him, among other
things, under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
for his conviction of two (2) crimes involving
moral turpitude not arising out of a single
scheme. Barton filed an application for
cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a).

The Eleventh Circuit panel unanimously
rejected Barton’s interpretation of the statute.
In its opinion, it performed a “state”-based
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textual analysis of the statute and found the
term “render” to mean “to cause to be or to
become.” The Eleventh Circuit used obscene
examples of the dictionary definition of
“render” to support its opinion that an alien
can be rendered inadmissible regardless of
whether he is actually seeking admission:

As of Tuesday, the Second, Third, Fifth, and
now Eleventh Circuit courts are of the
opinion that a lawful permanent resident need
not be seeking admission to the United States
in order to be “render[ed] … inadmissible.”
Barton’s attorney is considering petitioning
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case.
Ramineni Law Associates, LLC is closely
monitoring the proceedings and will provide
updates as they are available.

“… rot renders a piece of fish inedible
regardless of whether someone is trying to eat
it…
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“Green Card Holder Can’t Be ‘Inadmissible,’ High Court Told”
Law360
Suzanne Monyak
June 27, 2019
U.S. permanent residents can’t be “rendered
inadmissible” unless they are seeking
admission into the U.S., a Jamaican citizen
fighting his deportation told the U.S., a
Jamaican citizen fighting his deportation told
the U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday,
pushing an interpretation of the immigration
statute that has split the federal circuit courts.

Permanent residents are eligible for a form of
deportation relief called a cancellation of
removal if they have lived in the U.S.
continuously for at least seven years. But the
immigration judge found that Barton had
been “rendered inadmissible” by that 1996
crime just shy of reaching that seven-year
mark, even though he has lived in the U.S. for
nearly two decades by the time of the judge’s
decision.

Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican citizen
with a U.S. green card, argued in his opening
brief at the high court that he was not
“rendered inadmissible” more than two
decades ago by a firearms offense he
committed in 1996 when he was 18, as the
government has argued, because Barton had
already been legally admitted into the U.S. at
that time.

The idea that Barton was rendered
inadmissible because “hypothetically” in a
“counterfactual world” he would have been
inadmissible if he had needed to be
readmitted into the U.S. in “implausible,”
Barton told the justice.
“The government’s interpretation would
improperly rewrite the phrase ‘renders the
alien inadmissible’ as ‘could render a
hypothetical alien inadmissible,” Barton
argued.

The immigration courts’ finding that he was
in fact “rendered inadmissible,” which was
ultimately upheld by the Eleventh Circuit last
year, left Barton – now a father of four
American Children – unable to stop his
deportation years later under the so-called
stop-time rule, which stops the clock on the
number of years an immigrant accrues in the
U.S.

As an already admitted permanent resident,
Barton could only be rendered deportable,
not inadmissible, the brief says. And whether
an immigrant is “rendered” inadmissible or
deportable should refer to a decision that an
immigrant has just made, not to one that
hypothetically could have been made.

The panel’s interpretation has been rejected
by the Ninth Circuit but adopted by three
other circuit courts.
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The government’s interpretation of the law
would require immigration judges to decide
two removal hearings – the one at issue and
the hypothetical one – which would be
“irrational and inefficient,” the brief says.

Barton then filed an application for a
cancellation of removal as a permanent
resident who has resided in the U.S. since
1989. An immigration judge ruled that
Barton was not eligible for that relief because
his continuous residency ended in 1996,
when he was convicted of crimes that
rendered him inadmissible and triggered the
top-time rule.

“It is improbable that, buried in a provision
for computing the time period for continuous
residency, Congress inserted a requirement
for immigration judges to effectively restart
removal proceedings from scratch,” the brief
says.

Barton appealed, but both the appellate board
and Eleventh Circuit sided with the
immigration judge’s interpretation of the law.

The high court previously examined the stoptime rule in the 2018 case Pereira v. Sessions.
In that case, the justices ruled that the
government’s notices to appear in
immigration court served to immigrants must
include a hearing’s time and place
information to be valid under the stop-time
rule.

Conducting a word-by-word analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit panel applied what is called
a “’state’-based understanding” of the
language, noting that words that end in “able” and “-ible” indicated an individual’s
character or status.
Under that interpretation, the panel said in its
September opinion, essentially, a person does
not need to act on his or her status in order to
be rendered that status.

According to court filings, Barton entered the
U.S. on a visitor visa in 1989 as a child and
became a legal permanent resident three
years later. In January 1996, he was arrested
and charged with aggravated assault,
property damage and possession of a firearm.
He was convicted of those three offenses later
that year.

“A terminal illness renders its victim
untreatable regardless of whether she is
actively seeking treatment; not renders a
piece of fish inedible regardless of whether
someone is trying to eat it; sheer weight
renders a car immovable regardless of
whether someone is trying to move it. You
get the point. So too here – an alien can be
rendered inadmissible regardless of whether
he is actually seeking admission,” the opinion
said.

He was later charged and convicted of drug
offenses under the Georgia Controlled
Substances Act in 2007 and 2008, prompting
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to
initiate deportation proceedings against him
for being convicted of crimes “involving
more turpitude,” as defined by the
Immigration and Nationality Act.

Represented by attorneys with Jenner &
Block LLP, Barton then petitioned the
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Supreme Court in December to weigh in and
resolve the split, arguing that the Eleventh
Circuit panel got it wrong, The justices
agreed to take up the case in April.

Block LLP and H. Glenn Fogle Jr. of The
Fogle Law LLC.
The government is represented by Solicitor
General Noel J. Francisco and Joseph H.
Hunt, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley
and Timothy G. Hayes of the DOJ.

Counsel for Barton declined to comment, and
a Department of Justice spokesperson did not
return a request for comment Thursday.

The case is Andre Martello Barton v. William
P.. Barr, case number 18-725, in the U.S.
Supreme Court.

Barton is represented by Adam G.
Unikowsky and Lauren J. Hartz of Jenner &
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“Green Card Holder Can’t Be ‘Inadmissible,’ High Court Told”
Law360
Nicole Narea
April 22, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to take up a case to determine whether a U.S.
permanent resident can be “rendered
inadmissible” under the Immigration and
Nationality Act even if the individual is not
seeking admission into the country.

immigration court served to immigrants must
include a hearing’s time and place
information to be valid under the stop-time
rule.
Barton had argued in his petition for a writ of
certiorari that the case wan an ideal vehicle to
resolve the circuit split because the lower
court rulings had “turned entirely on [their]
interpretation of the stop-time rule.”

The Eleventh Circuit had found in September
2018 that Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican
citizen could not dodge a deportation order
through a cancellation of removal — a form
of relief available to permanent residents who
have lived continuously in the U.S. for at
least seven years — because he was rendered
inadmissible before reaching that seven-year
mark. Barton had petitioned the high court to
review the decision in December 2018.

Barton also asserted that, under the stop-time
rule, a noncitizen who has already been
admitted to the U.S. cannot be later found to
be inadmissible – only deportable. He
acknowledged that certain circumstanced
would require that authorities reevaluate a
noncitizen’s admission, such as when they
relinquish their green card, but said that he
had done no such thing.

Under the appeals court’s interpretation of
the INA’s language, which has been rejected
by the Ninth Circuit but adopted by three
other circuit courts, Barton — who entered
the U.S. in May 1989 — became
inadmissible in January 1996 when he was
convicted of a crime, cutting off his required
continuous residence under the so-called
stop-time rule.

“[Barton] was not ‘rendered inadmissible’ by
his 1996 offense,” his petition for a writ of
certiorari states. “He had already been
admitted to the United States and did not need
to be readmitted … [O]nce the alien has been
“lawfully admitted,’ he cannot be “rendered
inadmissible.”

The high court previously examined the stoptime rule in the 2018 case Pereira v. Sessions.
In that case, the justices ruled that the
government’s notices to appear in

Barton had additionally claimed that the
appeals court’s interpretation of the stop-time
rule is “inconsistent with the structure of
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federal immigration law.” He noted that the
INA does not discuss the idea of being
“inadmissible”
in
contexts
outside
noncitizens seeking admission to the country,
as the appeals court has done.

1989. An immigration judge ruled that
Barton was not eligible for the relief because
his continuous residency ended in 1996,
when he was convicted of crimes that
rendered him inadmissible and triggered the
stop-time rule.

According to court filings, Barton entered the
U.S. on a visitor visa in 1989 as a child and
because a legal permanent resident three
years later. In January 1996, he was arrested
and charged with aggravated assault,
property damage and possession of a firearm.
He was convicted of those three offenses later
that year.

The BIA rejected his appeal, as did the
Eleventh Circuit.
Counsel for Barton and a representative for
the DOJ did not immediately respond to
requests for comment on Monday.
Barton is represented by H. Glenn Fogle Jr.
of the Fogle Law Firm LLC and Adam
Unikowsky and Jonathan Langlinais of
Jenner & Block LLC.

He was later charged and convicted of drug
offenses under the Georgia Controlled
Substances Act in 2007 and 2008, prompting
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to
initiate deportation proceedings against him
for being convicted of crimes “involving
moral turpitude,” as defined by the INA.

The government is represented by Solicitor
General Noel Francisco of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
The case is Barton v. Barr, case number 18725 in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Barton then filed an application for a
cancellation of removal as a permanent
resident who has resided in the U.S. since
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